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SUMMARY
This study is concerned with one of the most 
critical issues for developing countries today - the 
international technology transfer process. While there 
appears to be no concensus on what technology is, it 
seems widely recognized that technology is an essential 
factor in the industrialisation process. In recent 
years, some developing countries have become 
increasingly aware of the importance of technology, 
advocating the transference of technological resources, 
in an attempt to "leapfrog" the long period of 
technological evolution of the advauiced nations, and 
accelerate their industrialisation process.
This research represents both a theoretical 
and an empirical attempt to understand the positive 
aspects of the technology transfer phenomenon. The 
major contributions of the study reported here are the 
following:
a) It proposes a broad conceptual framework 
for analyzing international technology 
transfer transactions on an
enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
b) It clarifies the concepts of technology 
and technology transfer.
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c) It describes the Brazilian pilot 
experience of transferring computer
technology for the establishment of a 
computer production capability.
The results of this study suggest that the 
process of transferring tangible, intangible, 
proprietary cind non-proprietary technological resources 
needed to establish an industrial production capability 
in another country is a dynaunic, complex,
multi-dimentional phenomenon, involving a variety of 
mutually interacting variables. These have been 
identified as contractual, individual, organizational, 
environmental, technological, transmiseion-mechanisms, 
resource-flow, and time-related variables.
In general, the technology transfer 
transaction was found to be an exchange of economic and 
technical interests between the technology-supplying 
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In recent years, there has been an increasing 
interest focussed on the study of technology transfer 
between industrialized and developing countries. While 
there appears to be no universal agreement on what 
technology is, or how it can be measured, at the same 
time, it seems widely recognized that technology is a 
key factor in the industrialisation process. As one 
study by the United Nations points out,
"Technology has an essential role to play in 
reducing the disparities that exist between 
the developing and the developed countries. 
Computers are especially important in this 
context, because so memy computer 
applications have a direct bearing on some of 
the main facets of the development process
and reflect certain aspects of the technology 
that has facilitated the growth of the
economically advanced countries" (United
Nations, 1971:13).
This research is concerned with the process 
of transferring technology internationally. The concept
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of technology transfer is not new. Over two hundred 
years ago, Adam Smith seemed to recognize the 
socio-economic and political importance of what today 
would be called international transfer of technology. 
Within the context of the eighteenth century, he 
referred to the transmission, by the European 
colonists, of "Knowledge", "Skills", "Talents" and 
"Abilities", giving the colonies of Europeam nations 
an opportunity to advance "... more rapidly to wealth 
and greatness thaui any other humam society" (Smith, 
1776:231).
Between the seventeenth aind the eighteenth 
century, the manner through which the Europeam 
industrial technologies were tramsmitted throughout the 
world had importaint implications in terms of subsequent 
industrialization and development. According to 
Furtado (1964) the expansion of Europeam technology 
proceeded in the following directions:
1. Western Europeam countries. The
endogenous development amd introduction of a 
series of inventions amd manufacturing 
techniques transformed the socio- economic 
structure of these countries. In general, 
the technological variable not only chamged 
the artisam economy of the mercantile system.
—  3 -
but also determined the development prospects 
of these economies.
2. The Colonies of Europe. The colonists who 
migrated to America, Australia and Camada 
tramsformed these regions into extensions of 
the Europeam economies. Basically due to the 
transference of skills, amd the relative 
abundance of natural resources, the colonies 
soon achieved relatively high levels of 
industr ialization.
3. Other Regions of the World. As a result 
of the industrial development in maritime 
transportation amd the expansion of 
international trade, some forms of Europeam 
technology eventually reached other parts of 
the world. However, since the links between 
these regions amd the technologically 
advanced economies were intermittent, amd 
sometimes restricted to trading
relationships, the spread , of European 
technology aunong these parts of the world was 
uneven.
Presently, developing countries have become 
increasingly aware of the technological gap (Kuznets,
—  4 —
1972; OECD, 1968, 1970, 1981, Denison, 1967;
Servan-Schreiber, 1968; Furtado, 1964, 1970) between
them and the industrialized nations. According to a 
study prepared by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, (UNCTAD, 1979) in 
technologically dynamic, research intensive sectors, 
such as aircraft; space; electronics, petrochemical and 
chemical industries, the general technological gap 
between developed and developing countries is more 
intensified and considerably wide. The saune study 
suggests that, in view of the rate of technological 
change in these sectors, the technological distauice is 
likely to increase.
In the last decades, in am attempt to reduce 
the technological gap amd to promote am accelerated 
industrialization process in developing countries, 
international organizations amd Governments of less 
industrialized nations have dedicated considerable 
attention to the possibility of transferring 
technologies from the industrialized countries. 
(United Nations, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1978; OECD,
1974, 1975, 1981; Hawthorne, 1971; Jequier, 1976;
Araujo, 1977, Germidis, 1977). Sometimes, reducing the 
technological gap is considered so critical for the 
extremely poor countries, that it virtually meams the 
difference between starvation and prosperity.
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(Livingstone, 1975) In general, the rationale for 
transferring technologies from abroad is presented as 
an attempt to "leapfrog" the long period of 
technological evolution of the advanced nations and 
spare the slow process of inventing things de integro. 
(Myrdal, 1981; Raju, 1973).
Traditionally, Brazil has been known as a 
commodity exporter. However, Brazil is now considered 
as the leading industrial producer in the Third World, 
mainly because of its extremely rapid economic growth 
during the last two decades. (OECD, 1979:214). Despite 
being characterized a "Newly Industrializing Country" 
for its shifts in the pattern of output and trade, 
Brazil is still modernizing through investments in 
basic industrial sectors of high technological content 
such as the electronics, capital goods, steel, 
metallurgical, chemical and petrochemical industries, 
which largely depend on the transmission of 
manufacturing, product cuid management technologies from 
abroad.
According to the development plans of the 
Brazilian Government, technology trsuisfer was expected 
to play a key role in the modernization of the 
industrial structure of the country. In an attempt to 
transform Brazil into a developed nation in the period 
of one generation. The First National Development Plan
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(1972-1974) considered technology as a critical factor 
for the country's industrialization process. (Brazil, 
Presidency of the Republic, 1971)
Among other things, the plaui envisaged the 
implementation of a National Technological Policy, 
based on the acquisition of foreign technology for what 
Thomas (1977:183) calls "key sectors of technology such 
as aero-space and computers".
Regarding the computer sector, Brazil's total 
dependence on foreign computer technology, the observed 
growth in demand for computers, national policies, 
among other factors, led the Government to consider the 
creation of a digital minicomputer industry as a 
priority project for the industrial development of the 
country. In this context, the transfer of computer 
manufacturing technology was expected to play a pivotal 
role in the estaüalishment of an indigenous computer 
industry. The Basic Plan for Scientific suid 
Technological Development stated:
"MINICOMPUTER INDUSTRY
This project will result in the establishment 
in Brazil of a minicomputer industry through 
association of the Government with national 
firms and foreign manufacturers. This will
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permit the immediate transfer to Brazil of 
pioneering industrial technology, comprising 
a continuing flow of foreign technology that 
would be rapidly assimilated and absorbed." 
(Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 1973:61)
The Government's strategy for the period 
1975-1979, stated in the Second National Development 
Plan, utilized a similar approach regarding the 
acquisition of foreign technologies for the computer 
industry and other sectors of high technological 
content such as the chemical, steel, aeronautical and 
capital goods industries. In addition, the plan 
emphasized the need for absorbing, adapting, and 
creating technologies, so that, gradually the country's 
own technological capabilities would be developed.
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1.2 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The international technology transfer is an 
extremely broad and complex subject which can be 
studied from a technical, economic, cultural, 
educational, legal, managerial point of view and from 
many other perspectives and academic disciplines. The 
present research was intended to deal with two aspects 
of technology transfer. First, the multidisciplinary 
aspects of technology transfer, particularly the 
multiplicity of variables involved in the process of 
transferring technology from one place to another. 
Second, the managerial and regulatory policy issues 
posed by contractual arrangements for the transfer of 
technology. The scope of the study was restricted to 
the positive aspects of technology transfer and no 
attempt was made to deal with normative issues such 
as the adequacy of the technology in relation to the 
needs of the receiving country, etc.
A review of the literature indicated the lack 
of an adequate conceptual fraunework for analyzing the 
process of transferring technological resources 
internationally and a general lack of consensus 
concerning the concepts of technology and technology 
transfer. Many different interpretations and meanings 
were found to be associated with the notion of
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technology. The term originally used to designate an
"art" or a "techna" in the contexts of the Greek and
Latin cultures today has acquired wide connotations.
Perhaps, reflecting the lack of agreement surrounding 
the meaning of technology, the expression "technology 
transfer" also means different things to theorists and 
users in various disciplines and field of activity.
For the purposes of this study, broad 
conceptions of technology and technology transfer were 
adopted, partially based on the United Nations' 
(1972,1979) definitions of the matter.
Technology was considered as an essential
input for production, comprising tangible, intangible, 
proprietary and non-proprietary elements of technology 
in the form of capital and intermediary goods, human 
resources and information. In general, these elements 
of technology will be referred to as technological 
resources.
Technology Transfer was considered as the 
process by which one organization transmits to another 
the technological resources necessary for the 
manufacture of a product, the implementation of a 
process, or the rendering of a service.
Except where otherwise stated, the above 
definitions of technology and technology transfer will 
be utilized throughout this study.
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1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Considering the lack of an adequate 
theoretical fraunework for explaining the process by 
which technological resources are transferred from 
enterprises located in industrialized countries to 
enterprises in less- industrialized nations, the major 
objectives of this research are:
a) To provide a general theoretical framework 
for the study of international technology 
transfer transactions on an
enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
b) To describe the Brazilian pilot experience 
of transferring computer technology for the 
establishment of a computer production 
capability.
Thus, this research represents an effort to 
make a theoretical and aui empirical contribution to the 
current state of knowledge with respect to technology 
transfer. The first research objective attempts to 
combine a number of existing empirical observations and 
conceptual formulations into a comprehensive model for 
analyzing the factors .cxnd conditions which may affect 
the transmission of technology from a business
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enterprise to another. The second research objective 
attempts to develop a case study of technology transfer 
focussed on a specific sector of activity auid industry. 
We have chosen to develop this case study within the 
context of a technologically dynsunic industry and a 
Newly Industrializing Country. By concentrating on the 
Brazilian experience of transferring computer 
technology, it was believed that this would provide 
further insights into the rather unclear process of 
transferring technological resources across national 
borders.
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1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
This dissertation is presented in nine 
chapters, as follows:
CHAPTER 1 contains a general introduction to 
the research, and a statement of the objectives of the 
study.
CHAPTER 2 presents the conceptual overview of 
technology and technology transfer, identifies some 
channels and mechanisms for transferring various 
elements of technology, summarizes a number of factors 
presumed to influence the transfer process and presents 
the theoretical model which served to guide the 
empirical study to be presented in the remaining part 
of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 3 deals with the research design and 
methods utilized in this research, presents the 
hypotheses derived from the literature and the 
conceptual model, describes the sources of information 
and the procedure for the collection of data, provides 
operational definitions of the variables gathered 
through the interview guide, cind discusses the methods 
employed for analyzing data and presenting the results.
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CHAPTER 4 gives an idea of the Brazilian 
environment in the period 1970-1980, describes the 
evolution of the domestic and external economic 
sectors, discusses some conjunctural and structural 
aspects of the economy, and presents the regulatory 
framework on technology trainsfer transactions.
CHAPTER 5 provides an overview of the 
evolution of the computer market in Brazil in the 
period 1970-1980, presents some characteristics of the 
computer sector, and identifies the main institutional 
mechanisms for Government intervention.
CHAPTER 6 describes the development of events 
in Brazil, leading to the creation of COBRA, a 
tripartite joint-venture formed by the State, a local 
company and a foreign technology-supplier.
CHAPTER 7 analyzes the contractual 
arrangement between Cobra cind the supplier of 
technology, and the mechanisms utilized for the 
transmission of technology. It includes an overview of 
the terms and conditions under which the technological 
resources have been transmitted, the forms of 
technology involved, the duration of the agreement, 
trade marks, information on technological improvements, 
training of human resources, technical assistance.
— 14 —
rates of royalty and the settlement of disputes.
CHAPTER 8 presents the results obtained from 
testing the hypotheses related to the perceptions of 
factors affecting the transfer process held by both 
supplier cind recipient.
CHAPTER 9 summarizes the conclusions derived 
from the previous chapters, presents the limitations of 
the research and suggests some areas for further study.
OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The major aim of this chapter is to establish 
a theoretical framework for analyzing the process of 
transferring technology internationally, on on an 
enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
The concepts of technology and technology 
transfer will be discussed in an attempt to derive 
operational definitions for the purpose of this 
research and to clarify the wide range of perceptions 
regarding the nature of technology and the transfer 
process. In addition, some channels cind mechanisms for 
transferring various elements of technology will be 
identified, a list of factors presumed to influence the 
technology transfer process will be derived from the 
existing literature and will be integrated into a 
conceptual model.
2.2 THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY
The term technology, as it is known today, 
seems to have been, another contribution of ancient 
Greece to western civilization. The etymology of the 
word technology suggests that the term derived from the
— 16 —
Greek language. According to a nineteenth century 
edition of Webster's dictionary, technology represented 
a combination of the Greek conception of "art" ( Texvn ) 
and "discourse" (Xoyos) . Thus, technology primarily 
meant "a description of, or a treatise on the useful 
arts" (Webster, 1853: 1358). Webster also pointed out
that the Greek word for art derives from the same root 
as that of the verbs to bring forth and to produce. An 
earlier translation of the adjective "technical" 
referred to the same Greek word root for art and 
described it as "belonging to the arts" (Johnson, 
1778).
The meaning of "art" (ars) in the context of 
the Latin language was associated with skill, 
knowledge, artifice, cunning, trick, way or means, 
trade, business, and even the concepts of power cuid 
virtue. The notion of technique (techna) was referred 
to as "a craft" and as "a trick". (Entick, 1770). The 
term "technicus" (Technical) was described simply as a 
"vocabulum arti proprium". Webster's nineteenth 
century English description of the adjective technical 
was "of, or pertaining to, the useful or mechanic arts" 
(Webster, 1853: 1358)
The idea of the term "art" being semauitically 
connected with the verb "to produce" may help to 
explain why later connotations of technology have been.
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sometimes, associated with industrial production 
activities. For instance, Adam Smith's "Inquire into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" uses
the expression "useful arts", perhaps to signify
industrial manufacturing technologies, or the "mechanic 
arts". Commenting on the causes of the prosperity of 
the new colonies of Europe, in relation to other 
civilizations which did not have the advantages of 
acquiring various technologies through the immigration 
of European colonists, he stated:
"The colony of a civilized nation which takes 
possession either of a waste country, or of 
one so thinly inhabited that the natives
easily give place to the new settlers, 
advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness 
than any other human society. The colonies 
carry out with them a knowledge of 
agriculture cind of other useful arts, 
superior to what can grow up of its own 
accord, in the course of many centuries, 
among savage and barbarous nations" (Smith, 
1776:231).
Adam Smith's notion of technology is 
expressed under a variety of terms. He often referred 
to it as knowledge, arts, skills, talents, abilities.
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ingenuity, among other things. Specifically, he 
classed the "wealth" of a society under three 
categories, encompassing some forms of tangible and 
intangible technologies, as follows:
1. That reserved for immediate consumption, 
without any profit purposes, i.e. food,
clothing, household furniture, etc.
2. That represented by the fixed capital of 
the society, used for the production of a 
revenue. This category was subdivided into 
four items:
2.1 Machines and instruments of labour. 
Perhaps, using a modern terminology these may 
be referred to as technology in the form of 
capital and intermediary goods. (United 
Nations, 1972). In general, these are
excimples of tangible, embodied or implicit 
technologies.
2.2 Buildings and edifices used for
industrial purposes and providing a revenue
for its proprietors.
2.3 Agricultural improvements of farms. 
Included in this item are the application of
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agricultural technologies which might improve 
the soil's productivity, and increase the 
revenue of the proprietors.
2.4 The abilities, talents «ind skills of the 
members of the society, acquired, at a cost 
by education, study or apprenticeship. 
Presently, these intangible "arts" are the
object of know-how agreements in
international markets for technology. They 
usually constitute the flow of explicit
technologies among advcinced and less
industrialized nations, and in the literature 
are described as technologies in the form of 
human labour. (United Nations, 1972).
3. That represented by the circulating 
capital of the society. It consisted of
money in circulation, raw materials,
intermediate inputs and stocks.
The notion of technology as a special
category of resource seems to have been stated by some 
of Adam Smith's followers in a variety of ways. 
Discussing the theory of comparative costs in foreign 
trade, David Ricardo used the terms "arts", 
"machinery", "knowledge" and "skills" to emphasize the
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technological variables in his analysis. One passage 
of the "Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" 
states :
"Of two countries having precisely the same 
population, and the same quantity of land of 
equal fertility in cultivation, with the same 
knowledge too of agriculture, the prices of 
raw produce will be highest in that where the 
greater skill, and the better machinery is 
used in the manufacture of exportable 
commodities. The rate of profits will 
probably differ but little; for wages, or the 
real reward of the labourer, may be the same 
in both; but those wages, as well as raw 
produce, will be rated higher in money in 
that country, into which, from the advantages 
attending their skill and machinery, eui 
abundance of money is imported in exchange 
for their goods". (Ricardo, 1817:123).
Alfred Marshall considered technology, or 
"knowledge", as the "most powerful" resource of 
production. Presenting his view on the classification 
of the agents of production, Marshall stated:
"The agents of production are commonly
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classed as Land, Labour and Capital. By Land 
is meant the material and the forces which
Nature gives freely for man's aid, in land
and water, in air and light and heat. By
Labour is meant the economic work of man, 
whether with the hand or the head. By
Capital is meant all stored-up provision for 
the production of material goods, and for the 
attainment of those benefits which are
commonly reckoned as part of income. It is 
the main stock of wealth regarded as am agent 
of production rather tham as a direct source 
of gratification. Capital consists in a
great part of knowledge amd organization: amd 
of this some part is private property amd
other part is not. Knowledge is our most 
powerful engine of production; it enables us 
to subdue Nature amd force her to satisfy our 
wants". (Marshall, 1890: 213).
More recent conceptualizations of technology 
also seem to include implicitly or explicitly, the 
notion of knowledge. For instance, according to John 
Galbraith, (1967:31) "Technology meams the systematic 
application of scientific or other organized knowledge 
to practical tasks". Gruber and Marquis (1969:255) see
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technology as "the meams or capacity to perform a 
particular activity" while Quinn (1969:148) defines it 
as "knowledge about physical relationships
systematically applied to useful purposes". The United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, suggests 
that technology or know-how is
"The sum of knowledge, experience amd skills 
necessary for manufacturing a product or 
products amd for establishing am enterprise 
for this purpose". (UNIDO, 1973:1).
Pearlmutter (1976:12) notes three additional 
definitions of technology, mentioned by Contreras : 
(1975:5)
"Technology may be defined as a set of 
instruments or tools, materials, know-how amd 
abilities which are used to satisfy the 
community needs and to increase its control 
over the environment". (Herrera, 1973).
"The ordered set of skills which is applied 
in the production amd marketing of goods amd 
services, amd which is integrated not only by 
scientific knowledge coming from the
natural, social amd human sciences but also 
by empirical knowledge stemming from
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observations, experience, certain abilities, 
tradition, etc. " (Sabato, 1972).
"Organized knowledge for production" (Sachs, 
1973).
Some conceptions of technology seem to be 
increasingly associated with knowledge and software 
rather than machinery. For instance, assuming that the 
term technology is usually identified with its physical 
embodiments, such as hardware and other equipment. 
Doctors points out that this view is changing. He 
suggests that the intangible elements of technical 
knowledge such as techniques, managerial skills, 
information and computer programs are also being 
incorporated into the concept. As he puts it,
"... we tend to view technology primarily in 
terms of machines and physical tools, that 
is, hardware. Increasingly, however, such 
software as systems concepts, management 
control techniques, amd computer programs may 
all be viewed as being as much a part of the 
common store of technology as a rocket 
vehicle or a linear accelerator". (Doctors, 
1969:3-4)
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A similar argument is put forward by Harvey 
Brooks. In addition, he suggests that technology 
should be viewed from a sociotechnical rather tham 
technical perspective. He argues that:
"It has been traditional to define technology 
in terms of its physical embodiments, as 
novel physical objects created by mam to 
fulfill certain humam purposes. In my 
opinion, this is too limited a view amd one 
that is becoming increasingly obsolete 
technology must be sociotechnical rather tham 
technical amd a technology must include the 
managerial amd social supporting systems 
necessary to apply it on a significant scale 
... It seems to me that the defining feature 
of technology is that it is "public 
knowledge" in the sense proposed by J. M. 
Zimam (1968) with respect to science. But 
rather tham knowledge of how amd why things 
are as they are, it is knowledge of how to 
fulfill certain humam purposes in a 
specifiable amd reproducible way 
Technology therefore, does not consist of 
artifacts but of the public knowledge that 
underlies the artifacts amd the way they cam
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be used in society. Management, insofar as 
it can be described by fully specifiable 
rules, is thus a technology and indeed every 
large bureaucratic organization can be 
considered an embodiment of technology just 
as much as a piece of machinery" (Brooks, 
1981: 35-36).
Recognizing the wide variety of connotations 
associated with the term technology, Livingstone offers 
three alternative definitions of the matter as follows:
"Technology consists of a patent or a group 
of patents and the relevant knowhow to use 
the patents. In this most precise of 
definitions it is something which cam be 
specifically licensed"
"More generally, and at a lower level it may 
simply be skills possessed by craftsmen or 
tradesmen"
"The most general definition of all sees 
technology as basic education, combined with 
am attitude of mind which favours chamge both 
as inevitable amd desirable" (Livingstone, 
1975:116-117)
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In 1971, the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs of the United Nations defined technology 
simply as "the knowledge of the industrial arts". 
(United Nations, 1971:13). In the following year, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
provided a comprehensive definition. It considered 
technology as "as essential input for production", 
(United Nations, 1972:5) which may be bought and sold 
in international markets, in the following forms:
a) Capital and Intermediary goods. These 
include machinery, parts, components, other 
production equipment, inputs, etc.
b) Human Labour. The various categories of 
semi-skilled, skilled and highly specialized 
manpower which may be used for operating the 
productive system.
c) Information. This includes proprietary 
and non-proprietary information such as 
specifications, drawings, process
instructions, design standards, testing 
standards, maintenance and repair procedures, 
layout of production systems, etc.
It seems that one of the main features of the 
United Nations' definition was to reduce technology to
- 27 -
a "commodity" with three dimensions. As such, it can 
be the object of transactions and analyses at its 
material, human and informative levels.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development stresses the difficulty in finding an 
all-embracing definition for technology, since the term 
involves tangible and intangible elements such as 
machinery, processes, techniques, skills and 
information and even a "technology culture". The 
cultural aspects of technology, apparently less 
discussed in the literature on international transfers 
seem, nevertheless, important. The OECD study 
suggests that "it is on such a "culture that the proper 
functioning of a given technical system ultimately 
depends" (OECD, 1981:18). Considering the cultural 
dimension of technology, the OECD's study notes that 
technology may be def ined as :
"The use of knowledge by a given society at a 
given moment to resolve concrete problems 
facing its development, drawing mainly on the 
means at its disposal, in accordance with its 
culture and scale of values" (OECD, 1978).
However, this concept of technology places 
the use of knowledge in a wider sociological amd 
anthropological perspective, beyond the scope of this
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research. The relationship between man, technology amd 
the environment has been discussed by Childe, (1956) 
amd the relationship between technology, mam, society 
amd cultural values has been analyzed by Goulet (1977).
A narrower view of technology, applied in 
industrial contexts was also provided by the OECD:
"Technology meams . systematic knowledge for 
the mamufacture of a product, for the 
application of a process or for rendering of 
a service, including amy integrally 
associated managerial amd marketing
techniques". (OECD, 1981:18).
This notion of technology as a form of 
knowledge rather tham hardware (Doctors, 1969; Brooks, 
1981) emphasizes intangible elements of technoloçfy, 
(Gabriel, 1972) such as technical amd managerial 
elements of knowledge incorporated in humam resources 
amd techniques. A similar view of technology was 
adopted in the draft Code of Conduct on the tramsfer of 
technology. (UNCTAD, 1979).
Wallender also conceptualizes technology as a 
type of knowledge. He defines technology as "the 
knowledge or know-how necessary for the productive 
functioning of am organization". (Wallender, 1979:97). 
Considering the various forms of technical knowledge
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needed to operate an industrial enterprise, based on
Peno's (1975) previous research, Wallender suggests the
following categorisation of technology in terms of 
knowledge :
1. General knowledge refers to society's 
common fund of knowledge, which may be
publicly available through newspapers, books, 
academic literature, professional
organizations, universities, etc.
2. Industry Specific Knowledge: Refers to the 
technical knowledge which is common to most 
firms within an industry. This type of 
knowledge is necessary for manufacturing a 
product or implementing a process which is 
generally known by the firms within the 
industry, i.e. in the computer industry, how 
to assemble peripherals.
3. System Specific Knowledge: Refers to the 
technical knowledge necessary to produce a 
specific product, or manage a process. For 
instance, how to manufacture computers 
designed for process control applications.
4. Firm Specific Knowledge: Refers to the 
unique technical knowledge possessed by a
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firm within the industry. This special 
production process knowledge or know-how 
derives from the firm's own capabilities and 
often represents a competitive advamtage over 
other firms, i.e. Ferranti's Uncommitted 
Logic Array microprocessor.
5. Ongoing Problem-Solving Capability: refers 
to the firm's acquired know-how derived from 
experience in solving production problems on 
a continuing basis.
Synthesizing the discussion on the concept of 
technology:
1. The wide variety of notions of technology 
seems to suggest that there is no conceptual agreement 
on the idea of technology. The term originally used to 
designate an "art" or a "techna", in the contexts of 
the Greek and Latin cultures, today has acquired many 
connotations. Perhaps, the notion of knowledge 
associated with many perceptions of technology is a 
common element between old and new conceptions and 
def initions.
2. For the purposes of this research, a 
broad concept of technology will be adopted.
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Technology will be considered as "éui essential input 
for production" (United Nations, 1972:5), comprising 
tangible, intangible, proprietary aind non-proprietary 
elements of technological knowledge in the following 
forms :
a) CAPITAL AND INTERMEDIARY GOODS. These 
refer to technology embodied in
technology-intensive goods such as computer 
equipment, peripherals, modules, hardware, 
etc.
b) HUMAN RESOURCES. These refer to 
technology incorporated as knowledge, 
experience, skills and know-how of 
engineering, technical, administrative, and 
managerial resources.
c) INFORMATION. This refers to scientific, 
engineering and managerial technology 
disembodied in data, programs documents, 
specifications, written testing procedures, 
standards, formulae, manufacturing
instructions, product designs, lay-outs, etc.
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2.3 THE CONCEPT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Over two hundred years ago, Adam Smith seemed 
to have a relatively clear understanding of the
economic importance of what today would be called, 
international transfer of technology. Within the
context of the mercantile system of the eighteenth
century, the expansion of international trade and the
maritime revolution, Adam Smith stated in the Wealth of 
Nations ;
"The discovery of America, and that of a 
passage to the East Indies by the Cape of
Good Hope, are the two greatest cuid most 
important events recorded in the history of 
mankind. Their consequences have already
been great; but in the short period of 
between two and three centuries which has
elapsed since these discoveries were made, it 
is impossible that the whole extent of their 
consequences can have been seen. By uniting 
in some measure, the most distant parts of 
the world, by enabling them to relieve one
another's wants, to increase one another's 
enjoyments and to encourage one another's 
industry, their general tendency would seem
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to be beneficial ... At the particular time 
when these discoveries were made, the 
superiority of force happened to be great on 
the side of the Europeans ... Hereafter, 
perhaps, ... the inhabitauits of all the 
different quarters of the world may arrive at 
that equality of courage auid force which, by 
inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe the 
injustice of independent nations into some 
sort of respect for the rights of one 
another. But nothing seems more likely to 
establish this equality of force, thaui that 
mutual communication of knowledge, and of all 
sorts of improvements, which an extensive 
commerce from all countries to all countries 
naturally, or rather necessarily, carries 
along with it." (Smith, 1776:259).
Thus, for Adam Smith, the "mutual 
communications of knowledge cUid of all sorts of 
improvements" seemed to be a "natural consequence" of 
international trade between Europe and the colonies. 
The notion of technology transfer associated with the 
trade of commodities appears to refer to the 
transmission of technologies embodied in products. 
However, in another passage, he gives an example of
— 34 —
transfer of technology embodied in human resources. 
Discussing the way in which different countries 
acquired the capability to manufacture certain 
products, such as silks, velvets and brocades, Adam 
Smith stated:
"In 1310, nine hundred families were driven 
out of Lucca, of whom thirty-one retired to 
Venice, amd offered to introduce there the 
silk manufacture. Their offer was accepted 
many privileges were conferred upon them, and 
they begun the manufacture with three hundred 
workmen". (Smith, 1776:166).
In today's terminology, the migration of 
technologists, carrying with them the technical and 
managerial knowledge necessary to organize
manufacturing activities, is sometimes referred to as a 
"brain drain". (United Nations, 1972).
The Draft Code of Conduct on Trauisfer of 
Technology proposed by the Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD V) considered trauisf er of 
technology in terms of a transaction occurring between 
parties, involving the transmittal of "systematic 
knowledge". The comprehensive definition adopted under
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the code was :
"The trémsfer of systematic knowledge for the 
manufacture of a product, for the application 
of a process or for the rendering of a 
service and does not extend to the 
transactions involving the mere sale or the 
mere lease of goods.
Transfer of technology transactions are 
arrangements between parties involving 
transfer of technology, ... particularly in 
each of the following cases;
a) The assignment, sale and licensing of all 
forms of industrial property, except for 
trademarks, service naunes and trade names 
when they are not part of transfer of 
technology transactions;
b) The provision of know-how and technical 
expertise in the form of feasibility studies, 
plauis, diagrams, models, instructions, 
guides, formulae, basic or detailed 
engineering designs, specifications and 
equipment for training, services involving 
technical advisory and managerial personnel, 
and personnel training;
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c) The provision of technological knowledge 
necessary for the installation, operation and 
functioning of plant auid equipment, and 
turn-key projects;
d) The provision of technological knowledge 
necessary to acquire, install and use 
machinery, equipment, itermediate goods 
and/or raw materials which have been acquired 
by purchase, lease or other means ;
e) The provision of technological contents of 
industrial =uid technical contents of
industrial auid technical co-operation
arrangements". (UNCTAD, 1979: 3-4).
Edgar Hardy considers technology transfer a 
misleading expression. As he puts it, "The image of
moving on transferring something from one area to
another is totally erroneous. It is more like
supplying a piece to an intricate and difficult puzzle 
or supplying the seed from which a tree may grow". 
(Hardy, 1974:187). He sees technology transfer as "a 
special case of the human communication problem", and 
defines it as "Communication for innovation between 
areas or organizations with different specific
objectives". There seems to be two points in this
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definition which are not found in most views on 
technology transfer. First, in relation to the auialogy 
between technology transfer and the communication act. 
Since both processes involve a sender, a message or the 
technology, a medium and a recipient, the analogy 
appears to be reasonable. Second, in relation to the 
specific objectives of the organizations involved in 
the technological transaction. Assuming that the 
transferring and recipient organizations may have 
different objectives, this seems to be an important 
variable in the relationship between the parties.
Recognizing the difficulties involved in 
finding a precise definition for the expression 
technology transfer, a study prepared by Cooper and 
Sercovitch for the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, proposed that:
"The trauisfer of technology from advanced to 
developing countries may be taken to cover 
the transfer of those elements of technical 
knowledge which are normally required in 
setting up auid in operating new production 
facilities or in extending existing ones - 
and which are characteristically in very 
short supply (and often totally absent) in 
the developing countries" (Cooper and
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Sercovitch, 1971:6).
The elements of technical knowledge included 
in this concept of technology transfer were classed 
into two groups, as follows:
1. Those needed in the pre-investment and 
construction stage, such as:
1.1 For the elaboration of market and 
economic feasibility studies;
1.2 For the determination and selection of 
the manufacturing technologies;
1.3 For engineering design of production 
facilities and the selection of equipment;
1.4 For constructing the plant and installing 
the equipment;
1.5 For the specification of the 
manufacturing process.
2. Those needed in the operation stage such 
as ;
2.1 For technical and managerial operation of 
the enterprise;
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2.2 For marketing the products;
2.3 For improving the efficiency of the 
production processes by minor innovations.
Based on Cooper and Sercovitch*s view of the 
mix of technological resources needed in designing, 
constructing and operating production facilities, a 
United Nations (1972:5) study redefined the following 
elements of technology associated with the transfer of 
technology for industrial projects from developed to 
developing countries:
a) Feasibility studies, market surveys and 
other pre-investment services;
b) Determination of the range of technologies 
and. the choice of technology;
c) Industrial processes;
d) Engineering design and detailed 
engineering;
e) Plant construction and installation;
f) Training of technical and managerial 
personnel;




i) Improvements to processes and product 
des igns.
According to Mansfield, (1971:110-115) 
technological improvements of products and processes 
may be expanded into the following elements of 
technical and managerial knowledge:
a. For developing applied research;
b. For preparing technical specifications of 
project requirements;
c. For designing the pilot-plant or
prototype, testing and constructing;
d. For planning of production activities, 
construction of the plant and facilities;
e. For organizing the resources for
manufacturing start-up;
f. For establishing the marketing start-up.
The above elements of technical and
managerial knowledge seem to cover a wide spectrum of 
technologies involved in the evaluation, construction
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and operation of industrial plants. However, there 
seems to be auiother element of knowledge particularly 
needed in the initial stage of aquisition of 
technologies by industrial enterprises in developing 
countries. This element will be called "Experience of 
Technological Transactions". It refers to the 
combination of technical, legal and managerial 
knowledge accumulated during previous technological 
transactions by the organization. It involves an 
awareness of the complexities of the technology 
transfer process and an understanding of the 
implications of the contractual agreement. Assuming 
that the terms and conditions under which technological 
resources are acquired and the way they are transmitted 
have broader implications for the subsequent 
development of the enterprise, this appears to be a 
relevant variable.
To Samuel Doctors, technology transfer is:
"The process whereby technical information 
originating in one institutional setting is 
adopted for use in another institutional 
setting. The transfer typically requires 
active participation by both the transferor 
and the transferee and implies more than the 
mere dissemination of technical information;
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it implies the adaptation of new technology 
through a creative transformation and 
application". (Doctors, 1969: 3).
This definition of technology transfer 
emphasizes the active participation of the transferor 
and transferee in the process, as well the adaptation 
of the techniques to the new institutional environment. 
Although Doctor's study focussed on the prograunmes of 
the National Aeronautics auid Space Administration, 
(NASA) his definition of technology transfer seems to 
be broad enough to cover some forms of international 
technology transfer. His analysis of NASA's technology 
transfer programmes indicated that computer 
manufacturers were those who benefitted most from 
"spin-offs" of military, space and nuclear technologies 
developed by the United States government.
The United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization points out that the transfer of technology 
between adveinced and developing countries is different 
from that between organizations in industrialized 
countries. Rather thcui acquiring merely a licence or 
patent rights to manufacture for certain products 
developing countries usually depend on the transfer of 
"composite technology", or the sum of technological 
knowledge, know-how and expertise needed for setting up
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and operating an Industrial enterprise.
A study published by the Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (1981) cited 
Harvey Brook's view of technology transfer as "the 
process" by which science and technology are diffused 
throughout human activity". According to Brooks, 
technology transfer occurs when "systematic rational 
knowledge developed by one group or institution is 
embodied in a way of doing things by other institutions 
or groups ..." (Brooks, 1966). According to a Brooks' 
(1981) recent publication, certain technologies such as 
computers and communications carry along with them the 
managerial and social supporting systems. Thus, if 
this assumption is correct, the application of computer 
systems by developing countries is likely to involve 
the adoption of a modus operandi, since "not only the 
software, but the organization that goes with the 
system are inseparable from the physical embodiment of 
the technology..." (Brooks, 1981:36).
Based on Brooks' perception of the technology 
transfer process, the OECD study suggests that "the 
transfer concept concerns the enrichment of auiy given 
field through an input from outside." and proposes that 
"transfer consists of the operation whereby knowledge 
is diffused" (OECD, 1981:19).
Wallender adopted a definition of the Fund
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for Multinational Management Education (1978) which 
states that technology is transferred "when technology 
is transmitted, received, and applied". Wallender 
emphasizes that the technology transfer process 
involves a linkage between the transferor cuid the 
transferee and suggests that the transfer of managerial 
technology is "a change in the ability to manage the 
productive functioning of am enterprise". (Wallender, 
1979:28). In other words, by equating the transfer of 
managerial knowledge to a change in the behaviour of 
the recipient, he seems to suggest, implicitly, that 
the transmission of managerial knowledge is similar to 
a learning process. (Boulding, 1966).
Summing up the discussion on the concept of 
technology transfer, the following points emerged:
1. Perhaps reflecting the lack of consensus 
surrounding the meaning on technology, there is also no 
universal definition of the expression technology 
transfer. Thus, it means different things to theorists 
and users in various disciplines and fields of 
activity.
2. For the purposes of this research
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technology transfer refers to the process by which one 
organization transmits to another the technological 
resources necessary for the manufacture of a product, 
the implementation of a process, or the rendering of a 
service. Thus, it involves technological resources in 
the following forms:
a) Embodied in capital and intermediary 
goods.
b) Incorporated in individuals, such as those 
who possess technical amd managerial 
know-how, skills and abilities.
c) Disembodied in information, instructions, 
specifications, designs, data, computer 
programs, etc.
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2.4 CHANNELS AND MECHANISMS FOR TRANSFERENCE
According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, (United Nations, 1972:8) there 
are several ways under which various elements of 
technical knowledge caui be acquired from external 
sources. In general, technology can be obtained 
through one or a combination of the following methods:
a) The flow of books, journals and other 
published information;
b) The movement of persons from country Lo 
country;
c) Education and training of human resources;
d) Exchange of information and personnel 
through technical co-operation agreements;
e) Employment of foreign experts and 
consultancy arrangements;
f) Import of machinery cind equipment and 
related literature;
g) License Agreements for the production 
processes, use of trademarks and patents, 
etc;
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h) Direct foreign investment.
As the same study indicates, from the point 
of view of developing countries, the acquisition of 
various elements of technical knowledge through books 
(a) the movement of technologists, (b) training, (c) 
and the exchange of information and personnel (d) seems 
to involve less cost than the alternative sources (e) 
to (g). Apparently, some fairly simple non-proprietary 
manufacturing techniques and know-how may be obtained 
through contracting foreign experts, (e) (UNIDO, 1973) 
Some countries may import (f) directly from machinery 
suppliers, manufacturing technology embodied in capital 
goods such as petrochemical production equipment, and 
later discover that the know-how needed to operate 
chemical companies is only available in technologically 
advanced countries. (Cooper auid Sercovitch, 1971) 
Licensing agreements, (g) franchising and management 
contracts are assuming increasing importance in the 
transference of proprietary cUid non-proprietary 
technologies to developing countries (United Nations, 
1975; 1978; UNIDO, 1973; Brooke and Remmers, 1970).
Foreign direct investment (h) is often cited as an 
important channel in the transmission of technical and 
managerial skills to less industrialized countries. 
(United Nations, 1975, 1978; Kindleberger; 1969,
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Baranoon, 1970). Foreign Direct Investment by 
Multinational corporations, in particular, is mentioned 
as one of the most effective methods of transferring 
industrial and managerial technologies to less advanced 
countries. Multinational corporations can provide in a 
package form, advanced technology, capital, 
entrepreneurship and management. (Quinn, 1969;
Baranson, 1978; Dunning, 1971, 1974, Behrmman auid
Wallender, 1976). On the other hauid, some critics of
the multinationals argue that they do not transfer 
technology at all; (Galeano, 1979) on the contrary 
they may attempt to limit the development of the local 
capabilities, (Santos, 1970) may use inappropriate
technologies in relation to the factor endowments of 
the host countries, (Cooper, 1973) constitute a threat 
to national sovereignty (Vernon, 1971) and promote a 
state of continuous technological dependency of the 
peripheral countries on the central economies. 
(Furtado, 1964, 1970; Sunkel, 1969-1970, Evans, 1979).
Assuming that the degree of "packaging" of
international transfer projects may have a positive
correlation with the degree of foreign control, the 
United Nations (1972:11) suggested the following 
classification of enterprises, presumably arranged in a 
descending order of the degree of packaging:
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a) Foreign branches (Extensions of the parent 
company operations in the host country);
b) Wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries (A joint 
stock company incorporated in the host 
country under local laws);
c) Foreign-controiled joint ventures;
d) Locally controlled joint ventures;
c) Local ventures with foreign contracLual 
agreements ;
f) Local ventures without foreign contractual 
agreements.
Cooper and Sercovitch describe a mechanism 
for transfer ing technology as "euiy meauis for making 
available to a production enterprise ... those 
elements of technical knowledge, which may be 
unavailable in the domestic economy, required to set up 
or operate production facilities " (Cooper cUid 
Sercovitch, 1971: 12), However, they suggest a
distinction between the general supply of technical and 
scientific information and the specific transfer of 
technical and managerial knowledge needed to set up a 
particular production facility, as follows:
The general supply of technical information.
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Refers to the common and informal ways in which general 
technical and Scientific knowledge may be acquired. 
These include:
a) Technical books, scientific newspapers, 
trade journals, sales literature;
b) Informal personal contacts amd 
r Glat ionsh ips;
c) Participation in professional conferences 
and meetings;
d) Participation in training prograunmes 
abroad, etc.
The specific transfer of technical knowledge. 
Refers to the tramsfer of technical, managerial amd 
entrepreneurial knowledge needed inthe pre-investment, 
construction amd operational stages of an industrial 
enterprise. These may include skills for the 
elaboration of feasibility studies, market research, 
design of production facilities, selection of process 
technologies, installation of the equipment, control of 
production, marketing of the output, etc.
Considering that the mix of technologies 
required to set up an industrial enterprise in a less 
industrialized country may be transferred in a number
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of ways and through a variety of channels, Cooper and 
Sercovitch proposed a classification of the mechanisms 
for transfer of technology. Based on the number of 
sources of technology the recipient may utilize for the 
acquisition of various elements of technological 
knowledge, they proposed the following categories of 
transfer mechanisms:
1. DIRECT TRANSFERS. The recipient enters 
into direct agreement with a number of 
different suppliers for the acquisition of 
the various technologies required for the 
establishment of production activities. 
Among the mechanisms for direct transfers 
are:
a) Contracting individual experts and 
consultant companies;
b) Engaging engineering design and plant 
construction enterprises;
c) Training nationals for specific production 
projects ;
d) Technical Information Activities;
e) Importing process technology embodied in 
capital goods.
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2. INDIRECT TRANSFERS. The recipient 
contracts only one supplier of technology, to 
provide the various elements of technology 
necessary to set up production facilities. 
The supplying organization, then contracts 
other suppliers of technical knowledge for 
the various activities amd stages of the 
project. This is often referred to as 
"packaged" transfer, (United Nations, 1972) 
since the supplier may provide most of the 
elements of technical knowledge needed, from 
the feasibility study to the management of 
the enterprise in a single 'package'. Cooper 
and Sercovitch distinguish other modalities 
of indirect tramsfer mechamisms:
a) Investments in wholly-owned subsidiary 
enterprises. This is often considered one of 
the most important mechanisms for supplying 
technologies for less industrialized
countries, (Baranson, 1969, 1970; 1978
Kindleberger, 1969; 1978; Behrmam, 1962;
Dunning, 1970; Behrmam and Wallender, 1976). 
Sometimes, when the technological
capabilities and the industrial
infrastructure of the receiving countries are
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limited, this "may be the only mechanism 
through which the developing country can get 
access to contain kinds of technology, and 
perhaps the only means whereby some local 
resources can be exploited" (Cooper amd 
Sercovitch, 1971: 34).
b) Licensing Agreements. These agreements, 
usually giving access to proprietary process 
technologies, may take a variety of 
configurations in the form of joint ventures, 
with varying degrees of equity participation 
in the recipient's capital structure. (United 
Nations, 1972; 1978; Balasubraunamyaun, 1973)
c) Turnkey agreements. These extreme forms 
of licensing agreements provide in a 
"package" the full range of tamgible amd 
intangible technological resources needed to 
establish am industrial enterprise. These 
agreements may involve proprietary amd 
non-proprietary technologies. (UNIDO, 1973; 
United Nations 1972, 1975, 1978)
d) Other forms of contractual Agreements. 
Under this - category are the management 
contracts, co-production agreements.
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contractual joint ventures and similar 
arrangements, (Gabriel, 1972, 1967; Brooke
and Remmers, 1977) for the transmission of 
managerial, administrative and technological 
resources and capabilities.
3. DIRECT AND INDIRECT TRANSFERS. A 
combination of direct and indirect transfers 
occurs when a recipient acquires certain 
technologies directly from some suppliers 
and, at the same time, makes a contractual 
arrangement with one or more intermediaries 
to obtain indirectly, the remaining
technological resources needed for the 
project.
Sometimes technology transfer is classed as a 
vertical or horizontal process. (Brooks, 1968;
Mansfield, 1975, OECD, 1981).
VERTICAL TRANSFERS. Refer to the transfer of 
product or technical knowledge within a 
similar organizational environment. For 
instance, when a new technology is 
transferred from the research through 
development to the manufacturing division of 
an organization.
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HORIZONTAL TRANSFERS. Refer to the transfer 
of product or technical knowledge between 
different fields of application, usually 
involving different organizations. For 
example, mauiy developments of military and 
space projects of the United States 
Government, especially solid state
electronics, computer and laser technology, 
now have been transferred to civil 
applications. (Brooks, 1972).
Recently, SRI International and Drexler 
Technology Corporation, of the United States, started 
to manufacture what is expected to be a major 
development in computer recording medium technology. 
Based on laser technology, they developed the "laser 
card", which is about the size of stauidard bcuik credit 
cards, and when recorded on both sides will be able to 
store forty million bits of data, some five million 
characters or approximately one million words of normal 
text. (Cane, 1982:11).
White (1974) provides four additional 
examples of horizontal transfers of technology, 
involving different types of institutions:
1. Corporation to Corporation. The
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transference of transistor technology from 
Bell Laboratories to Texas Instruments. 
(1952-1954).
2. Government to Corporation. The
transference of Jet Transport technology from 
the United States Government to the Boeing 
Corporation, (1952-1959).
3. Technical Institute to Corporation. The 
transference of Electrostatic Copy Technology 
from Battele to Halloid Xerox. (1977-1953).
4. University to Corporation. The
transference of Electronic Digital Computer 
technology from the University of 
Pennsylvania to UNIVAC resulting in the
subsequent establishment of the cunerican 
computer industry (1946-1951).
According to White, the key variables in 
these successful cases of transfer of technology were:
a) Entrepreneurial initiative in the 
recipient organization;
b) Close personnel interaction between the 
transferror and transferee;
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c) Technical knowledge of the recipient 
personnel;
d) Interactive joint efforts between 
recipient and supplier personnel over the 
years.
According to Mansfield, (1975) international 
transfer of technology between advanced amd developing 
countries, sometimes involve both horizontal auid 
vertical transfers, which might make it an extremely 
difficult process to mamage.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
cxnd Development makes a distinction between commercial 
amd non-commercial transfers of technology. According 
to the OECD (1981) these two categories involve:
COMMERCIAL TRANSFERS. Based on the UNCTAD's 
Draft Code of Conduct on the Transfer of 
Technology, the OECD characterizes as 
commercial transfers of technology, the 
following technological transactions between 
two enterprises:
a) Assigning or granting of industrial 
r ights;
b) Handing over technical or non-technical
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know-how in the form of documents, plauis, 
diagrams ;
c) The communication of technical or other 
know-how in the form of supply of services;
d) Providing a combination of services with a 
view to commissioning an industrial complex;
e) Providing technical services related to 
the selling or leasing of machinery.
NON-COMMERCIAL TRANSFERS. These include the 
multilateral and bilateral technological 
transactions between governments, agencies 
for international and national development, 
research institutions, universities, etc. 
According to the OECD, these are generally 
forms of co-operation between national 
authorities, designed to promote the host 
country's development, such as the provision 
of technical services for infrastructure 
projects and other governmental scientific, 
military, agricultural services.
Hertz (1980) suggests six alternative methods 
of transferring technological resources for the 
establishment of computer manufacturing activities
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between advanced and less industrialized countries, as
follows :
1. The purchase of technologies directly from 
the suppliers. In his view, this method was 
widely used by Japanese firms when they 
acquired computer technologies directly from 
the United States cuid European manufacturers.
2. Licencing of technologies. Considering 
that enterprises in less developed countries 
usually lack the necessary technical auid 
administrative infrastructure. Hertz argues 
that this method may not be an adequate 
solution for developing countries. According 
to the OECD (1969) several computer firms 
outside the United States, such as 
AEG-Telefunken, Mitsubishi, Olivetti-GE, 
Siemens and others, have acquired some 
computer technology through patent euid 
manufactur ing/licens ing agreements. 
Ferranti, ICL, Fujitstu, Phillips and others, 
were some of the few companies without a 
manufacturing licence.
3. Foreign Direct Investments. Hertz posits 
that, in relation to technology transfer, the
- 60 -
success of this method depends, among other 
things, on a clear understanding of the 
objectives of the supplying and recipient 
organizations.
4. Donation of Technology. As Hertz has put 
it, although this method may be used among 
educational and health institutions, it seems 
improbable for firms operating in the highly 
competitive markets of the computer industry. 
(Dawson, 1975; Wlthington, 1975; Pantages, 
1976; Lee, 1971; Szuprowlcz, 1978; EIÜ, 
1979a).
5. Industrial Espionage. According to Hertz, 
this method of acquiring technology is 
practised in advanced countries among some 
firms operating in highly competitive 
markets. (Wiener, 1982)
6. Multinational Corporations. In his view, 
although these firms may have superior 
managerial technological, financial,
material, marketing resources and
capabilities, am effective transfer of 
resources seems to be dependent, among other 
things, on their long-term objectives.
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(Fayerweather, 1969). Assuming that a mutual 
accommodation (Gabriel, 1972) between their 
long-term interests and those of the 
host-country governments may be found. Hertz 
argues that these corporations probably have 
the vital elements needed for successful 
transfers. (Baranson, 1978; Behrman, 1970; 
Dunning, 1974)
A relatively recent study by Bornstein amd 
others (1981) included fourteen alternative methods of 
transferring technological resources between western 
amd Eastern European countries, compiled by McMillam 
(1977) for hearings of the Joint Economic Committee of 
the United States Congress. The following different 
types of commercial amd industrial co-operation 
arrangements were identified:
"1. Sale of equipment for complete production 
systems - Such as 'turnkey* plants (usually 
including technical assistance).
2. Licensing - Of patents, copyrights, amd 
production know-how.
3. Franchising - Of trademarks amd marketing 
know-how.
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4. Licensing or franchising - With provision 
also for market-sharing and quality control.
5. Cooperative sourcing - This involves 
long-term agreements for purchases and sales 
between partners (especially exchanges of 
industrial raw materials and intermediate 
products).
6. Subcontracting - Under a short-term (e.g., 
renewed annually) agreement, the
subcontractor, with existing facilities, 
makes a product to the specifications of the 
contractor, who often also supplies materials 
or components.
7. Sale of plants equipment, auid/or 
technology - Including 1-3 above, but with 
complete or partial repayment in resultant 
products.
8. Production contracting - This agreement 
provides for production, on a continuing 
basis to the partner's specifications, of 
intermediate or final goods to be 
incorporated into the partner's product or to 
be marketed by him. In contrast to (6) 
subcontracting, production contracting
— 63 —
involves some transfer of production
capability, in the form of capital equipment 
and/or technology (through a license or 
technical assistance contract).
9. Coproduction - Usually on the basis of 
some shared technology and agreed 
specifications, the partners specialize in 
producing and then exchange components, so 
each makes the same final product for sale in
his own market area. Usually the Eastern
partner makes the simpler or more
labour-intensive components and the Western 
partner the more complicated or
capital-intensive parts.
10. Product specialization - The partners 
specialize in making end products suid then
exchange them so each has a full line for
sale in his market area. In contrast to (5)
cooperative sourcing, product specialization 
involves changes in existing end product 
lines.
11. Comarketing - The partners (a) divide up 
market areas for some products, (b) sell and 
service each other's products in their
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respective market areas, and/or (c) sell
jointly in third markets the products of one 
or both partners. In practice comarketing 
occurs together with other forms of 
industrial cooperation, like (4), (8), (9),
and (19), or through (14), a separate joint 
venture marketing compauiy.
12. Project cooperation - Often called 'joint 
tendering', this involves East-West
cooperation in building plamts, developing 
natural resources, auid/or providing
infrastructure facilities in third (usually
less developed) countries. It is sometimes
labeled 'tripartite' to acknowledge the
participation of the host country.
13. Joint research and development (R & D)
The agreement provides for joint planning and 
conduct of R & D, and joint commercial rights 
to the resulting product or process
technology.
14. Joint venture - For any of the above 
activities the partners form a special mixed 
company, ordinarily with joint equity
participation, management and
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r isk-and-prof it-shar ing" (McMi 1 laui,
1977:1182)
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2.5 THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS
This section intends to present some concepts 
concerning the nature of the process of transferring, 
internationally, technological resources, in aui attempt 
to derive a set of variables which will be 
subsequentely integrated Into a conceptual model.
In 1969, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology "Conference on The Human Factors in the 
Transfer of Technology" provided some insights into the 
process of transferring new technical information from 
one organization to another. Initially planned to 
concentrate on human factors presumed to influence the 
process, scientists, engineers, political scientists 
and sociologists, recognizing the complexity and 
multiplicity of variables affecting the transfer 
process, it later decided to publish the proceedings of 
the conference as "Factors in the Transfer of 
Technology".
This conference focussed its attention on 
the transfer of technology between organizations within 
the same country. A priori, there are various 
indications to assume that the process of transferring 
technology across national borders may be considerably 
more complex because of socio-economic,
infrastructural, political, legal auid other
— 67 —
environmental differences. (Fayerweather, 1969;
Seurat, 1976; Bass, 1974; Mansfield, 1975; Wallender, 
1979, Brooke and Remmers, 1977). However since both 
national as well as international transfers of 
technology may involve flows of information, financial, 
human and material resources, there appears to be some 
common characteristics between the two processes. 
Because both national and international processes have 
some characteristics in common, it seems reasonable to 
draw some analogies between them, as long as the set of 
variables which distinguishes one from another, or the 
differentia, is kept in mind.
In general, the participants of the 
conference agreed that technology transfer was
determined, among other things, by the
interrelationship between technical, economic and humam 
factors, and that "the mechanism of technological 
transfer is one of agents, not agencies; of the
movement of people among establishments, rather than 
the routing of information through communication 
systems". (Burns, 1969: 12; Gruber and Marquis, 1969: 
266) Hardy (1974) supports this view and emphasizes 
that individuals are the key to successful transfers of 
technology. A particular model developed at the
conference focussed on the transfer process and
proposed that the magnitude of the transfer was a
— 68 —
function of:
a) The source organization
b) The nature of the item to be transferred
c) The structure of the channels for 
transference
d) The recipient organization (Gruber and 
Marquis, 1969: 7)
Other variables assumed to affect the 
individuals' willingness and ability to transfer 
technological resources between organizations included:
a) The individuals' training, education and 
exper ience.
b) The individuals' personality
characteristics. Personality traits, need 
achievement level, (Maslow, 1943, 1954)
emotional reactions, sentiments, etc.
c) The individuals' communication patterns. 
Personal communications, personal
interactions, (Little, 1965) personal 
relationships, (Allen and Conney, 1973; 
Allen, 1973; Hertz, 1980; Bass, 1974),
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"coding schemes" (Allen, 1969), etc.
d) Organizational effects. Vested interests 
of the organizations involved, possible
conflict of objectives between the supplying 
and recipient organizations. (United 
Nations, 1972; Fayerweather, 1969; Hertz,
1980; Gabriel, 1972). Resistance to change, 
etc.
e) The organization's mission orientation. 
The extent to which the organization assesses 
the desired effects, formulates objectives, 
designs the necessary activities, allocates 
resources, etc.
f) The organization's motivation in relation 
to competitive pressures, expected financial 
rewards, visibility of results auid 
governmental influences.
Figure 2.1 presents a micro-economic model of 
the technology trauisfer process, put forward by Samuel 
Bar-Zakay (1972). According to the author, this model 
identifies the basic elements, as well as presumable 
activities and sequence of events of the technology 
transfer process. The above part of the semi-PERT 
diagram indicates the activities to be performed by the
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technology supplier, or donor, while the lower part 
denotes those of the recipient. In the center of the 
diagram are listed the activities which are expected to 
be developed by both the supplier and recipient, i.e. 
the recognition of a technology transfer opportunity, 
the establishment of viable contact, the formulation of 
the transfer project, the auialysis of the project's 
cost effectiveness, the recruitment of human resources, 
the establishment of a pilot organization, the 
establishment of a full-scale operation and the 
evaluation of the results. In relation to these 
activities, Bar-Zakay argues that:
"The probability of success of any technology 
trauisfer would increase if the donor and the 
recipient were to perform the activities or 
satisfy the requirements outlined above and 
below the horizontal centre line. Many 
individuals cuid organizations engaged in 
technology transfer are taking shortcuts 
(indicated by wide arrows) which often lead 
to unsuccessful transfers", (Bar-Zakay, 
1972:3) .
The model includes four conditional decision 
points, separating the four major stages of the process 
denominated as search, adaptation, implementation and
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maintenance. At these points both the supplier smd 
recipient decide whether the project should be 
terminated or continued, according to the inputs of 
previous activities and current circumstances. As 
indicated in the diagram, the cost and time of the 
project increase concurrently as the activities are 
executed. Other activities which should be carried out 
simultaneously by the supplier and recipient are 
designated as technological forecasting, long-range 
planning and project-related intelligence.
In relation to the applicability of the 
model, the author argues that "although there are 
differences in magnitude and relative importance, the 
forces involved in the process of technology transfer, 
are the same, irrespective of whether it takes place 
within a country or between countries". (Bar-Zakay, 
1972:2). This assertion seems to suggest that national 
amd international transfer of technology are basically 
identical processes, ignoring, among other things, 
fundamental differences that may exist between the 
transferring and recipient environments, such as 
culture, etc. Assuming that individuals are the main 
agents in the transmission of technological resources, 
(Burns, 1969; Allen, 1973; Knox, 1974; Geschka, 1974; 
Hardy, 1974) recognition of the cultural differences 
seems to be an important contextual variable in the
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international technology transfer process. (Bass, 1974; 
Chudson and Wells, 1974). According to Fayerweather, 
(1969;175) the communication problem between 
individuals from different nations, with no common 
social mores, values and other aspects of interpersonal 
relationships, is "a substantial obstacle distinct from 
the common problems of communication between different 
people within a single cultural group". As he points 
out, "cui idea expressed by a manager which has a 
particular meaning in his cultural frame of reference 
may be received into the mind of a man from another 
culture with quite a different interpretation". 
(Fayerweather, 1969:175). Besides the problems of 
perception, (Baranson, 1969; Drucker, 1970; Gabriel, 
1972; ) there appear to be other economic, industrial,
educational, legal, (Farmer and Richman, 1966) 
organizational and technical variables (Seurat, 1976; 
Wallender, 1979; Goulet, 1977; Baranson, 1969) which 
may add increased difficulties in the transmission of 
elements of technical knowledge from one country to 
another. (Mansfield, 1975; Rogers, 1972). Therefore, 
Bar-Zakay's contention that the technology trauisfer 
process is environment-independent and that the forces 
involved in national and international transfers "are 
the same" appears to be controversial.
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Seurat's (1976) conceptual scheme of the 
technology transfer process is presented in Figure 2.2. 
According to his view, the major actors and variables 
of an international flow of technological resources 
are:
a) The socio-economic environment of the 
supplying and recipient organizations. Some 
of the main variables considered here are the 
country's economic structure, the scientific 
and technical infrastructure, the educational 
system, the cultural environment, national 
technical standards and measures, etc.
b) The supplying and recipient organizations. 
The important characteristics of the 
transferor amd transferee's organizations, 
the nature of the production systems 
involved, the scale of the enterprise, the 
industrial amd managerial background of the 
personnel, the degree of penetration amd 
familiarity with the technologies amd the 
level of manufacturing integration, defined 
as the percentage participation between the 
enterprise amd sub-contractors.


















IF A NEW PROJECT:
SUPPLYINGENTERPRISE
EXISTING TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
INTERESTED PARTIES GROUPS, ETC.
RECIPIENTENTERPRISE
TECHNOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK TO BE CREATED
INTERESTED PARTIES, GROUPS, ETC.
F igure 2.2 Relationship of actors in the Technology 
Transfer System.
S o u r c e  : Seurat (1975)
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recipient organizations. These parties cam 
be a group, a division of the organization, a
technical sector, etc., which will be
directly involved with the object of the 
transference. The key factors considered are 
the administration of these sectors, am 
organizational "macro-structure" adapted to 
the degree of penetration of the techniques, 
a "micro-structure" with functions compatible 
with the culture amd motivation of the 
individuals, the recruitment amd subsequent 
development of personnel; group training,
etc.
In Seurat's view depending on the complexity 
of the technologies involved, besides the actors listed 
above, other participants may join the transfer 
process. Sub-contractors, licensors civil engineering
firms, assemblying contractors, etc., from the 
supplying amd/or recipient countries may participate
actively during the initial stages of the transfer
process, supplementing elements of technical knowledge 
amd physical resources needed, for the industrial
project. A "technology Transfer Council" may also be
established as am . independent body in order to 
supervise the transfer activities between the parties.
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According to Seurat this council performs a "technology 
transfer- engineering" function, dealing with the 
organization of resources needed for the transfer, 
rather than the set of techniques, and procedures. 
Among other things, the "Technology Transfer Council" 
may be responsible for the development of preliminary 
studies related to the situation of the supplier and 
recipient, the selection of personnel to act as 
"activators" of the process, the conception of the 
transfer system, the organization of tasks, the 
internal and external recruitment of manpower, the 
formation of individuals for particular roles, the 
training in group, the development of technical and 
managerial personnel, definition of criteria for 
measuring and evaluating the results , taking 
corrective actions, the development of the technology 
transfer plan, etc.
In relation to the presumed stages of the 
technology transfer process Seurat adopted a concept 
from Davous which distinguishes the following phases in 
the recipient organization for receipt of technology:
1. THE DIFFERENTIATION STAGE
This stage is characterized by the creation 
of a group of specialists with unique 
technological capabilities in relation to the
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other sectors of the organization.
2. THE INTEGRATION STAGE.
In this stage, there is a progressive
absorption of unique technological
capabilities by other members of the 
organizations.
3. THE DIFFUSION STAGE.
This stage is reached when the new
technologies or skills are not restricted to 
a few specialists, but are diffused 
throughout the technical sectors of the
organization.
Mansfield (1975) also emphasizes the
importance of distinguishing between the various stages 
of the international technology transfer process. He 
suggests the following phases in the process of 
transferring tangible and intangible technological 
resources between industrialized and less
industrialized countries:
1. MATERIAL TRANSFER STAGE. The export of 
material technologies, such as products or 
inputs for production, from one country to 
another.
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2. DESIGN TRANSFER STAGE. The transfer of 
information, designs, blueprints, operational 
instructions, etc., necessary for the 
manufacture of products in the receiving 
country.
3. CAPACITY TRANSFER STAGE. Refers to the 
treinsfer of elements of technical knowledge 
needed to adapt the product or technological 
resources to the conditions of the 
environment. Apparently, this is the most 
difficult stage of the process, since it 
involves "learning of how to learn as well as 
to use what others have learned". (Mansfield, 
1975: 373).
Behrman amd Wallender's (1976) estimate the 
possible stages involved in the process of transferring 
technological resources from transnational corporations 
to wholly-owned subsidiaries located in less 
industrialized countries, as follows:
1. Proposal and planning of the project;
2. Product design;
3. Plant design and construction of the 
facilities ;
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4. Start-up of the industrial activities;
5. Value engineering and controls;
6. Product development;
7. External support activities.
Rubenstein (1974) has been studying the 
organization, management and economics of research auid 
development in developing countries for approximately 
two decades. As a result of a project developed with 
the Organization of American States, (GAS) auid previous 
research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and Northwestern University, he identified some general 
factors influencing the process of transferring 
tangible and intangible technological resources within 
and between organizations. The variables were:
1. Characteristics and behaviour of the 
source and user. Their attitudes,
capabilities values, organizational position, 
communication style, education, past 
experience, etc.
2. Environmental factors. Governmental 
regulatory framework, geographic, financial, 
economic and market conditions, etc.
- 81 -
3. The nature of the interaction between the 
source and user. Personal relationships, 
liaison, trust, direct and indirect contacts, 
etc.
4. Technical factors. Characteristics of the 
technology, level of complexity in relation 
to the state of the art, its adaptability to 
local conditions, etc.
In a study focused on the transmission of 
technological resources to India, Balasubramauiyam 
(1973) suggested that the key elements determining the 
success of transfer projects on an
enterprise-to-enterprise basis were:
1. The willingness and ability of the 
supplying organization to transmit the mix of 
tecnhologies needed for the project. He 
argues that this factor seems to be closely 
related with the degree of ownership by the 
transferor. Apparently, there is a trade-off 
between the extent of technology transferred 
and the degree of capital ownership by the 
foreign partner. Thus, based on this 
argument, he suggests that the greater the 
complexity of the tecnhologies involved, the
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greater the need for some form of capital 
control by the supplier. (Bredo, 1974 ) 
Presumably this allows a continous and close 
participation between the transferring and 
receiving organizations. In these cases, 
joint ventures and foreign direct investments 
seemed to offer better prospects for 
technology trauisfer than other modes of 
contractual agreements.
2. The absorptive capacity of the recipient 
organization to implement and/or adapt the
technological resources to the local milieu. 
Balasubraunanyam argues that the amount of
resurces involved in implementing foreign 
technologies without substancial
modifications is considerably smaller thaui 
that required for adapting them to the local 
environment. In his view, the investments 
and technological resources needed for 
adapting the technologies to the local
conditions are usually beyond the 
capabilities of firms in developing 
countries. Thus, research euid development 
activities needed in altering a product to 
the local conditions are more likely to occur
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when Ltic Lcchnoiogy supplier: h»n> some (iegree 
of control of the recipient's capital 
structure.
Based on his experience in the Brazilian 
subsidiary of Burroughs corporation, one of the largest 
companies in the data processing industry of the United 
States (Barna, 1979)^ Hertz (1980) postulates the 
following list of variables influencing the process of 
transmitting technologies between organizations of 
industrialized and industrializing countries:
1. The nature of the technology;
2. Characteristics and objectives of the 
source and user organizations;
3. The transfer mechanism utilized;
4. Personal interactions between individuals 
of the supplying and recipient organizations. 
Hardy (1974), Burns (1969), Allen (1973), and 
Bass (1974) also consider this a key 
var iable.
5. The technological infrastructure of the 
supplying and recipient countries;
6. Governmental policies and legislation
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concerning technological transactions;
7. International commercial agreements
involving the countries of the parties;
8. Political, economic, amd market
conditions.
In a study sponsored by the Fund for 
Multinational Management Education and focused on the 
transfer of managerial technology from industrially 
advanced countries to Brazil, Peru, Kenya, Korea and 
Tcinzania, Wallender (1979) attempted to identify the 
major actors, factors and stages involved in the 
international technology transfer process. According 
to his view, the major actors of the process of 
transferring technology in the form of managerial 
knowledge, skills and expertise are:
1. The firm supplying the technology.
2. The environment of the supplier.
3. The firm receiving the technology.
4. The environment of the recipient.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the interaction of 
these actors in the transfer process. In general terms, 
Wallender suggests that the technology supplier becomes
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the transferring agent in the process. On the 
importance of analyzing the process of transferring 
elements of managerial knowledge between organizations 
situated in different environments taking into 
consideration all presumed participants or actors of 
the process, he states:
"Intergovernmental discussions cuid research 
on technology transfer have not focused equal 
attention on all four actors and have been 
skewed toward the technology supplier auid the 
technology user environment. Criteria for 
decisions made by suppliers to transfer 
technology have been exaunined in detail, 
theories on how supplier behaviour can impede 
or accelerate development in the Third World 
have been posited, and responsibilities of 
technology supplier (home) governments and 
user (host) governments in developing local 
technological capabilities have been 
articulated. For less attention, however, 
has been paid to the characteristics of the 
technology user. The result is that only one 
half of the transfer process has been 
examined. Initiatives undertaken by


























developing countries to improve technology 
transfer and theories aimed at explaining 
technology trauisfer are characterized by a 
failure to exaimine adequately the traits of 
technology users and the conditions that 
affect their receipt émd use of technology." 
(Wallender, 1979)
Regarding the stages of the recipient firm 
development for the acquisition, use and development of 
technologies, Wallender hypothesized eight cumulative 
stages presented in Table 2.1. These stages are grouped 
into four general phases denominated as organizational 
development, search for and acquisition of alternative 
technology, maintenance amd modification of transferred 
technologies, and research, development and creation of 
unique technological capabilities, supposedly leading 
to the last stage of the process, or the capability of 
selling technology to other firms. Suggesting that the 
acquisition of a general management capability is a 
prerequisite for the subsequent stages of the recipient 
firm development for receipt of foreign technology, he 
argues that:
"In any given environment, individual firms 
will be at varying levels of development in 
terms of their internal capabilities to
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identify needs, search for technology, and 
exploit technology opportunities. Some 
developing country firms may have already 
developed the internal capability to receive 
and utilize foreign technology. Their 
immediate concern should be that of acquiring 
more information about alternative sources of 
technology. Most of the firms, however, will 
not have developed the general management 
capability to begin seeking much less 
acquiring or exploiting technology. " 
(Wallender, 1979: 48).
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Table 2.1 Stages of user firm development for receipt 
of Technology
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
1. Building the initial organizational structure 
(Management and initial technical assistance)
2. Developing an internai problem solving and 
diagnostic capability at the general 
management level.
SEARCH AND ACQUISITION
3. Searching for alternative technology after 
diagnosis amd internal problem identification 
has been carried out.
4. Acquiring alternative technologies.
5. Transferring and exploiting specific technologies.
MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION
6. Maintaining auid modifying technologies already 
transferred (product modification and system 
adaptation).
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCT ENGINEERING
7. Developing unique internal technology capabilities 
(R & D and product engineering).
8. Exporting (sales) technology to other firms.
Source; (Wallender, 1979 :48)
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Concerning the factors presumed to affect the 
transfer of intangible elements of technology, 
Wallender suggested the following sets of variables:
1. Internal variables. The recipient firm's 
experience in technology acquisition, the 
organizational structure, the internal task 
technology, styles of leadership, the 
ownership of the enterprise, the strength of 
labour unions in the firm, the level of 
managerial, technical and mampower resources, 
availability of financial resources, 
perceptions of the value of technology amd 
positive organizational myths.
2. External variables. Market
characteristics (Wells, 1972; Vernon, 1966) 
and level of competition, governmental 
regulatory fraunework auid policies, (Quinn, 
1969), economic conditions, the degree of 
political stability, sources of supply, the 
country's technological (Stewart, 1977; 
Goulet 1977) auid physical infrastructure, 
(Spencer and Woroniak, 1967) local support 
systems, and the cost and appropriateness of 
the technology. (Gupta, 1978).
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From sixty seven projects auialyzed in five 
countries, field researcher evaluations, and an 
additional four hundred auid five volunteer responses 
from similar projects in various countries, the major 
conclusions of his study in relation to variables 
affecting the transmission of managerial technology 
seemed to be connected to internal factors. The lack 
of general managerial capability to recognize the value 
of the technology, the inability to establish long-term 
goals and the lack of management resources were 
considered major constraints at the user firm level. 
Other factors such as the ability to organize, external 
technological support, experience in the acquisition of 
technologies and market demand were assumed to have 
only a minor influence in the successful cases of 
technology transfer emalyzed.
Assuming that an objective assessment of the 
organization's managerial marketing, technical, 
manufacturing, material and financial resources is a 
prerequisite for a successful trauisfer of technology, 
Bass suggests the following list of variables presumed 
to influence the process of transmitting technological 
resources from one organization to cuiother :
"1. Receptivity of the Beneficiary. The
organization to which the technology is
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transferred should be wholeheartedly 
favorable to its reception and should 
provide, to the best of its meéuis, 
information about local requirements which 
have a bearing on its adaptation.
2. Dedication of the Transferer. The 
organization which transfers the technology 
should make every effort to transmit all 
information pertinent to the success of the 
operation in the local environment.
3. Mechanism of Transfer. The most
effective transfer of technology occurs when 
there is very close interaction between the 
source and the recipient. For this reason, 
both parties should establish mechanisms to 
promote this face-to-face interrelationship 
by appointing congenial representatives with 
appropriate authority to enforce full
cooperation.
4. Agreement Governing Transfer. All 
important aspects of the transfer should be 
spelled out. in detail in the contractual 
documents, including arbitration procedures
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for settling differences between the two 
parties.
5. Interim Review. A schedule should be 
established in the agreement for periodic
joint review of performance by both parties 
in order that short-falls may be pointed out 
and corrected.
6. Competence of Recipient Orgam izat ion.
The parties should agree on the skills needed
by the recipient to implement the trauisfer
amd the latter should take steps to acquire 
this internal expertise.
7. Termination of Transfer. There should be 
formal stipulation as to the conditions for 
relieving the donor of further responsibility 
amd of vesting responsibility in the 
recipient for taking over the operation.
8. Continuing Relationship. After the 
tramsfer is completed to mutual satisfaction, 
there are usually further improvements by 
both parties. It is very desirable that 
cooperation should be continued to insure 
optimum benefit to the receiver.
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9. Recognition of Cultural Differences. 
Both parties to the transfer should make best 
efforts to take into account the differences 
between the two cultures.." (Bass, 1974: 95).
From the preceding review of the literature 
on international technology transfer, the following 
points emerged:
1. There are some sparse but significant 
contributions to the literature towards an 
understanding of the international technology 
trauisfer process. At present, however, it 
appears that no conceptual scheme 
satisfactorily embraces the multiplicity of 
elements auid variables involved in technology 
transfer, from organizations in
industrialized countries to enterprises in 
industrially less-advauiced nations.
2. The process of transferring technology in 
the form of capital auid intermediary goods, 
information, humaui resources, elements of 
technical auid managerial knowledge auid 
know-how needed to establish aui industrial 
production facility in a less industrialized 
country, seems to be a complex.
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multi-dimentional phenomenon involving
several actors and a variety of mutually 
interacting variables.
Based on the above assumptions, in the next 
section, an attempt will be made to develop a 
comprehensive conceptual model for analyzing the 
process of transferring technological resources 
internationally, on an enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
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2.6 A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS
In this section, a conceptual model of the 
international technology transfer process is presented. 
The model derives from the review of the literature and 
attempts to integrate the major concepts discussed in 
the previous sections. Initially, a brief rationale 
for developing this model is presented.
In the social sciences the researcher is 
often confronted with complex, multi-disciplinary 
problems (Ansoff, 1977) involving a large number of 
variables, which sometimes are not amenable to 
quantification. Assuming that technology transfer is 
essentially a humaui activity, it involves what Abt 
(1968) has described as the "muddy" variables of 
attitudes, feelings auid behaviour auid their interaction 
with organizational, economic, political, cultural auid 
technological variables.
Faced with the complexity auid the wide range 
of variables which may affect the process of 
transferring technology internationally, auid the lack 
of cui adequate theoretical framework to guide this 
study, the researcher developed a conceptual model of 
the transfer process, in an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing 
technology transfer transactions on an
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enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
Broadly speaking, a conceptual model
represents an approach for investigating complex, real 
world problems or situations. It is based on the
method of analogy, which is considered as one of the 
main methods of scientific inquiry (Ackoff, 1962). The 
construction of a conceptual model basically involves 
the setting up of a conceptual suialogue of the subject 
matter, representing only the main features of the
thing to be investigated. Thus, by reducing reality to 
more manageable proportions, the investigator might 
gain some insights into the complexities of the problem 
or situation being examined. As Kaplam has indicated,
"Science always simplifies; its aim is not to 
reproduce the reality in all is complexity, 
but only to formulate what is essential for 
understanding, prediction, or control". 
(Kaplan, 1973:280).
OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL
The multiplicity of actors and variables
identified in the review of the literature have been
combined in an attempt to comprise a comprehensive
model for explaining the process of transferring
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industrial technology internationally on an 
enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
Figure 2.4 presents the diagram of the 
general conceptual model and illustrates,
schematically, the actors and interfaces in the 
transfer process. Technology transfer was
conceptualized as am exchange process. The notion of 
exchamge (Weber, 1947; Homams, 1950; Blau, 1958 ; 
Fayerweather,1969) involves a bargaining relationship 
between two parties. Thus, according to the exchange 
fraunework, the technology supplier provides the 
technological resources to the recipient in exchamge 
for monetary or other resources. The main actors in 
the international tramsfer process have been identified 
as follows:
a) The individuals from the
technology-supplying amd recipient
organizations ;
b) The organizations supplying amd receiving 
the technological resources;
c) The environments of the countries 
supplying amd receiving the technology.
Figure 2.4 also displays three hierarchically 





















process. Assuming that a conceptual model represents a 
system; (Kaplan, 1973) and that a system is essentially 
"a complex of elements stamding in interaction" 
(Bertalanffy, 1950) with its hierarchy of levels of 
subsystems, the three interfaces between the supplier 
amd the recipient shown in figure 2.4 cam also be 
conceptualized as subsystems of the total tramsfer
system. Thus, from the highest to the lowest level of 
analysis, the following interfaces or subsystems cam be 
distinguished :
a) THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFACE concerns
itself with the interaction between the 
supplier amd recipient's environments. 
Exaimples of relevamt variables involved are 
the reciprocal economic agreements between 
the two countries, diplomatic relationships, 
special agreements on tax matters, 
legislation on the migration of human
resources, governmental policies on the flow 
of industrial amd defence technologies, 
import restrictions, etc.
b) THE ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACE concerns
itself with the interaction between the 
technology-supplying and recipient
organizations. The conflict or congruence of
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interests between the objectives of the
organizations, the degree of ownership amd
control involved, the pattern of
intercommunication, the availability if
resources, etc.
c) THE INDIVIDUAL INTERFACE concerns itself 
with the interaction between the individuals 
from the two organizations involved. The
individuals' attitudes, behaviour, formal amd 
informal relationships, communication
patterns, etc.
ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL
The basic elements of the conceptual model of 
the technology tramsfer process are presented in figure 
2.5. The major variables affecting the tramsfer process 
are defined as follows:
a) CONTRACTUAL VARIABLES. Refer to the set 
of variables related to the contractual 
agreement governing the tramsfer of resources 
between transferor and transferee. The terms 
and conditions under which various forms of 
technology will be transferred, duration of 

























of trade marks, rates of royalty, 
improvements on technological developments by 
the parties, training of personnel, technical 
assistance, the settlement of disputes, etc.
b) INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES. Refer to the 
characteristics and behaviour of the
individuals from the supplying and recipient 
organizations. These include their formal 
education, training, previous experience in 
relation to the technologies involved, 
interests, motivations, capabilities, pattern 
of interactions, relationships, etc.
c) ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES. Refer to the 
characteristics amd behaviour of the
supplying and recipient organizations. The 
experience of technological trsuisactions, 
familiarity with the technologies involved, 
the availability of financial material, 
technical managerial and meuipower resources, 
organizational objectives, communication 
channels, the degree of technical and
managerial control of the enterprise, the 
capital structure of the organization, 
structure of trauisfer activities, the scale 
of the enterprise, etc.
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d) ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES. Refer to the
economic, legal, political, cultural, 
educational auid market environment of the 
transferring and receiving countries. The
economic structure and conjuncture,
governmental policies and legislation, the 
technological ôuid physical infrastructure, 
the government regulatory framework
concerning technology transfer, industrial 
market structure, cultural ouid educational 
characteristics, national standards aind 
measures, etc.
e) TECHNOLOGICAL VARIABLES. Refer to the
nature suid characteristics of the 
technologies involved. The tangible
intangible, proprietary auid non-proprietary 
elements of technology, the complexity, and 
level of sophistication in relation to the 
state of the art, the relationship and 
dependence on related technologies, the rate 
of technological change, etc.
f) TRANSMISSION-MECHANISMS VARIABLES. Refer 
to the mechanisms, procedures and methods 
whereby the technological resources are 
transmitted from one organization to another.
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Technical manuals, specifications, training 
courses, technical assistance, drawings, 
close personal relationships, etc.
g) RESOURCE-FLOW VARIABLES. Refer to the 
resources that are exchanged between the 
parties. These represent the object of the 
technology transfer transaction. From the 
recipient's point of view these are the flows 
of technology in the form of material, human 
and information resources, knowledge, skills, 
etc. From the supplier's point of view, 
except in barter transactions or similar 
arrangements, these are the payments for 
licences, the supply of products, technical 
assistance, etc. A further subdivision of 
technological resources can be distinguished.
1. Tangible Resources. Included in this 
category are those which cam be physically 
transferred from one place to another, as 
follows :
1.1 Material Resources. Refer to capital and 
intermediary goods, etc.
1.2 Human Resources. Refer to the actual 
movement of human resources from one place to
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another, i.e. the migration of personnel.
1.3 Information. Refers to elements of 
technical knowledge disembodied in mamuals, 
documentation, procedures, specifications, 
computer programs, etc.
2. Intangible Resources. Included in this 
category are those which cam not be 
physically transferred from one place to 
amother, but may be transmitted through 
learning processes, personal experience, 
training, etc. These are:
2.1 Knowledge, skills and abilities. Refer to 
the elements of Knowledge and capabilities 
required for:
a) Manufacturing an existing 
product or implementing a process 
auid marketing the output;
b) Modifying an existing product or 
process and marketing the output;
c) Developing a new product or 
process aind marketing the output.
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h) THE TIME VARIABLE. Refers to the periods 
of time involved in the transmission of 
resources between the transferor and 
transferee.
In chapters 7 and 8 an attempt is made to 
test the conceptual model presented above , by taking 
the example of the Cobra-Ferranti experience in 
international technology transfer. Chapter 7 auialyzes 
some aspects of the contractual agreement between the 
technology-supplying and recipient organizations, and 
the mechanisms utilized for the transmission of the 
technological resources involved in the transaction. 
Chapter 8 discusses four hypotheses related to the 
supplier and recipient's perceptions of individual, 
technological, organizational and environmental factors 
affecting the transfer process. In the next chapter, 
the methodology utilized for this study is discussed 
and a statement of the hypotheses is presented.
3. RESEARCH APPROACH AMD METHODOLOGY
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3. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter the literature on 
international technology transfer was reviewed, the 
concepts of technology and technology transfer were 
discussed and some mechanisms, actors and variables 
presumed to influence the process of transferring 
technological resources between organizations in 
countries at different levels of development were 
identified and integrated into a conceptual model.
The major objective of this chapter is to 
discuss the methodology utilized in this research. 
This chapter consists of six sections. Section 3.2 
describes the research design and methods employed in 
this study. Section 3.3 presents the hypotheses derived 
from the review of the literature and the conceptual 
model. Section 3.4 presents the unit of analysis 
utilized for the study. Section 3.5 deals with the 
procedure for the collection of data and the selection 
of the respondents. Section 3.6 describes the methods 
utilized for analyzing data and presenting the results.
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3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
A review of the literature, presented in 
chapter 2, indicated that there is no agreement on 
what the concept of technology means, and suggested, at 
the same time, the existence of wide connotations 
associated with the expression "Technology Transfer". 
Thus, assuming that there exists no theoretical 
consensus on the concepts under investigation, this 
study adopted a combination of an exploratory and 
descriptive approach. According to Selltiz and his 
associates, (1976) the exploratory research approach 
attempts "to gain familiarity with the phenomenon and 
to achieve new insights into it ..." (Selltiz et al., 
1976:90). The same authors suggest that the 
exploratory research design may be a useful strategy 
for :
a) Gaining a better understanding of a 
particular problem, process or situation;
b) Clarifying vague concepts for analysis;
c) Establishing priorities and information 
for subsequent studies;
d) Providing a collection of information on a 
particular phenonenon.
- 110 -
In view of the objectives of the research 
stated in section 1.3 and within the limitations 
imposed by the availability of research resources, the 
availability of time and subjects, the following 
methods of information gathering were used in this 
study:
1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE. The previous 
chapter indicated that the available 
literature on the positive aspects of the 
process by which technological resources are 
transmitted internationally is sparse. 
However, assuming that scientific
explanations may be produced only when 
empirical cuid theoretical knowledge are used 
together, (Toulmin, 1953) the review of the 
literature was considered am essential stage 
in clarifying the concepts for analysis, 
unifying the theoretical framework, gaining 
theoretical awareness in general, amd 
integrating the variables presumed to 
influence the transfer process into a 
conceptual model.
2. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS. These included both 
structured amd unstructured interviews with 
executives, managers, engineers amd
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technicians of the technology-supplying and 
recipient organizations involved in the 
process of transferring computer
manufacturing technology to Brazil.
Additional information was gathered from 
interviews with individuals from Government 
agencies, universities, manufacturers of 
computer and peripheral equipment,
professional associations auid other
organizations connected with the computer 
industry. Despite the problems of
systematizing information derived from open 
discussions, the use of unstructured 
interviews and qualitative data (Schneider et 
al, 1980; Patton, 1980) provided illuminating 
details which, perhaps, otherwise would be 
lost. However, information gathered through 
personal interview is subjected to biases 
derived, aunong other things, from the 
investigator and subjects' personalities, 
attitudes and expectations. (Rosenthal, 1956; 
Phillips, 1973)
3. THE EXAMINATION OF DOCUMENTS. Information 
was supplemented by the examination of some 
internal documents, contractual agreements,
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letters, technical data on the products and 
processes involved, amd other written 
material provided by the technology-supplying 
and recipient organizations. It was assumed 
that the use of important documents could 
help to identify some non-malleable variables 
in the transfer process, such as the terms 
amd conditions of the contractual agreement 
signed between the transferor amd transferee, 
etc. Although the exaunination of significant 
documents apparently produced some insights 
into the process of transference, their use 
was limited, aunong other things, by the 
complexity of the problem being analyzed, the 
investigator's perception of the material, 
the representativeness of the data, the 
adequacy of the information, the reliability 
of the record and the validity of the 
interpretations of the researcher. (Angell 
amd Freedman, 1953). In addition, some 
documents amd data were collected from the 
National Institute of Industrial Propriety 
(INPI), the Central Bank of Brazil (BC), the 
Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), and other 
organizations representing a cross-section of 
the computer industry in Brazil.
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4. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS. The amalysis of the 
Ferranti-Cobra experience in international 
trainsfer of computer manufacturing technology 
was another method utilized in this 
research.
The case study analysis is basically "a 
depiction either of a phase or the totality of relevant 
experience of some selected datum" (Foreman, 1948: 
408). The case study method, developed by the Havard 
Law School and adopted by Harvard Graduate School of 
Business Administration, has become widely used by 
social scientists in a variety of disciplines. 
(Chinoy, 1955; Argyris 1958; Udy, 1970) It involves, 
among other things, a detailed description or history 
of a problem or situation to be amalyzed and discussed, 
(MacNair, 1954) sometimes emphasizing the time 
dimension. In general, the major goal of the case 
study approach is seeking insights and explanation. As 
Selltiz and his associates have argued,
"Scientists working in relatively
unformulated areas, where there is little 
experience to serve as a guide, have found 
the intensive study of selected samples to be 
a particularly fruitful method for 
stimulating insights ..." (Selltiz et al.,
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1976:97-98).
The s cime authors mentioned above have 
suggested that the critical features of the case study 
approach are the following:
1. The attitude of the investigator. This 
refers to the extent to which the researcher 
is able to develop an attitude of alertness 
and perceptiveness, emphasizing seeking 
rather than testing, in the classical sense. 
As regards the conduct of the inquiry, it is 
dynamic in nature, and is constantly in the 
process of reformulating and redirecting as 
new information is acquired.
2. The intensity of the study. This refers 
to the possibility of obtaining sufficient 
data for characterizing auid explaining not 
only the problem, process or situation being 
analyzed but also features which are common 
to other cases.
3. The integrative powers of the 
investigator. These refer to his ability to 
put together the events, variables and 
actors, or the bits of information into a 
unified interpretation.
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According to Lipset and his associates, there 
are, basically, two kinds of approaches which may be 
taken for analyzing case study material. The first 
category may be designated as the particularizing or 
idiographic kind of analysis which is restricted to 
description and explanation of a single problem 
situation in order to provide information on the
present state of things and their dynaunics. The second 
category may be termed as the generalizing or
nomothetic kind of analysis which attempts to derive
empirical generalizations from the study of the case
material, utilizing the findings not for providing 
explanations for the case in itself, but as a basis for 
wider empirical generalizations. Lipset and his
associates explain the difference between the first and 
second categories of case study analysis:
"The crucial element which distinguishes 
these two types of amalysis is the way they 
treat general laws amd particular statements 
about the single case. The first kind of 
amalysis uses general laws or regularities in 
order to carry out the analysis of the
particular case... The second kind of
amalysis is just the reverse of this ... the 
social scientist in this kind of analysis
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attempts to utilize the particular case in 
developing general statements." (Lipset et 
al., 1970: 169)
Assuming that the particularizing and the 
generalizing types of analysis are not mutually 
exclusive, (Lipset et al., 1970) the present research 
attempted to combine, wherever possible, elements of 
the first and second categories of analysis. 
Therefore, am effort was made to describe amd analyze 
the process of transferring computer technology to 
Brazil, while, at the saune time, attempting to provide 
some statements which might be applicable to 
organizations operating in similar environments. 
However, it is recognized that the power of 
generalization derived from amalysis of case study 
material is limited. Nevertheless, considering the 
rather embryonic state of knowledge on the actual 
process of transferring technological resources between 
organizations in countries at different levels of 
development, perhaps some findings derived from the 
Ferranti- Cobra experience might help other 
organizations to gain faimiliarity with the problems 
associated with transferring computer manufacturing 
technology across national borders.
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3.3 THE HYPOTHESES
According to Aristotle our knowledge of 
reality is based on the humam phenomenon of 
perception. Broadly speaking, there is a real world of 
facts cuid objects that individuals perceive according 
to their experiences. Thus, in looking at the saune 
fact, problem or situation, individuals are likely to 
perceive different things (Drucker, 1970; Baranson, 
1969; Fayerweather, 1969), based on their cultural
fraune of reference or what Ansoff (1977) calls their 
"models of reality".
Considering that individuals from the
technology-supplying auid recipient organizations come 
from different cultural environments, auid based on the 
review of the literature and the conceptual model 
guiding this research, (Figures 2.4 auid 2.5) four 
alternative hypotheses were formulated to test whether
there would be significant differences between the
supplier and recipient's perceptions of factors
affecting the transference of technological resources 
during the initial (1975-1976) intermediary, 
(1977-1978) auid present (1979-1980) stages of the 
transfer process. The following hypotheses were 
formulated as vehicles of exploration:
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HYPOTHESIS NO. 1 There are significant
differences between the supplier and
recipient's perceptions of individual factors 
affecting the transmission of technological 
resources at the initial, intermediary auid
current stages of the process.
HYPOTHESIS NO. 2 There are significant
differences between the supplier auid the 
recipient's perceptions of technological
factors affecting the transmission of
technological resources at the initial,
intermediary auid current stages of the
process.
HYPOTHESIS NO. 3 There are significant
differences between the supplier auid
recipient's perceptions of organizational
factors affecting the transmission of
technological resources at the initial,
intermediary auid current stages of the
process.
HYPOTHESIS NO.4 There are significant 
differences between the supplier auid
recipient's perceptions of environmental
factors affecting the transmission of
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technological resources at the initial, 
intermediary amd current stages of the 
process.
Appendix 4 presents the method of measurement 
amd provides operational definitions of individual, 
technological, organizational amd environmental 
measures employed for testing the hypotheses. Chapter 8 
presents the results obtained from testing the 
hypotheses and a discussion of the findings.
3.4 THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
According to Lipset et al., the generalizing 
type of amalysis involves "the necessity of delineating 
units of analysis amd characterizing the units 
according to certain general concepts or properties". 
(Lipset et al., 1970:170)
The unit of analysis utilized in the present 
research was the actual process of technology transfer.
As stated in section 2.3, technology transfer 
was conceptualized as the process by which one 
organization transmits to another the technological 
resources necessary for the manufacture of a product, 
the implementation of a process, or the rendering of a
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service. The concept of technology was considered in a 
broad sense, including capital amd intermediary goods; 
individual knowledge, skills, know-how and abilities; 
and information in general.
Considering the complexity of international 
technology transfer, (Rubenstein, 1974; Seurat; 1976; 
OECD, 1981; Mansfield, 1975; Hertz, 1980) part of the 
present investigation focussed on the process by which 
the various forms of technology were transmitted, in an 
attempt to discover and amalyze, in so far as possible, 
what were the major participants, strategic variables 
and conditions influencing the transmission of computer 
manufacturing technology from one country to another. 
By utilizing the technology transfer process as the 
unit of investigation and by analyzing the matter from 
the technology supplier amd recipient's amgles, it was 
expected that this would provide some insights into the 
nature of the technology transfer problems, as 
perceived from each side.
3.5 THE PROCEDURE
In order to assess the supplier and 
recipient's perceptions of the process of transferring 
technological resources to Brazil and in an attempt to 
identify the multiplicity of variables affecting the
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transmission of computer production technology, this 
research gathered information from three different 
sources, as follows:
GROUP 1 - THE TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER. This
group consisted of five experts from the 
technology-supplying organization. These were
Ferranti's executives, mauiagers and engineers directly 
involved in the transmittal of technological resources 
to Cobra, since the initial phase of the trauisfer 
process. (1975-1976).
GROUP 2 - THE TECHNOLOGY RECIPIENT. This
group consisted of nineteen experts from the recipient 
orgamization. These were the recipient's executives, 
managers, hardware and software engineers, auid 
technicians also directly involved in the process of 
transferring computer technology to Cobra since the 
early stage.
GROUP 3 - COMPUTER INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS.
This group consisted of thirty two subjects, 
representing a cross-section of the computer industry 
in Brazil. It included representatives from the 
following organizations:
3.1 Government Agencies and State-owned
Corporations. These were the Brazilian
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Digital Electronics Corporation (DIGIBRAS); 
the Agency for Financing of Studies auid 
Projects (FINEP); The Federal Data Processing 
Service (SERPRO); and the Brazilian 
Mechanical Corporation (EMBRAMEC).
3.2 Manufacturers of Computers auid 
Peripheral Equipment. These were IBM do 
Brasil Ltda. (IBM); Burroughs Eletronica 
Ltda. (Burroughs); Sistemas de Informacao 
Distribuida S.A. (SID); Labo Eletronica S.A. 
(LABO); Conpart Industrie Eletronica Ltda. 
(CONPART); Sistemas e Computadores S.A. 
(SISCO).
3.3 Universities. These were the Federal 
University of Rio de Jauieiro (UFRJ) ; auid the 
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. (PUC).
3.4 Associations auid other organizations. 
These were the Brazilian Association of 
Manufacturers of Computers and Peripheral 
Equipment (ABICOMP); The Brazilian Computing 
Society (SBC); The Brazilian Society of 
Computer Users (SUCESU) ; auid the Brazilian 
Association, of Electrical auid Electronic 
Industries. (ABNEE).
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Individuals from the technology-supplying amd 
receiving organizations were selected at random on the 
basis of their participation in the initial, 
(1975-1976) intermediary, (1977-1978) auid current 
(1979-1980) stages of the trauisfer process. Since this 
study intended to auialyze the supplier auid recipient's 
perceptions of the factors affecting the trauisfer 
process over a fixed period of time, participation in 
these three stages of the process was the critérium 
adopted for selecting the respondents for these two 
grourps. These individuals were considered experts in 
their field of activity, in the sense proposed by 
Dalkey (1969) in studying strategic economic and 
military isssues in the United States. Perhaps, the 
major disadvantage of adopting this critérium was the 
relatively small number of subjects in both groups. On 
the other hauid, the anticipated gains in 
representativeness of the data seemed to outweigh the 
costs. Subjects from the cross section of the 
Brazilian computer industry were invited to participate 
in this research on the basis of the investigator's 
access to individuals and organizations.
The field work for this research was carried 
out in Great Britain (GROUP 1) and Brazil. (GROUPS 2 
and 3). Following the initial contact and open 
discussions with the technology supplier, the interview
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guide was designed. It was subsequently tested with 
two members of the supplying organization. Following 
the pilot test, some questions were modified to cover 
more situations amd a few open-ended type of questions 
were included.
The subjects from both groups were exaunined 
through interviews amd open discussions in their 
natural settings in England amd Brazil. Eighteen out of 
thirty two individuals from the computer industry were 
interviewed during the XIII National Data Processing 
Congress in Brazil. The remaining interviews were held 
in their respective organizations.
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS AND REPORTING
In this research, the following procedures 
were utilized for analyzing data, drawing the figures 
amd preparing the final report:
a) Statistical procedures. In order to test 
the hypotheses, student's t-tests of 
statistical significance were performed on 
the weighted data at group level, using the 
"T-test" subprogram within the Statistical
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Package for the Social Sciences. (Nie et al., 
1975). The relationship between Brazil's 
Gross Domestic Product auid its installed 
computer base was tested by using the 
'Crosstabs' subprogram, also available within 
the saune statistical package. Both
subprograms were run in the ICL 2980 computer 
system, available at the University of Bath.
b) Drawings. The graphics, isometric 
projections and figures in this research were 
produced using specially developed 'FORTRAN' 
prograuns and the 'GINOGRAF ' and 'GINOSURF' 
libraries of subroutines. The prograuns were 
run in the Honeywell's Multics system, 
(Honeywell, 1979) available at the University 
of Bath, through the South West Universities 
Computer Network (SWUCN).
c) The Final Report. The original text of 
this study was edited with the "QEDX" editor, 
auid the final report produced using the 
'RUNOFF' text formatter. Both of these 
facilities were available within the multics 
system, at the University of Bath.
THE BRAZILIAN ENVIRONMENT
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4. THE BRAZILIAN ENVIRONMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to provide an overview of 
the Brazilian economic, political and legal background, 
and the regulatory framework on technology transfer 
transactions. It consists of three main sections. 
Section 4.2 gives a general view of Brazil's economic, 
legal and political background. Section 4.3 presents 
the evolution of the domestic and external sectors of 
the economy in the period 1970-1980. Section 4.4 
presents the Brazilian regulatory fraunework on 
technology transfer transactions.
4.2 ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
4.2.1 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
In 1500, the Portuguese navigator Pedro 
Alvares Cabral discovered Brazil, in an attempt to 
reach the Indies by the Western route. Initially 
Cabral thought he had landed on an islamd, so he naimed 
the country. The Island of Vera Cruz. Later, King 
Manuel of Portugal changed this naune to Brazil, after 
some reserves of 'pau-brazil' (Brazil-wood) which were
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found there. This heavy wood, also known as lignum 
Brasiliense (Entick, 1770), the produce of a
papilionaceous plant of the species caesalpinia 
ochinata, much sought by sixteenth-century textile 
manufacturers for dyeing red, (Webster, 1853:150) 
became Brazil's first exploitable resource.
In subsequent years Brazil was colonized by 
the Portuguese and seems to have experienced its first 
case in international technology transfer. The
Portuguese, who had been growing sugar in Portugal, 
Madeira and in the African colony of Sao Tome, took
with them, initially to Sao Vicente amd then, to the
North East of Brazil what Adsun Smith (1776) called the 
superior "knowledge of agriculture and other useful 
arts". As a result, the sugar plantations of the North 
East of Brazil became successful and were one of the 
main sources of economic prosperity for the country 
during the sixteenth émd seventeenth centuries. In the 
second half of the seventeenth century, in view of the 
increased competition from the Antilles, the exports of 
sugar-cane declined. (Furtado, 1964). Fortunately, in 
the end of the seventeenth century gold and precious 
stones were discovered in Minas Gerais. Considering 
the economic importance of gold in the context of the 
European mercantilistic societies, the exploration of 
gold soon became top priority in Brazil. According to
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Smith, (1775) gold imported from the Brazilian mines 
became so abundant for the Portuguese empire that, 
under the Methuen Treaty signed in 1703, Portugal 
imported textiles from England in exchamge for gold. 
In the end of the eighteenth century, with the apparent 
exhaustion of the gold mines, the decline of the mining 
boom, and the series of inventions which transformed 
the textile industry in England, (Landes, 1959) the 
plantation of cotton assumed a new economic importance 
in Brazil. The cotton cycle, however, was relatively
sort, since that by the end of the eighteenth century, 
coffee had been introduced in Brazil from the French 
Guyana. Coffee rapidly became Brazil's most successful 
crop in terms of exports. The growth of coffee in the 
South of Brazil was accompanied by the rise of the 
rubber plantations in the Amazon region. In this 
century, the exports of natural latex for the 
production of rubber beccune cin important source of 
income and prosperity for the Amazon region until the 
twenties, when Brazil faced strong competition from the 
rubber plantations in Java.
Since the nineteenth century, except during 
the rubber boom, coffee has been Brazil's most 
important crop. As can be seen in table 4.1, until the 
mid-sixties, coffee represented over fifty per cent of 
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importance of manufactured goods (30%) exceeded that of 
coffee exports (22%). Nevertheless, Brazil has 
remained the world's largest producer and exporter of 
coffee. According to Campos, (1980) the production of
coffee has been the main impetus behind the process of 
industrialization in Brazil. He distinguishes three 
main phases in the Brazilian industrialization process, 
as follows:
a) The industrialization of Sao Paulo. In 
the early part of this century, the expansion 
of coffee plantations, in response to a 
rising demamd for coffee in the United States 
and Europe, (Deaui, 1969, cited in Campos, 
1980) led to further investments in 
agriculture by immigrant entrepreneurs, a 
diversification of agricultural exports, 
railroads, industrial investments, and an 
extraordinary period of economic growth. 
This incipient stage of industrialization is 
denominated as an "entrepreneurial export-led 
growth".
b) The import-substitution industrialization. 
In the fifties, despite the wide variety of 
strategies adopted by national Governments, 
in Latin America, the promotion of
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industrialization via import-substitution 
policies, was inspired in the Prebisch 
manifesto of 1949. Regarding Brazil, Caunpos 
stresses the importance of recognizing the 
influence of the second world war, balance of 
payments difficulties, the expansion of the 
domestic market as a result of export growth, 
and the Government development policies. He 
argues that, in the second half of the 
fifties, the industrialization of the country 
was not financed by local savings but through 
foreign capital in the form of direct 
investments and external loams. In addition, 
it concentrated on final goods, as opposed to 
the domestic production of basic inputs. In 
general, he suggests that, from the fifties 
to the early seventies, the industrialization 
of Brazil had been characterized by a 
coalition between the Government and the 
foreign investor, while local entrepreneurs 
tended to concentrate on the traditional 
industries or supplying the new industries.
c) The second-generation import-substitution 
industrialization. According to Caunpos, the 
current stage of industrialization started
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after the world petroleum crisis and
represented, essentially, a Brazilian 
response to the international economic 
conjuncture. As demonstrated in Table 4.2, 
this phase of industrialization is
characterized by growing imports of capital 
goods and intermediary inputs. Another 
important characteristic is the emergence of 
new organizational forms of co-operation for 
the transference of advanced, technologically 
intensive industries. In these areas, the 
Brazilian Government has been promoting 
tripartite joint-ventures between State 
companies, indigenous entrepreneurs and
foreign suppliers of technology.
As Deéui (1969) and Campos (1980) have 
suggested, the incipient industrialization of Sao Paulo 
by immigrant entrepreneurs, in the first half of this 
century, seems to have been the main impetus behind the 
country's industrialization process. In the fifties, 
Brazil, as most other Latin American countries, began 
to adopt import-substitution policies. (OECD, 1979) 
Initially, the policies of the Brazilian Government 
seem to have emphasized imports of capital goods and 
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durable consumer goods. (Baer, 1965; Leff, 1968; 
Brazil, Ministry of Planning, 1969; Suzigem, 1974) In 
the late sixties and early seventies, the Governmental 
import-substitution policies appear to have 
concentrated on capital and intermediary goods, euid 
sectors of high technological content such as 
electronics, computers, the chemical cind petrochemical 
industry, etc. (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 
1973, 1974; Doellinger, 1977; Bonelli, 1978; Campos, 
1980).
4.2.2 POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Between 1500 and 1821 Brazil was ruled under
the Portuguese colonial regime. In 1808, when
Napoleon's troops were trying to invade Portugal, the 
Royal Family fled to Brazil, forming in 1815 the United 
Kingdom of Brazil and Portugal. The King, Joao VI 
remained in Brazil until 1821, when he returned to 
Portugal. In 1822, his son. Prince Regent Pedro, 
proclaimed Brazil's independence from Portugal. 
Emperor Pedro I ruled Brazil until 1831, when he 
abdicated in favour of his son, Pedro II, who stayed in 
power until a new form of Government was installed in 
the country on November 15th, 1889. Since the
proclamation of the Republic in 1889, Brazil has
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adopted a federal form of Government. Between the 
proclamation of the Republic and the 1954 intervention 
of the Brazilian military, (Stepan, 1971) Brazil had 
twenty four presidents. Since 1964 Brazil has been 
ruled by five military presidents. In 1979, the 
Electoral College elected General Joao Batista de 
Oliveira Figueredo to serve until March 1985. 
According to the National Westminster Bauik (1979) and 
the Bank of London and South America (1980), this new 
administration is committed to the further gradual 
political liberalization of the country. As one 
veteran Brazilian politician commented, since the late 
seventies, Brazil seems to be "making the transition to 
real democracy" (Financial Times, 1978:1).
According to the present constitution adopted 
in 1967, and revised in 1969, the Federal Government 
exerts exclusive jurisdiction on certain matters such 
as electoral legislation, national security, the 
national debt, and the foreign, monetary and fiscal 
policies. In formulating economic policy the President 
is assisted by the Economic Development Council (CDE). 
The permanent members of the CDE are the Ministers of 
Industry and Commerce, Finance, Agriculture and 
Interior. Other ministers may join the CDE according 
to the nature of the matters being discussed. During 
the CDE sessions, the President of the Republic
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presides over the Council, assisted by his Planning 
Secretar iat.
The organs directly connected to the 
President of the Republic are the High Command of the 
Armed Forces; the Attorney General's office; the 
Department for the Administration of Public Services; 
the General Staff of the Armed Forces; the National 
Security Council; the National Information Service, the 
Planning Secretariat, and the Civil and Military 
Households.
Since 1960, the Brazilian Government 
opperates in the Federal District of Brasilia. Federal 
legislation is determined by the National Congress 
which is composed of a Senate and a Federal Chamber of 
Deputies. In 1979, the Senate had 67 members, while 
the Chamber of Deputies was composed of 420 
representatives from the various states. (EIU, 1979b). 
The President of the Republic is selected by an 
electoral college, subject to approval by the National 
Congress. The President exerts executive power for six 
years and is not eligible for re-election. The 
senators cxnd deputies are elected for eight and six 
years, respectively.
The judicial system is comprised of The 
Federal Supreme Court, The Federal Court of Appeals and 
other tribunals such as Military, State and Labour
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Courts.
Presently, Brazil has twenty-two states, four 
territories, and the federal district of Brasilia. 
Although each state has its own constitution and 
executive, legislative and judicial powers, they 
operate in conformity with the broader legal framework 
cuid policies of the Federal Government.
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4.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMY
4.3.1 THE DOMESTIC SECTOR
Between 1947 and 1962, the Brazilian economy 
managed to keep the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growing at an average annual rate of 6.6 per cent 
(Stoneman, 1981). During 1963 and 1964, the economy 
experienced what Caunpos (1980:12) calls "stagflation". 
In other words, the Brazilian economy showed signs of 
stagnation auid inflation "well before this hybrid 
creature made its appearance in the European scene".
The real growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product
declined from 10.3 in 1961 to 5.3 in 1962 and 1.5
percent in 1963. According to the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation's estimates, shown in Table 4.3, the general 
price index grew from 37.0 in 1961 to 51.6 in 1962, 
reaching the unprecedented levels of 75.4 and 90.5 per 
cent in 1963 aind 1964, respectively. The Economic and 
Social Planning Institute (IPEA) suggested that the 
1964-1964 period was characterized by a general slowing 
of economic activity, relatively high public sector 
deficit, a growing climate of political instability, a 
reduction in foreign investments and a decline in 
domestic savings rates. Following the military
intervention in 1964, the Brazilian Government
TABLE 4.3
BRAZIL'S ANNUAL RATES OF INFLATION 1960-1980
YEAR GENERALPRICEINDEX
RIO DE JANEIRO COST OF LIVING INDEX
1960 29.2 28.2



















1980 100.2 E C. 8
Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation, in Stoneman (1980) 
* Subsequently estimated at approximately 26%
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continued to emphasize industrialization by 
import-substitution, but at the same time, implemented 
an economic stabilization programme which envisaged, 
among other things, the control of the level of
inflation, the enlargement of investment opportunities, 
the promotion of domestic savings, the reduction of the 
public sector deficit, and changes in the tax
collection system to improve revenue. (IPEA, 1978; 
Stoneman, 1981).
In the late sixties and early seventies,
substantial progress had been made by the economy. 
(The World Bank, 1981). By 1973 the General Price
Index had declined to 15.1 per cent, the public deficit 
had been eliminated, the balance of trade registered a 
surplus of US$ 7 million, and the real GDP growth 
reached its highest level in Brazil's history. (14%).
During the 1968-1973 period the average annual growth
of the real GDP exceeded ten per cent. According to 
the Financial Times, (1979) the Brazilian "economic 
miracle" might have continued at this pace, except for 
the world petroleum crisis late in 1973.
In general, the relatively rapid industrial
expansion of the country in the last two decades, seems 
to have produced some structural changes in the 
economy. According to the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, (OECD) since the late
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seventies, because of its rapid shifts in the pattern 
of output and trade, Brazil was considered as the 
leading industrial producer of the Third World. (OECD, 
1979). The emergence of Brazil as a "Newly 
Industrializing Country" (NIC) was characterized, among 
other things, by an expansion of exports with a growing 
share of manufactures on world markets. (OECD, 1979; 
The World Bank 1981, 1982). Regarding Brazil's recent 
pattern of economic growth, one article in The Banker 
stated:
"Since the 1960s (Brazil) has undergone a 
classic industrial revolution. Major new 
industries including petrochemicals, steel, 
capital goods, automobiles (with annual 
production already putting Brazil in the 
million-plus league) have sent the country 
shooting up the table to become number ten 
among the world's economic powers ...." (The 
Banker, 1979:31).
4.3.1.1 GDP AND THE LEVEL OF INVESTMENTS
Table 4.4 shows Brazil's Gross Domestic 
Product and Gross Fixed Capital Formation rates in the
TABLE 4.4 REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND GROSS FIXED CAPITAL
FORMATION RATES, BRAZIL 1960-1980
YEAR REAL GDP (ANNUAL % INCREASE)






















Sources: 196U-1971 (IPEA, 1978)
1972-1980 Central Bank of Brazil
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period 1960-1980. An examination of table 4.4
indicates that in the 1968-1974 period, GDP growth, in 
real terms, averaged over 10 per cent per annum. From 
1974 onwards, the Brazilian economy began to reflect 
some problems associated with the deep changes which 
occurred in the international petroleum market. As a 
non-oil developing country importing approximately 
eighty per cent of its petroleum consumption, (The 
World BanK, 1981) Brazil suffered the impact of the 
increases in world oil prices. Among other things, 
relatively lower GDP growth rates were observed after 
1973. The real annual rate of GDP changed from 14% in 
1973 to 9.8% in 1974%.
During the period 1974-1980, despite the
unfavourable world economic conjuncture, and associated 
balance of trade problems, the GDP seems to have 
recovered reasonably well for a non-oil developing 
country. In 1976 the real GDP grew at 9 per cent. By 
the end of 1978, Brazil's GDP was estimated to have 
been US$ 188.6 millions, one of the ten largest among 
the nations of the Western World (Gabeira, 1981). In
1980, notwithstanding the recent increases in oil 
prices and the highest level of inflation ever reached 
in Brazil's history (100.2%), the GDP recorded a real 
growth rate of 8%. In general, one factor which seems 
to have contributed significantly to the sustained
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growth of the economy, has been a relatively high rate 
of capital formation through domestic savings and 
foreign investments. As csui be seen in Table 4.4 in 
the period 1974-1980, the rate of gross capital
formation averaged 23.4% of the GDP. According to the 
Central Bank of Brazil, in 1975, the relative 
contribution of domestic and foreign savings to the
gross fixed capital formation was 78.8 amd 21.2 per
cent, respectively. In 1980, these proportions chauiged 
to 75 and 25 per cent, suggesting a higher
participation by foreign investments.
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4.3.1.2. SECTORAL OUTPUT
Table 4.5 presents Brazil's sectoral real 
output variation in the period 1970-1980, in percentage 
terms. Figure 4.1 illustrates graphically, the auinual 
real output variation of the GDP, amd that of the 
industrial amd agricultural sectors separately. Figure
4.2 presents the results of the services sector divided 
into two subsectors, namely. Commerce, amd Transport 
and Communications. In general terms, am examination 
of Table 4.5 amd figure 4.1 amd 4.2 seems to indicate 
that, after 1973, there has been a trend towards 
relatively lower growth rates of sectoral output.
4.3.1.2.1 AGRICULTURE
Regarding the performance of the agricultural 
sector, am examination of table 4.5 amd figure 4.1 
appears to indicate that, since the early seventies, it 
has experienced more problems tham the industrial amd 
services sectors. During the 1970-1980 period the 
agricultural sector grew at am average of approximately 
5% per year. As it can be seen in Figure 4.1, the 
agricultural production rose by 11.4% in 1971, 8.5% in 
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expansion of 1971 (1%) and negative growth of 1978
(-1.7%). In 1978, however, according to the Central 
Bank of Brazil, agricultural activities were affected 
by severe droughts and frosts. Apparently, these 
climatic problems led to a substantial decline in 
agricultural production of corn, soyabeans and rice, a 
reduction in the exports of these products, and an 
overall negative growth rate for the sector.
Traditionally, agriculture has played a 
major role in the Brazilian economy, providing, in
1976, employment for approximately 49% of the country's 
population. According to Banco do Brasil (1979), in
1977, the 9.6% growth rate observed in the sector has
not been a function of greater capital or labour
productivity, but the result of a 22% increase in the 
area of cultivation, which changed from 36.7 million 
hectares (1970-1972) to 44.8 million hectares in
1976-1978. Although the production of coffee remains
Brazil's most important agricultural activity in terms 
of export earnings, in recent years, the relative
importance of soybeams has been growing steadily.
(Table 4.1). Other important crops are cocoa, rice,
corn, onions, sugar cauie, cotton, peanuts, white
potatoes, beans, tobacco leaves, orsuiges, cassava,
tomatoes and wheat.
Since the sixties, the relative participation
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of agriculture in the GDP has been declining. In 1960, 
the agricultural product represented 23.2% of the GDP,, 
and 11.2% in 1978. In the late seventies, in an 
attempt to improve the performance of the primary 
sector and optimize Brazil's vast agricultural 
potential, the Government has given special priority to 
the development of the sector. Special credit lines 
were established through Banco do Brasil, and 
assistance programmes set up by the Ministry of the 
Interior, in a massive effort to modernize the rather 




Table 4.5 and figure 4.1 show the evolution 
of the industrial sector. Between 1970 and 1973, the 
industrial sector, which comprises manufacturing, 
mining, construction and public utilities, grew at am 
average rate of 13%, reaching its highest level in 1973
(15.9%). Since 1974, however, the industrial sector
has been growing at lower rates, recovering reasonably 
in 1976 (10.7%), 1978 (8.1%) and 1980 (8%). In 1977, 
when the industrial product grew at its lowest rate 
(3.9%), in the period under analysis, it accounted for 
approximately 31% of the GDP.
The manufacturing sector is particularly 
important for the Brazilian economy, since most of the 
post-war industrial expansion of Brazil seems to be
linked with the growth of manufacturing industries 
producing durable consumer goods such as household 
appliances, motor vehicles, rubber products, office 
equipment, etc.
The evolution of the manufacturing sector
between 1972 and 1980 is presented in table 4.6. As 
can also be seen in table 4.6, the manufacturing sector 
tended to grow at relatively lower rates after 1973, 
particularly in 1975 (3.8%) and 1977 (2.7%). In 1977, 
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industrial activities mostly affected were transport 
equipment (-2.7%), and textile and clothing (-2.3%). 
In subsequent years, however, the manufacturing sector 




The evolution of the services sector,
subdivided into Commerce auid Transport auid 
Communications, is presented in Table 4.5 and 
illustrated in figure 4.2. As shown in Table 4.5 and 
figure 4.2, in general, the services sector achieved
lower growth rates since 1974. This sector, which
accounts for over fifty per cent of Brazil's Gross 
Domestic Product since the sixties, seems to have
suffered the direct impact of the world petroleum 
crisis. Since highways are the principal mode of
transportation in Brazil, representing, in 1976, 
approximately 80% of the freight traffic amd over 90% 
of passenger traffic, the transport and communications 
sector was particularly affected by increases in 
petroleum prices. The real growth rates of transport 
and communication activities declined from 17.1% in 
1973 to 12.7% (1974), 11.8% (1975), 7.5% (1976) and
4.1% in 1976, the lowest level registered in the period 
1980-1980. As from 1977, the growth rates tended to 
improve, especially in 1979 (10.1%) and 1980 (12%).
The commerce sector also seems to have 
experienced lower growth rates after the oil crisis 
late in 1973. From relatively high growth rates in the
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period 1970-1973, it reached its lowest level in 1975 
and 1977 (3.5%). In subsequent years, however, it
experienced higher rates of growth.
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4.3.2 THE EXTERNAL SECTOR
4.3.2.1. INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Between 1968 and 1973, when a process of
rapid economic expansion was observed in Brazil, the
country's balance of payments registered surpluses, 
reflecting a tendency of absorbing foreign investments 
cind external loams to finamce the industrialization 
prograunmes. However, in 1974, in view of the 
substantial deficit in the current account (US$ 6.8 
billions), Brazil's balamco of payments recorded the 
highest deficit in its history. (US$ 1.0 billion).
Table 4.7 presents Brazil's Balance of
Payments in the period 1970-1980, amd figure 4.3 
illustrates the balance of trade. As cam also be seen 
in figure 4.3, in 1974, the balance of trade recorded
am unprecedented deficit of over US$ 4.5 billions. As
shown in Table 4.7, the largest contributor to the 
balance of trade deficit was the doubling of imports 
from 6 to 12 ÜS$ billions. In 1974, the imports of
petroleum and derivatives more tham tripled,
representing nearly half of the balance of trade
deficit. This deteriorated balamce of trade remained 
in deficit until 1980, except for a small surplus 
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As regards the capital account of the 
international balance of payments, an examination of 
table 4.7 indicates that it has remained in surplus 
throughout the 1970-1980 period. It seems that this 
can be attributable to two main factors: The level of
foreign investment in the country and Brazil's medium 
and long-term loans. According to Central Bauik of 
Brazil's estimates, the amount of net foreign
investments in Brazil rose from US$ 337 millions in
1972 to US$ 1,923 millions in 1980. In other words, 
the not inflow of capital in the form of foreign direct 
investment has grown at an average annual rate of over 
24% in the period 1972-1980. In 1980, the total amount 
of foreign direct investments represented approximately 
19.6% of the surplus of the capital account. The 
Brazilian loans and financing with private bôuiks amd
international organizations and government agencies 
reached over US$ 11 billion in 1980.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the structure of 
Brazilian imports in the period 1970-1980. An 
examination of figure 4.4 reveals the rising importance 
of petroleum and derivatives in the context of the 
Brazilian balauice of trade. In 1970, imports of
petroleum and derivatives represented 10.9% of the 
total imports, consumer goods (14.7%), raw materials 
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importance of petroleum had increased to 25%, while the 
other items decreased to 6.8% (consumer goods), 35% 
(raw materials) and 32.3% (capital goods). In 1980, 
imports of petroleum auid derivatives increased to 
44.5%, while the other items further reduced their 
relative participation to 5.7% (consumer goods), 30.7% 
(raw materials) and 19.1% (capital goods). In 1980, 
the total amount spent on imports of petroleum and 
derivatives (US$ 10.210 million) corresponded to over 
50% of Brazilian exports, 18.9% of the gross foreign 
debt, and 78.4% of the amount spent on debt service. 
(Amortization and net interest) This seems to indicate 
briefly, the extent to which, the Brazilian economy was 
affected by the increases in world petroleum prices.
One factor contributing to the growing 
deficit in the current account, has been the increasing 
deficit in the services account, which includes the net 
values of transportation, interest, profits and 
dividends, and other services. In 1980, net interest 
remittances totalled US$ 7,457 millions, which 
corresponded to approximately 57% of the deficit in the 
current account, as compared with 30% in 1973. A 
substantial sunount of the services deficit seems to be 
attributable to Brazil's massive foreign debt.
Table 4.8 presents the evolution of Brazil's 
foreign debt and international reserves, in the period
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1970-1980. An examination of Table 4.8 reveals that 
the ratio net debt/exports evolved from 0.99 in 1973 to 
2.33 in 1980. In other words, in 1973 only one year of 
exports would be sufficient to cover the country's net 
debt, as opposed to the equivalent of two years and 
four months in 1980. In 1980, the public sector was 
responsible for 69.2% of the total debit, whereas the 
private sector share was 30.8%. The question of 
Brazil's massive foreign debt has been a source of much 
concern and discussion. In 1979, one article in the 
Banker stated:
"An increasing number of foreign bamkers are 
finding the country's debt, US$ 43.5 billions 
at the end of 1978, awesome. Yet, aware of 
the country's resource potential, amd rating 
it politically stable, they have shared the 
optimism of Brazil's expans ion-minded
technocrats. They awarded the country a high 
credit rating and the foreign bauiks poured 
into Sao Paulo amd Rio" (The Banker, 1979)
The saune article suggests that increasing 
aunounts of foreign resources were utilized to finamce 
the big investments in the country's capital goods and 
resource industries, as well as to cover the increasing 
deficits in the Balance of Trade, largely affected by
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the rising petroleum prices. Although Brazil's total 
debt seems substantial, as it can be seen in Table 4.8, 
to some extent, it has been mitigated by the relatively 
high level of international reserves held by the 
country. (National Westminster Bauik, 1979). Regarding 
Brazil's extreme indebtedness, one Government official 
provided the following comment:
"If you owe your bankers a small sum you have
to do what they say. If you owe them as much
as we owe our bankers, then the roles tend to
be reversed". (Financial Times, 1978:1).
4.3.2.2 FOREIGN TRADE
Table 4.9 shows Brazil's geographic 
distribution of trade in the period 1972- 1980, in 
percentage terms. Regarding exports, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) seems to be Brazil's most 
important market since 1972. In addition, a 
substantial value of Brazilian imports also derived 
from the EEC. Recently, however, Brazil has had a
trade surplus with the EEC countries. The second most 
important export market for Brazil are the United
States. Traditionally, Brazil has had trade deficits 
with the United States. Another importauit trade area
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(ALALC). Although Venezuela and Equador are part of 
ALALC, their relative share of foreign trade with 
Brazil appears under the OPEC countries. In recent 
years, the OPEC countries have been absorbing a growing 
share of Brazilian exports. Nevertheless, in view of 
Brazil's increasing imports of petroleum auid 
derivatives, as shown in figure 4.4, since 1974 Brazil 
has been having substantial trade deficits with the 
OPEC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Venezuela, Iran and Gaüson. Between January and 
November 1980, Brazil's trade deficit with the OPEC 
countries reached over US$ 7 billion. Since 1972 
Brazil has been expanding its exports to the Socialist 
countries of the Mutual Assistance Economic Council 
(COMECON). Japan also constitutes another important 
trading partner for Brazil, both in terms of exports 
and imports. Between January and November 1980, Brazil 
managed to achieve trade surpluses with Japan, LAFTA, 
EEC, COMECON, and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) .
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4.4 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
4.4.1 THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
In December 1970, the Brazilian Government
created the National Institute of Industrial Property 
(INPI) as a federal autarchy connected with the
Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
The Institute's main objectives were "to
execute, nationally the regulations which control the 
industrial property, in view of its social, economic, 
juridical and technical end". Beside these 
attributions, the Institute was designed, and aimed at 
the country's economic development process, to take 
"measures to accelerate and regulate the transfer of 
technology auid establish better conditions for 
negotiation and utilization of patents". The sole
paragraph of Law No. 5648 of December 11, 1970 which 
created the Institute, also stressed that it should 
"issue reports as to the convenience of signing, 
ratifying or denouncing conventions, treaties, pacts or 
agreements on industrial property". (Brazil, National 
Congress, 1970).
The regulatory mission of the National 
Institute of Industrial Property regarding technology 
transactions was emphasized by Law No. 5772 of December
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21, 1971, which formalized the Brazilian Code of
Industrial Property. Article 126 of this law stated: 
"All the acts or contracts which involve the 
trauisfer of technology are hereby subject to 
legalization by the National Institute of
Industrial Property, according to article 2,
sole paragraph, of Law No. 5.048 of December 
11, 1970" (Brazil, National Congress 1971).
Although the National Institute of Industrial 
Property was established in 1970 for regulating the 
flow of technology and providing a legislative 
framework on the registration of patents and
trademarks, the idea of protecting the intellectual 
property of inventors and grauiting them exclusive 
privileges was not new in Brazil. The juridical basis
of the patent grant, was laid by Dom Joao VI, in 1809,
approximately one year after the Portuguese royal
faunily had fled to Brazil, when Napoleon's troops were 
trying to invade Lisbon in aui attempt to get Portugal's 
allicuice against Great Britain. Thus, the Brazilian
Patent Law of July 15, 1809, signed when Rio becaune the 
seat of the Portuguese Empire, becaune the fourth modern 
legislation on patents introduced in the world,
following the English, United States', French statutes. 
(United Nations, 1964:10) The basic principles of the 
Brazilian Patent Law of 1809 were:
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"It being highly convenient that inventors of 
any new machinery should have am exclusive 
privilege for a certain time, I hereby order 
that no matter who should be in such a 
position to submit the plauis of his invention 
to the Royal Board of Trade which verifying 
that such invention is really worthy should
be given the exclusive right for the period
of fourteen years after which the invention 
should be published so that all the nation 
might have the right to share the benefits of 
such invention". (United Nations, 1964: 10)
Perhaps, it is interesting to note a dual 
preoccupation by the law. First, regarding the 
"exclusive privilege" intended to reward individuals as 
an incentive for their inventions. Second, concerning 
the macro economic implications of the technology, "so
that all the nation might have the right to share the
benefits of such invention".
Later, in July 7th 1884, under the reign of 
Dom Pedro II, Brazil joined the International Union for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, which was 
established by the Paris Convention in May 1883. The 
United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the Republic of
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Viêt-Nam also joined the "Paris-ünion" in 1884, while 
the United States, Japan and Germany adhered in 1887, 
1899 and 1903, respectively. (United Nations, 1964:14)
Under the main provisions of the Paris 
Convention is the principle of "national treatment". 
(Article 2). Basically it establishes that nationals 
cind non-nationals be given the same rights by member 
states, whether applicants or patentees live in the 
country or are domiciled in a participating country. 
However, this principle does not necessarily mean
"reciprocal treatment" for the member states. (United 
Nations, 1964:14) Thus, according to the national
treatment principle, each participating nation sets its 
own framework and laws concerning the rights auid 
obligations connected with industrial property auid 
applies the legislation uniformly to nationals and
non-nationals.
The evolution of the Brazilian regulatory 
framework pertaining to patents, licensing auid 
technology transactions is summarized in a 
chronological order in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON BRAZILIAN 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
1883 - 1925 Paris Convention (The Paris-Union)
1891 - 1925 Arrangement of Madrid 
1910 Buenos Aires Convention
1947 Arrangement of Neuchatel
NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
1809 Brazilian Patent Law
1945 Law No. 7903 (Industrial Property Law)
1946 Paragraph 17, article 141, of the 
Brazilian Constitution
1958 Decree No. 436 - Established that Bauik
of Brazil should register 
technology transactions 
1962 Law No. 4131 - Regulates foreign capital
1964 Law No. 4390 Alters Law 4131
1965 Decree-Law No. 5572 Regulates Law 4390
1969 Decree-Law 1005 Code of Industrial 
Property
1970 Law No. 5648 (Creates the INPI)
1971 Law No. 5772 Code of Industrial Property
1975 INPI Act No. 15 Consolidates the
Legislation on Technology Transactions
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4.4.2 THE CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL
Although the INPI was established in 1970 
to take measures to control the technology transactions 
in the country, it seems that until 1975 there were no 
explicit policies guiding its actions, and a parallel 
control of technology contracts was being performed by 
the Central Bauik of Brazil.
Since 1962, owing to lack of adequate 
national policies relating to matters of technology 
transfer, registration auid control over payments 
involving foreign oxchauige remittances for technical 
assistance, and licensing agreements concerning the 
utilization of marks auid patents, were Central Bauik of 
Brazil's attributions (Figueredo, 1972:119-146). Thus, 
it appears that even after the INPI was created in 
1970, the Department of Registration of Foreign Capital 
auid the Foreign Trade Section of the Central Bauik were, 
the institutions exercising a parallel control over 
technology transfer contracts. According to Figueredo, 
they were led to assume increasingly important roles in 
the regulatory framework of technology trauisactions, 
acting as "interpreters of the legal texts and 
negotiators of licensing agreements and similar 
contracts" (Figueredo, 1972:119). This point is 
supported by Baer's view of the role of the Central
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Bank of Brazil's departments in the context of 
technology transfer policies: "The influence of these 
institutions is felt through their interpretation of 
laws and through their power of approval or disapproval 
of licensing agreements, technical assistance 
contracts, etc". (Baer et al., 1973:30).
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4.4.3 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE LEGISLATION
A study published in 1972 by the United 
Nations emphasized the importance for developing 
countries to establish an appropriate institutional 
machinery for dealing with technology transfer
transactions. It stated:
"In order to organize the collection and 
dissemination of basic information ... auid 
on that basis to formulate and implement 
appropriate policies concerning transfers of 
technology, to undertake the evaluation 
procedures ... for the purpose of arriving
at optimal decisions on projects involving a 
tramsfer of technology amd mechanisms for 
transfer, auid to carry out the sophisticated 
negotiation required to obtain favourable 
terms of transfer contracts ... it is 
necessary for the developing countries to 
have efficient institutional machinery".
(United Nations, 1972:48).
The specific functions that such
institutional machinery were to perform concerning the 
regulation of the flow of technology among member 
countries, were suggested previously by an 
intergovernmental agreement reached in Santiago and
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approved at the 112th plenary meeting of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Paragraph 3 of the UNCTAD's Resolution 39 (III), 
mentioned :
"(The United Nations Conference on trade and 
Development...)
Invites the developing countries to establish 
institutions, if they do not have them, for 
the specific purpose of dealing with the 
whole range of complex questions connected 
with the transfer of technology from 
developed to developing countries, and takes 
note of the wishes of the developing 
countries that these institutions should 
inter alia:
(a) Be responsible for the registration, 
deposit, review and approval of agreements 
involving transfer of technology in the 
public and private sectors;
(b) Undertake or assist in the evaluation, 
negotiation or renegotiation of contracts 
involving the transfer of technology;
(c) Assist domestic enterprises in finding 
alternative potential suppliers of technology 
in accordance with the priorities of national 
development planning;
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(d) Make arrangements for the training of 
personnel to staff institutions concerned 
with the transfer of technology;
4. Invites the developing countries to take 
the specific measures they deem necessary to 
promote an accelerated transfer of adequate 
technology to them under fair and reasonable 
terms and conditions." (United Nations, 1972)
In view of the proliferation of Brazilian 
Laws, decrees amd executive acts, international 
conventions and agreements, it seems that even after 
the INPI was created in 1970, the operational
resolutions auid instructions of Central Bank of Brazil, 
were important instruments controlling technology
transactions in the country. Perhaps, in the light of 
a deteriorating balance of payments and aui increasing 
public and private national debt, stressed in section 
4.3.2.1, and the United Nation's emphasis on the 
establishment of aui efficient institutional machinery 
in developing countries specifically for dealing with 
the technology transfer policies, finally
in September 11, 1975, the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce consolidated the Government's 
policy for the transfer of industrial technology.
The normative act No. 15 of the INPI
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Consolidated in one document all legislation concerning 
technology transactions and royalty payments in Brazil. 
Appendix 2 contains extracts of the normative act 
governing technology agreements in Brazil.
One of the major objectives of act No. 15 was 
"to control the contracting of the transfer of 
technology" providing guidelines for the supplier and 
recipient, "so that they can adapt the terms and 
conditions of the agreements to current legal 
principles, and also therefore to the Government's 
policy for the transfer of industrial technology and to 
the economic-financial policy of the country, in whole 
or in part". (Appendix 2)
The guidelines of the Government's policy for 
the period between 1975 and 1979 were formally stated 
in the Second National Development Plan. (Brazil,
Presidency of the Republic, 1974) Technology Transfer 
was expected to play a key role in the modernization of
the industrial structure of the country. Among other
points, the plan emphasized the importance of acquiring 
technology for priority sectors of the economy,
creating and adapting technology whenever possible, and 
gradually developing the country's own technological 
capabilities. It stated:
"In the effort to consolidate a modern
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industrial economy by the end of the decade, 
Brazil will have to face a complex of 
problems among which the following should be 
pointed out: the need to create and adapt 
technology continuously and not merely 
produce goods, even the most sophisticated; 
the realization of advance guard projects in 
spearhead sectors showing Brazil's capacity 
to master technologies of the highest 
sophistication in well-defined areas ..." 
(Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 1974:35)
"in the technological area it is important to 
recognize that, in the period under 
consideration, the bulk of the effort must be 
directed to updating the technology in a 
large number of different sectors , bringing 
to them the benefit of knowledge already 
existing in developed countries (the 
so-called "transference of technology" cuid 
carrying out greater or lesser adaptions of 
technology. This by itself is aui enormous 
task ...
Industrial technology:
The technological development of basic 
industrial sectors of high technological
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content :
the electronics industry, in particular 
computers ;
- the capital goods industry;
- the chemical and petrochemical industry;
- the steel auid metallurgical industry;
- the aeronautical industry.
In the case of several products of fields of 
activity in these sectors, there will be need 
for am effective transfer of technology so 
that gradually conditions may be developed to 
have our own technology." (Brazil , 
Presidency of the Republic, 1974: 136)
Under the consolidated legislation,
registration of technology transactions at the National 
Institute of Industrial Property was made a condition 
sine qua non for the following purposes:
a) Acquiring foreign exchamge remittances 
related to patents licences, trademarks, emd 
other contracts involving technical
assistance and services. These payments were 
subjected to Central Bank of Brazil's 
approval and were governed by an executive 
decree (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 
1965) which regulated the Laws establishing
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the fundamental procedures for foreign 
capital in the country. (Brazil, National 
Congress, 1962,1964) In general payments for 
patents, trademarks, manufacturing processes, 
and formulae varied between one and five per 
cent of the net income, while remittances for 
technical assistance and services appeared to 
depend on the nature of the contract and the 
importance of the technology in relation to 
the Government's policy for the specific 
sector of the economy.
b) Obtaining income tax deductions. Tax 
deductions pertaining to technology
transactions were governed by directive No. 
436, from the Brazilian Ministry of Finauice 
(1958). This directive established the 
maximum coefficients which firms were allowed 
to claim according to the degree of 
importance and the type of economic activity. 
Manufacturers of computers and other office 
machinery were allowed a three per cent 
deduction on the gross operating income 
derived from the licence. In other 
activities deductions related to patents, 
technical services and know-how, varied
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between two and five per cent. Royalties 
paid for the use of industrial and commercial 
trademarks in auiy type of economic activity 
were elegible for a deduction of one per 
cent.
c) Satisfying the requirements of the 
Industrial Property Code. (Brazil, National 
Congress, 1971). According to this code, 
licencees of patents and trademarks had to 
submit evidence of regular use of the patent 
or trade-mark - every year. If they failed 
to comply with these requirements, or if the 
patent or trademark were not worked within 
two years of issue, the National Institute of 
Industrial property could release them as 
compulsory licencing to interested parties.
4.4.4 THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENTS
For the purposes of registration at the 
National Institute of Industrial Property, agreements 
involving technology transactions were classified under 
five categories, as follows:
a) Licencing agreements for the exploitation 
of patents. Refer to agreements involving 
technology for the design of products.
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manufacturing processes, formulae, etc.
b) Licencing agreements for the use of a 
trademark. Refer to agreements pertaining to 
trade-marks, marketing or publicity slogauis, 
etc.
c) Licencing agreements for the supply of 
industrial technology. Refer to agreements 
concerning the supply of technology, such as 
knowledge, special skills, and know-how, for 
the production of consumer auid intermediary 
goods.
d) Agreements for technical-industrial 
co-operation. Refer to long- term agreements 
providing technology, knowledge, know-how and 
other special skills auid services for the 
manufacture of capital goods such as complete 
industrial units, machines, equipment, and 
components.
e) Agreements for the supply of specialized 
technical services. Refer to the short-term 
supply of technology, such as managerial auid 
engineering skills for appraisal, planning, 
programming, controlling and supervising 
industrial projects.
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This classification of technological 
agreements was derived for INPI's administrative aims 
of evaluating, registering and monitoring each 
transaction separately. Its generalization for 
theoretical purposes seems to be rather limited, taking 
into account that most technological transactions 
nearly always involve a combination of technologies in 
the form of capital goods, intermediary goods, human 
expertise, and information. (United Nations, 1972) 
For instance, the technologies associated with the 
construction of industrial projects in industrialising 
countries generally utilize a mix of patented and 
unpatented technologies for the preparation of 
feasibility studies, the supply of machine auid inputs 
for production, tranining of engineering and managerial 
personnel, etc.
Considering INPI's taxonomy for technological 
contracts above there seems to be a common factor 
present in all categories which will allow a further 
break-down of the original classification into two 
general groups of contracts. Taking INPI's classes of 
contracts and arranging them according to whether they 
refer to "patented" or "unpatented" technology it is 
possible to class contracts into the following groups:
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1. Contracts involving Patented Technologies
1.1 Patent Licensing Agreements
1.2 Trade-mark Licensing Agreements
2. Contracts involving Unpatented
Technologies
2.1 Agreements for the supply of Industrial 
Technology
2.2 Agreements for technical-industrial 
co-operation
2.3 Agreements for specialized technical 
services.
As from July 1, 1978, "in view of the
frequency with which contracts which do not conform to 
the relevant legal amd normative provisions are 
submitted" the INPI instituted a system of prior 
consultation in negotiations for technology trauisfer 
transactions. (INPI, 1978) According the this system, 
the supplier and recipient should submit in advance to 
INPI their proposals for entering into agreements 
involving technology transfer transactions. The 
application for prior consultation should be made 
through:
a) The completion of a standardized 
questionnaire providing the general details 
of the proposed agreement between the parties
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b) The inclusion of a draft of the proposed 
contract, prepared in parallel columns, in 
Portuguese amd in the foreign lamguage chosen 
by the supplier.
With the exception of short-term specialized 
technical services agreements up to US$ 20,000, prior 
consultation was made obligatory for all categories of 
contracts involving remuneration referred to in item
1.1 of INPI normative act No. 15.
4.4.5 TECHNICAL-INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS
In this section, the salient features of the 
legislation pertaining to agreements of
technical-industrial co-operation will be examined. 
The basic principles amd conditions for registering 
these type of contracts at INPI were established by 
articles 1 amd 5 of the consolidated legislation 
included in appendix No. 2.
The INPI*S consolidated legislation adhered 
to the 'national treatment' principle of the Paris 
Convention, under which nationals and non- nationals 
are basically given the saune treatment under the law. 
However, there is one special provision which taüces 
into account the degree of ownership control in the 
technological transactions made between parent amd 
subsidiary organizations.
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Article 1.2 refers to the extent to which the 
supplier of technology participates in the capital 
structure of the recipient compamy. It considers three 
situations of ownership control, defined as total 
control, majority participation amd minority 
participation. This categorization seems to be 
particularly important in view of article 20 of the 
Executive Act No. 55.762, regulating the registration 
of foreign capital in Brazil, which states:
"Article 20 - There shall not be permitted
remittances for payment of royalties for the 
use of patents amd industrial or commercial 
trademarks between a branch or subsidiary of 
a compamy, located in Brazil amd its head 
office aibroad or when the majority of the 
capital of the compamy in Brazil belongs to 
those receiving the royalties payments abroad 
(Law 4.131, Art 14).
Sole Paragraph - For purposes of this 
Executive Act, there is considered a 
subsidiary of a foreign compamy, a juridical 
person established in the country, of whose 
capital with the right to vote at least 50% 
(fifty per cent) belongs, directly or 
indirectly, to the compamy with head office 
abroad" (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic,
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1965) .
According to Biato, (1973) this legal 
restriction on remittances of royalties by subsidiaries 
of foreign companies in Brazil to their head office 
abroad was responsible for the elevated number of 
"Technical assistance" contracts found in his analysis 
of technology transfer transactions in Brazil between 
1965 and 1971. The results of his study indicated that 
long-term technical assistance contracts, represented 
47 per cent of the total, while contracts involving 
royalties auid trade-marks totalled only 24 per cent, 
and other types of contracts pertaining to short-term 
agreements for engineering services amd project 
management reached 29 per cent. His study suggested 
that since the legislation was restrictive in relation 
to royalties and trade-marks, and since the INPI's 
administrative machinery was dilatory, subsidiaries of 
foreign companies found it easier to characterize their 
payments for technology as technical assistance, rather 
than patent or trade-mark remittances.
The main objective of technical-industrial 
co-operation agreement is to acquire "knowledge, 
know-how and services required for the manufacture to 
order of industrial units and sub-units, machines, 
equipment and corresponding components and other 
capital goods". According to the conditions
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established for this type of contract, the supplier 
must provide for the recipient" all the technical data, 
drawings amd engineering specifications for the 
"product amd the materials used for its manufacture, as 
well as all the methodology of the technological
development employed to obtain the saune". Besides the 
provision for the supply of technical data for 
up-dating the product, the agreement must also include 
training of personnel amd technical assistance by
supplier's technicians.
In line with the Government industrial 
strategy established in the Second National Development 
Plam, (1975 - 1979) which emphasized the need for an
effective transfer of technology for selected sectors 
of the economy, (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 
1974) the INPI stressed the basic principles under 
which foreign technologies would match the governmental 
intentions as follows:
a) In relation to national alternative 
sources, the technologies should be of a 
superior quality and bring, in the short 
term, benefits to the specific economic 
sector.
b) The technologies should allow the 
substitution of imports amd, eventually, the 
export of those saune products.
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In relation to the remuneration Article 5 
stresses that it should be "linked to the actual 
manufacture of the product resulting from the 
application of the technology", such as a proportion of 
the net sales price, or if alternatively based on a 
fixed price it should be calculated "on the basis of 
cost plus fixed fee". According to the terms of the 
agreement, payments may be made "either in one lump sum 
or in instalments, by meams of a duly legalized invoice 
issued by the supplier, evidencing the remittance of 
the technical documentation" (Article 5.3.3). In 
general, these instalments vary between 1 amd 5 per 
cent of the net sales prices amd lump sums are 
authorized depending upon the importance of the 
technologies involved in relation to the priorities of 
the governmental policies for the sector.
In respect to the duration of the contracts, 
article 5.4.1 establishes am initial maximum period of 
five years "which may be extended". This article also 
stresses the pro tempore nature of the contractual bond 
concerning the transmission of technologies for the 
manufacture of capital goods. Although it is not clear 
how mamy times the contracts, may be extended, the 
recipient should present a chronogram of the activities 
amd resources needed "to reach a position of being able 
to master the technology". This assumes that the
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recipient is in a position to evaluate the requirements 
of the technology trauisfer process in terms of time, 
resources auid skills needed to accomplish the desired 
results. As a United Nations (1972:5) study stated, 
generally recipients "are not fully aware of the nature 
auid the components of the acquired technology-mix". 
Thus, the ability of the receiving parties to 
anticipate the requirements of the technology trauisfer 
process seems to be limited. A possible exception 
concerns those circumstances where both the supplier 
auid recipient firms are able to benefit from learning 
economies (Arrow, 1962) derived from previous 
experiences in Technology Trauisfer processes.
Other basic conditions stipulated for 
agreements of technical-industrial co-operation are 
included in article 5.5. Item 5.51 details a list of 
topics which should be included such as a clear 
definition of the field of application of the 
technology, the product, techniques, resources auid 
documentation involved, and the means designed to 
transmit those, income tax liability, auid other 
responsibilities and obligations for the parties. 
Conditions which should be avoided in the elaboration 
of contracts are listed in item 5.5.2. Among those, 
the identification of the proprietary rights of the 
supplier, the obligation for the recipient to pass on
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to the suppliers any improvements made in the 
tecnology, the inclusion of clauses which determine the 
source of inputs, the quantity, quality, means of 
distribution, marketing or destiny of the products of 
services involved, post-termination clauses which may 
prevent the recipient from continuing to use the 
technology after the termination of the contract, and 
other provisions which may limit the development 
potential of the recipient.
5. OVERVIEW OF THE COMPUTER MARKET
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5. OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN COMPUTER MARKET
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter intends to provide an overview 
of the evolution of the computer market in Brazil in 
the period 1970-1980. It consists of two major 
sections. Section 5.2 presents some aspects of computer 
technology. Section 5.3 is subdivided into three 
subsections. Section 5.3.1 provides an overview of the 
Brazilian computer market. Section 5.3.2 presents the 
evolution of the installed computer base. Section 
5.3.3 identifies the main institutional mechanisms for 
Government intervention in the market.
5.2 COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
Although the first electronic computer becaune 
available in the fourties, the history of computer 
technology seems to go back to ancient civilizations. 
The Chinese performed calculations by sliding counters 
along rods. The abacus Pythagoricus developed in 
ancient Greece, was basically am instrument for 
arithmetical computations utilizing small balls sliding 
on wires placed at different levels for representing 
different numerical values in units, tens, hundreds.
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etc. Based on the abacus, in the mid-seventeenth
century, Blaise Pascal, a French mathematician built a 
mechanical device to add and subtract by digits. 
Later, in the same century, Leibnitz constructed a
machine which was able to perform multiplication of 
numbers using the method of successive additions. In 
the early part of the eighteenth century. Bouchon 
introduced the idea of a punched card for the purpose
of storing numbers. In the early nineteenth century, 
Charles Babbage, am Englishmaui, designed the 
'cuialytical engine* which included six digits for 
calculations amd some features of today's modern
computers, such as a memory for storage amd retrieval 
of data to be used in subsequent computations. Because 
of the revolutionary concept of internal memory, 
Babbage's machine might have been the first computer. 
(Mayall, 1980).
According to Turn, (1974:6) computer
technology is the "totality of meams, devices, 
processes amd techniques employed in the construction 
amd operation of digital computers". This broad 
conceptualization of computer technology embraces the 
elements of technical knowledge, intermediary goods, 
computer hardware amd software techniques, and
fabrication processes involved in the construction of 
computers. In the Organization for Economic
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Co-operation and Development's (OECD, 1969) view, 
computer technology is interdisciplinary in nature, and 
derives from three closely interdependent, mutually 
interacting sources, as follows:
a) COMPUTER SCIENCES. These form the 
theoretical basis of knowledge for instance, 
cybernetics deals with the study of control 
and communication between mam and machines. 
Other exaunples are robotics, numerical 
analysis, pattern recognition, lamguage 
analysis, material sciences, etc.
b) COMPUTER ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY. Deals 
with computer hardware amd software design. 
It involves logic design, systems design, 
peripheral equipment design, computer-aided 
design, etc.
c) COMPUTER USAGE TECHNOLOGY. It involves 
data handling methods, such as statistical 
analysis, data transmission, information 
storage, etc amd various kinds of computer 
applications such as commercial data
processing, scientific calculations,
industrial processing control, navigation amd 
tracking, military weapon control systems.
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etc.
During the second world war, the research
into computer technology was intensified in England, 
Germany and the United States. Among the envisaged 
projects were the development of anti-aircraft guns
which would be able to calculate the trajectory of the
enemy's plane and activate the firing system; the
development of software for automatic flying of
military airplanes; the prograunming the trajectory of 
the missiles, the decoding of the enemy's message etc. 
These intended war applications seem to provide am
illustration of the multidisciplinary aspects of 
computer technology referred by the OECD. For 
instance, the development of computers able to 
calculate the trajectory of a plane amd destroy a
moving target involves capabilities amd knowledge in
diverse fields such as mathematics, electronics, 
mechanics, physics, amd particularly aerodynaunics, etc.
The development of computer technology seems 
to be closely linked amd dependent, among other things, 
upon technological advances in the electronic component 
industry. According to the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, (EIU, 1979a) since the invention of the 
integrated circuit in the early sixties, there has been 
a progressive miniaturization of electronic components.
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accompanied by an impressive reduction in cost. In the 
early sixties, tens of electronic elements (SSI - small 
scale integration) were manufactured together on 
semiconductor material, such as silicon. In the end of 
the sixties, hundreds of components were associated on 
to small circuits (MSI - Medium Scale Integration). In 
the late seventies, thousands of electronic elements 
were compacted together in single circuits, or chips. 
(LSI - Large Scale Integration). In Amdahl's (1978) 
view in the eighties more than one million electronic 
components will be compacted in a single chip. (VLSI - 
Very Large Scale Integration). Commenting on the main 
structural forces affecting the computer industry, 
Amdôüil stated:
"There are significant forces at work - 
hardware technology in computers and 
communications on the one hôuid, and reactive 
forces from a large number of emerging 
applications on the other. All of this, of 
course is nurtured by the intermediary 
software - and by an impatient set of 
prospective users.
The most draunatic force is the fervent pace 
of semiconductor technology. Data processing 
continues to reap its own harvest from
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advamces in semiconductor technology... 
Microprocessors now abound in terminals, 
peripheral controllers, communication
devices, auid small standalone computers. 
Semiconductor memories are rapidly improving 
the price/performance characteristics of 
computers of all sizes". (Amdaüil, 1978:18).
COMPUTER GENERATIONS
Sometimes the expression computer generation 
seems to be utilized for associating computer 
technology with the level of technological development 
of the components which were utilized to mamufacture 
the computers. (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973, 
1976; Withington, 1972; Bromberg, 1978; Baranson, 
1979). However, considering that computer technology 
involves a variety of elements such as hardware design, 
software design, mechanical, electrical and 
electromechanical components, among other things, a 
categorization of computers based solely on component 
technology does not take into account technological 
advances in the other fields. (OECD, 1969). Thus, 
keeping this restriction in mind, the following
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generations of computers can be distinguished:
a) THE FIRST GENERATION. During the fourties 
cind early fifties, the first generation 
vacuum tube computers were relatively slow in 
terms of processing speeds, had limited 
storage capacity, were extremely expensive, 
occupied large ôunounts of space and were 
mostly used by government agencies and large 
organizations.
b) THE SECOND GENERATION. With the invention 
of the transistor in 1947, by a group of 
scientists of the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, (Tilton,1971) in the late 
fifties euid early sixties, the transistorized 
second generation of computers appeared in 
the market. In general, the application of 
transistor technology, led to the design of 
computer hardware with greater storage 
capacity, a broader range of applications, 
more reliability, faster speeds auid a more 
accessible price of the product in the 
market.
c) THE THIRD GENERATION. By the mid sixties 
further advances in electronics, particularly
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in the integrated circuit technology, enabled 
computer manufacturers to develop larger and 
faster memories, to reduce the size of the 
machines, to offer a better performance/price 
ratio, a wider range of software, modularity 
in design auid time-sharing and
multiprogramming capability.
d) THE FOURTH GENERATION. In the seventies, 
the increasing miniaturization of electronic 
components in single circuits, the 
progressive reduction in cost per 
microelectronic component, among other 
factors, led manufacturers to offer computers 
with large-scale integrated circuitry, large 
memories, teleprocessing capabilities, 
improved software options, increased computer 
speed, better price/performance ratio, etc.
e) THE FIFTH GENERATION. According to 
Japaui's Interim Report on study auid Research 
on Fifth Generation Computers, (JIPDEC, 1980) 
the next generation of computers will be 
characterized by radical chauiges in hardware
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amd software technologies. The fundamental 
change envisaged involves a new concept in 
computer design. Computers are intended to 
be knowledge processing machines, rather them 
simply data processing devices in the sense 
formulated by Von Neumann and his associates 
(1946). The major anticipated features of 
the knowledge information processing machines 
are a high level of man-machine interface, 
such as conversational input media, and the 
computer system's ability to extract meaning 
from the information. International Business 
Machines (IBM) also seems to be planning for 
the fifth generation of computers. Recently, 
IBM's secret plans for the next generation of 
machines, known as the 'Adirondack Hardware 
Design Workbooks' were the object of a high 
technology espionage case against Hitachi 
associates, filed in the Federal Court in San 
Jose, California by the United States Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, (Wiener, 1982).
THE CLASSIFICATION OF COMPUTERS
In view of the rapid rate of technological
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change in the computer sector (European Business, 1974; 
Withington, 1972, 1975, 1978; Houston, 1973: Amdôüil,
1978), there seems to be no universally accepted 
critérium for classifying computers into categories. 
The pace of technological change in computers seems to 
be so dynamic that "today's minicomputers could really 
be classified as giant mainframes of the past" 
(Bromberg, 1978).
In addition, there seems to be no agreement 
on what a minicomputer is. For instance, some experts 
conceptualize "minicomputers" in terms of their price, 
physical size, storage capacity, range of applications, 
software capabilities, etc. They state:
"Minicomputer is ... a range of small to 
medium scale digital computers" (Healey, 
1976:226)
"... a machine developed primarily for the 
processing of a single application or the 
processing of a number of small applications" 
(Bromberg, 1978:98).
"A 'micro computer' is a small computer 
having very little main store, a somewhat 
limited order code suid very few peripherals, 
whilst a "minicomputer" is a bit bigger, has
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more store, more order code, and more
expensive peripherals" (Minicomputer Forum, 
1975:2).
"The minicomputer is nothing more thaui a 
small, low-cost general purpose computer. 
...The smallness relates to both physical 
size as well as limits on word size, storage 
capacity, registers, instruction repertoire, 
and software. The low cost relates to basic 
minicomputer prices that range from CJS$ 2,000 
to CJS$ 50,000." (Frost auid Sullivan, 1974: 
13-14).
Although there appears to be no absolute 
critérium for classifying computers into categories, in 
recent years, there has been a trend towards
categorizing computers from a marketing point of view, 
rather than hardware or pricing parameters. (EDP
Industry Report, 1980). Frost and Sullivan, for 
instance, suggest that minicomputers should be 
classified by the manner by which they are supported 
and marketed. (Frost and Sullivan, 1980).
CAPRE'S CLASSIFICATION
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In the remaining part of this chapter, most 
of the quantitative data utilized for analyzing the 
general characteristics and the evolution of the 
Brazilian computer market, derived from the Commission 
for Co-ordinating Electronic Data Processing Activities 
(CAPRE, 1977, 1979). Between 1972 and 1979, as the 
Governmental Agency responsible for the computer 
sector, CAPRE had access to the total number of 
organizations using computers in Brazil, both in the 
private amd public sectors. As from 1974, CAPRE 
developed periodic assessments of the installed 
computer capacity, by sending questionnaires directly 
to users of computer systems and compiling the results 
in a census. The critérium adopted by CAPRE for 
categorizing computers by size was the price range of 
the central processing unit and main memory, defined as 
follows :
a) MINICOMPUTERS. Price range: Less than US$
30,000.
b) SMALL COMPUTERS. Price rauige: Between US$
30,000 and US$ 180,000.
c) MEDIUM COMPUTERS. Price Ramge: Between
US$ 180,000 and US$ 600,000.
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d) LARGE COMPUTERS. Price ramge: Between US$
600,000 and US$ 1,200,000.
e) VERY LARGE COMPUTERS. Price range : Over 
US$ 1,200,000.
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5.3 THE COMPUTER MARKET
5.3.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE MARKET
THE MARKET IN 1972
A U.S. Department of Commerce Global Market 
survey of computer equipment conducted in eighteen 
countries, stated:
"Brazil is now showing enthusiasm for 
advanced technology, particulary in the field 
of computers. The move of many government 
departments to the new capital city of 
Brasilia occasioned major reorganisations, 
and computers are part of the new 
administrative structure. Massive
investments in Brazil's infrastructure have 
led to unprecedented growth in capital 
spending by power and telecommunication 
utilities and engineering and construction 
firms, resulting in a sharp rise in demauid 
for new aind improved machinery and equipment, 
including EDP auid related equipment.
Widespread prosperity among medium-size
commercial and industrial firms in the
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central and southern regions has created a 
market for smaller computers". (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1973: 26)
At that time Brazil's economy was 
experiencing unprecedented rates of growth, leading to 
rising demand for computers in many sectors. Between 
1968 and 1973 the real Gross Domestic Product averaged 
approximately a ten per cent auinual growth rate. 
Industrial real output achieved a 15.9 per cent annual 
growth in 1973, émd for the first time in many years, 
the balance of trade achieved a surplus of US$ 7 
millions. As it was suggested by the Financial Times, 
(1979) sui "economic miracle" was being performed in the 
economy of Brazil, in terms of quantitative indicators 
of economic growth.
The main conclusions reached by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce study were:
a) The growth prospects of the computer and 
related equipment market, in msuiy countries, 
were higher them those of the United States.
b) About 90 per cent of the world market was 
being supplied by U.S. companies, their 
foreign subsidiaries and licensees. This 
represented aui enormous advantage for U.S. 
manufacturers in terms of compatibility of
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equipment, hardware auid software technology.
c) The worldwide market was expected to grow 
at an average rate of 25-30 per cent during 
1973 cuid 1977 and the highest growth rates 
were anticipated in the field of 
minicomputers, data communications and 
peripheral equipment.
d) As shown in Table 5.1, the total market 
for computers amd related equipment in 
eighteen countries surveyed was estimated at 
US$ 5,353.5 millions in 1972. The
projections for 1977 reached US$ 18,842.9, 
representing a percentage chamge of 251.9. 
In terms of growth prospects of the
individual countries, Japan was expected to 
expand the value of its computer market by 
(498) per cent between 1972-1977, followed by 
Brazil (271), Israel (240), Spain (211), 
Belgium (201), Frauice (153), Italy (153), 
Yugoslavia (142), Australia (128), Norway 
(121), Mexico (114), Switzerland (107),
Germany (107), United Kingdom (104),
Venezuela (97), Sweden (94), Netherlands (85) 
and Denmark (38) per cent.
TABLE 5.1
TOTAL MARKET FOR COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT IN 18 COUNTRIES,
1972 AND PROJECTED 1977
( In  US$ M i l l io n s )







Germany 1 ,268.4 2 ,627 .2 107
A u stra lia 83 .0 190.0 128
Belgium 136.1 410 .0 201
Brazi 1 50.7 188.3 271
Denma rk 57.0 79.2 38
Spain 106.8 332.5 211
France 693.0 1 ,823 .0 163
United Kingdom 454.0 926.2 104
Netherlands 164.5 305.3 85
Is rae l 10.1 34.4 240
I t a l y 222.8 564.1 153
Japan 1,791.4 10,713.2 498
Mexico 30.0 64.2 114
Norway 20.5 45.5 121
Sweden 126.2 246.0 94
Swi tze r lan d 106.6 221.4 107
Venezuela 13.6 26.8 97
Yugoslavia 18.8 45.6 142
5,353 .5 18,842.9 251
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1973)
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Table 5.2 presents the U.S. Department of 
Commerce main estimates and projections for the 
Brazilian Computer market. According to them, the 
market for computers and related equipment in Brazil 
was worth US$ 23.7 millions in 1970, US$ 39.0 millions 
in 1971 and US$ 50.7 millions in 1972. The projections 
for 1973, 1974 and 1977 were US$ 65.9, 85.7 and 183.3
millions respectively. The aggregate growth of the 
market in the period 1970-1977 was calculated as 694 
per cent.
In relation to the value of the minicomputer 
segment of the market, table 5.2 indicates that it grew 
200 percent between 1970-1971 and 104 per cent between 
1971-1972, while small, medium auid large computers
increased only by 58 per cent auid 24.3 per cent during 
the same periods. Thus, according to these figures 
minicomputers were growing faster than any other
segment of the market.
Their research also suggested that 
approximately 57% of the minicomputers installed in 
Brazil in 1972 were being used in the industrial êuid 
transportation sectors, 28% in the commercial sector 
and 15% concentrated in government departments auid
educational establishments.
In terms of applications by fields of
activity, prospects for minicomputers were anticipated
in
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in the scientific and process control areas, despite 
their "developing but limited market". An apparent 
demand was also identified for the use of minicomputers 
as intelligent terminals for larger computer systems, 
cuid as programable, front-end processors in data 
communication systems. As regards the application of 
minicomputers in management, the prospects were
summarized as follows:
"The market for minicomputers for use in 
business management applications is more than 
doubling each year, according to trade
sources. Small and medium size firms
comprise the bulk of Brazil's industrial auid 
commercial sectors, amd minicomputers offer 
these firms am attractive solution to their 
mounting paperwork problems". (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1973:24).
THE MARKET IN 1976
According to the Commission for Electronic 
Data Processing Activities, (CAERE) in July 1976, there 
were 5078 computers - installed in the country amd 20 
suppliers of computer systems operating in Brazil.
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These suppliers of computers ranged from small sales 
subsidiaries to very large, diversified manufacturers. 
CAPRE's assessment of the market share by
manufacturers, in terms of the value of the systems
installed, suggested that the market was dominated by
major international compamies in the computer sector. 
For instance, one compauiy. International Business 
Machines, (IBM) concentrated 63.6% of the market,
followed by Burroughs (20.2%); Honeywell (4.2%); Univac
(3.6%); Olivetti (1.7%); NCR (1.5%); DEC (1.4%) and
others (3.8%).
In terms of value of the segments of the
market according to CAPRE's estimates in 1976 very
large computers represented 30.6% of the total market, 
small computers (23.3%), medium computers (22.4%), 
large computers (15.2%) amd despite the large numbers 
of minicomputers installed, this segment was evaluated 
as only 8.5% of the total market value.
In 1976, CAPRE also investigated the total 
amount of investments amd expenditures in data
processing activities in Brazil. As shown in Table 5.3 
the public sector accounted for 45% of the total 
expenditure, while the private sector was responsible 
for 55%. Within the public sector, very large 
installations were the predominant segment with 52.2%, 
while minicomputers accounted for only 12% of the
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expenditures and investments. In the private sector, 
the largest aunounts were concentrated on the very large 
and small segments, each of which had 25% of the total. 
Minicomputers had a 10.7% share of the total aunount, 
while medium amd large computers accounted for 19.6 amd 
11.8 respectively. Considering the private amd public 
sectors at the saune time, very large installations 
spent 37.4% of the total aunount, while minicomputers 
totalled 11.3%.
A breaikdown of the expenditures by kind of 
activity amd sector indicated that the industrial users 
were the second largest user category with almost 30% 
of the market (Table 5.4). The largest user group were 
computer bureaux of data processing services, with 35% 
of the total amount spent on data processing. This 
category, however, includes suppliers of equipment 
which also provide service to clients, such as IBM, 
Burroughs amd Olivetti. The financial sector, which 
was mostly made up by the State amd private Bamks, 
accounted for 14.2% of total expenditures. Private 
Banks represented approximately two thirds of the total 
aunount. Teaching amd research showed a limited share 
of the expenditures (3.8%) suggesting restricted 
allocation of financial resources for data processing 
activities at the universities amd research
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A further breakdown by activity, aggregating 
both sectors of the economy, revealed that
"Bureau/Consultancy" accounted for over thirty per cent 
of total investment and expenditures in Brazil in 1976. 
(Table 5.5) Commercial Bamks accounted for 12.16%; 
public utilities 5.23%; metallurgy 4.44%; electrical
amd communication material 3.92%; computer suppliers 
3.77%; commerce 3.55%; teaching 3.21% amd research for
0.60%. These activities, taken together, represented
over two thirds of Brazil's expenditure on data 
processing in 1976.
THE MARKET IN 1978
In 1978, am estimated 6641 computers had been 
installed in Brazil. According to DIGIBRAS, the 
Brazilian domestic computer market was worth US$ 340 
millions, or the equivalent to 0.9% of the world market 
for computers and related equipment. (US$ 37,300 
millions). In July 1978 there were 21 manufacturers of 
computer systems represented in the Brazilian Computer 
market. These cam be divided into the groups as 
follows :
a) FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS. These consisted of
TABLE 5.5






METALLURGY AND SIDERURGY 4.44
ELECTRIC AND ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING 3.92
COMPUTER SUPPLIERS 3.77







CIVIL CONSTRUCTION 1 .96
GENERAL SERVICES 1.85
ELECTRICAL ENERGY AND GAS 1 .60
CHEMICALS 1 .60
TRANSPORTS 1.47
PAPER AND CARDBOARD 0.96
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 0.87
TEXTILES 0.76
STOCK MARKET FIRMS 0.64
RESEARCH 0.60
OTHER 9,86
T O T A L 100.00
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large companies with worldwide reputation, 
capital, technological resources amd 
historical experience in the development, 
production amd marketing of computers. IBM, 
Burroughs, Honeywell-Bull, Univac, Olivetti, 
Phillips, Hewllet-Packard, Digital, NCR amd 
ICL represented the largest section of the 
market with over 95% of the installed 
computer base in 1978.
b) BRAZILIAN MANUFACTURERS. These consisted 
of Cobra amd Sisco, a newly formed 
independent compamy which was manufacturing 
computers compatible with Data General's Nova 
3 model. In July 1978, Cobra amd Sisco's 
estimated share of the market were 0.7 amd 
0.2% respectively.
Table 5.6 presents the market share by 
manufacturer, in terms of the number of systems 
installed. CAPRE's survey in mid-1978 revealed the 
following results by segment of the market:
a) Very large computers. This segment of the 
market was dominated by Burroughs (23.7%) and 
IBM (72.0%) the other two suppliers were 
Control Data (1.1%) amd Honeywell-Bull
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(3.2%). There were only 93 very large 
installations in Brazil and this segment
corresponded to only 1.4% of the total market 
in terms of the number of installed 
computers.
b) Large computers. A total of 166 large 
computers were installed in Brazil in 1978, 
representing 2.5% of the computer base at
that time. Within this segment, IBM had its 
largest share of the Brazilian market (85%). 
Other suppliers and their relative market 
share were: Burroughs (5.4%); Honeywell-Bull 
(3.6%) Univac (3.0%); NCR (1.8%) amd Fujitsu 
(1.2%).
c) Medium computers. Medium sized computers 
represented 5.6% of the market, with 370 
units installed in mid 1978. Again, IBM's 
strong position was repeated here with 45.4% 
of this segment. Burroughs had a relatively 
strong position (26.8%) being followed by 
Honeywell-Bull (13.3%); Univac (7.8%);
Fujitsu (3.8%); Digital (0.8%) amd Thompson
(0.5%).
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d) Small computers. The 1378 small
computers installed in Brazil in July 1978 
accounted for 20.7% of the market. Major 
suppliers and their relative share of the 
segment were: IBM (53.7%); Burroughs (12.5%); 
Digital (13.1%); Univac (3.8%) and I CL 
(2.0%). The remainder of the segment was 
divided among Data General, NCR and Thompson.
d) Minicomputers. The number of
minicomputer systems installed in the country 
reached 4634 units in July 1978, representing 
69.8% of the market. Most major 
manufacturers were operating in the 
minicomputer segment in 1978, except IBM, 
Control Data, Thompson and Univac. Up to 
July 1978 COBRA had installed 41 units of its 
"COBRA-400" and 6 units of the "COBRA-700" 
model, totalling 47 minicomputers. This 
represented 0.7% of the market. The largest 
share of this segment was that of Olivetti, 
the Italiaui manufacturer with 44.7% of the 
market, being followed by Burroughs (32.8%); 
Phillips (6%); NCR (5.8%); Hewllet-Packard 
(4.7%) and others totalling 6%.
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5.3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARKET
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of Brazil's
installed computer base between 1970 and 1980. An
examination of figure 5.1 suggests that the country's 
installed computer base has evolved considerably 
between 1970 and 1980. From a total computer 
population of 574 in 1970 to 8844 units in 1980, the
installed computer base grew at am annual rate of over
31.4% in the period.
The data utilized to analyze the evolution of 
the number of computers in Brazil in the period 
1970-1980 derived from three sources. Data for the 
period 1970-1973 were gathered from DIGIBRAS (Brazilian 
Digital Electronics) internal documents. Data for the 
period 1973-1979 were provided by the Brazilian 
Commission for Electronic Data Processing Activities. 
Data for 1980 derived from the Special Secretariat of 
Informatics, the Governmental Agency which took over 
CAPRE's attributions in the end of 1979. The critérium 
utilized by these organizations for categorizing 
computers by size, was CAPRE's price ramge.
Table 5.7 presents the total number of 
computers installed in Brazil by size. In the period 
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44.9 per cent, while the aggregate growth of the other 
segments was approximately 19.3 per cent. Figure 5.2 
shows graphically the evolution of the mini, small, 
medium, large and very large segments of the market 
between 1970-1980. An examination of table 5.6 and
figure 5.2 reveals that, in quantitative terms, the 
minicomputer segment has been the largest segment of 
the market since 1973. In 1970, minicomputers 
represented only 27.1% of the market while small 
computers held the largest share with 58% of the 
market. Since 1970, however, the relative importance 
of minicomputers has been growing, while that of small
computers has been decreasing steadily. In 1980
minicomputers represented 72.3% of the number of
computers installed in Brazil, small computers (19.0); 
medium computers (4.3); large computers (2.8); and very 
large computers only 1.3 %.
The relative importance of minicomputers in 
the context of the Brazilian computer market is,
perhaps, better illustrated in figures 5.3 auid 5.4.
These figures present isometric projections of Brazil's 
installed computer base in the period 1970-1980, from 
four different perspectives. In these figures, the 
small, medium, large and very large segments of the 
market have been combined in "other segments". An
examination of figures 5.3 auid 5.4 suggests clearly
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Figure 5.3 Brazil's Installed Computer Base, Minicomputers
and Other Segments, 1970 - 1980
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Figure 5.4 Brazil's Installed Computer Base, Minicomputers
and Other Segments, 1970 - 1980
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that, in the period under consideration, the relative 
importance of minicomputers exceeded that of all other 
segments combined.
THE NUMBER OF COMPUTERS AND THE G.D.P
A United Nations report on the application of 
computer technology for development suggested that the 
number of computers installed in a country is related 
to the country's gross domestic product. Following a 
survey conducted in several countries they found that 
there existed a positive relationship between the 
installed computer base auid the G.D.P. levels, both in 
developed and developing economies. (United Nations, 
1971) .
In order to test this relationship, a simple 
linear regression ôuialysis was performed on the data 
from the installed computer base in the period 
1970-1980 (Table 5.7), and Brazil's Gross Domestic 
Product at 1970 factor cost, calculated by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit. (Stoneman, 1981) Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient, the associated 
test of significance, the slope of the regression line 
































































5.8. Figure 5.5 shows a scattergram of the data points 
cuid the coordinates of the variables considered.
An examination of table 5.8 auid figure 5.4 
indicates a strong, significant, positive relationship 
between Brazil's installed computer base auid its Gross 
Domestic Product in the period 1970-1980. (r » 0.98; p 
< 0.001). Thus, these results support the United
Nations' contention that the total number of computer 




In the last two decades, the historical 
experience of Japan, France, Germany and The United 
Kingdom shows us that some degree of government 
intervention has been developed in the computer market.
In general their initiatives could be designated as
attempts to protect the survival of indigenous 
enterprises in the highly competitive markets of the 
computer industry. (Lee, 1971; The Economist, 1971; 
Baranson, 1979; Dawson, 1975).
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce 
(1973) the Japanese Government has been intimately
involved in the development of the local computer
industry. Since 1958 the Japanese Government developed 
a network of measures intended to protect the incipient 
computer industry. Only in the early seventies, when 
the Japanese manufacturers were relatively
consolidated, these measures were alleviated. The 
British Government also played an important role in 
providing financial support for Ferranti auid ICL, 
stimulating research and development programmes and 
fostering the consolidation of small companies in the 
industry (Management Today, 1980). In 1966, the 
National Computing Centre was created by the British 
Government and industry for "promoting am increased amd
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more effective use of computers in every field of 
national and commercial activity". (NCC, 1981). In 
the late seventies the British Government has 
intensified its support for the development of computer 
technology, particularly in relation to the application 
of microprocessors. (Economic Progress Report, 1979). 
In the sixties, the German State stimulated the 
transfer of computer manufacturing technologies to 
local firms by establishing am adequate regulatory 
fraunework for licensing agreements with Amer icam 
manufacturers. In addition, the German Government 
supported Siemens amd Nixdorf by subsidies, preference 
in Governmental purchases, amd policies to promote the 
growth of electronics amd automation activities in that 
country. Following the acquisition, by General 
Electric, of 'Compagnie des Machnines Bull', the French 
Government established the 'CALCUL' plam, in 1967, in 
am attempt to reorganize the electronics industry amd 
create a computer manufacturing capability in the 
country. Recently, the French Government announced 
measures intended to increase financial support for 
research amd development in microelectronics. (White, 
1982). Thus, as Pamtages has suggested,
"Governments and commissions of major
industrialized nations amd even mamy
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developing nations are trying to ensure that 
their homelands will have a strong foundation 
in computer technology, if not lucrative 
pieces of their own and foreign markets. 
They are encouraging those partnerships, 
providing subsidies amd intensifying "buy 
national" pressure - Germamy, Framce, U.K., 
Japam". (Pamtages, 1976:56).
Traditionally, the Brazilian Government has 
been playing am important role in the economy. Between 
the thirties amd fifties, the State attempted to 
rehabilitate the economy from the recession, stimulated 
import-substitution projects in infrastructure, capital 
goods, chemicals, metallurgy, heavy-industries, etc. 
In the sixties amd seventies the Government has 
intensified its involvement in steel, chemicals, 
energy, communications, public utilities, amd more 
recently in electronics, computers, telecommunications, 
amd other technologically dynaunic sectors. In general, 
the participation of the State in the economy has been 
enormous. The State has been considered not only the 
main regulator of economic activity but one of the 
major financera amd producers. (The Bamker, 1979).
As it may be. seen in Table 5.9 the value of 
computers amd related equipment being imported into the
TABLE 5.9
IMPORTS OF COMPUTERS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT. 
BRAZIL 1970-1980
( In  US$ m il l io n s )
YEAR IMPORTS 















1977-1980 (Dados e Id e ia s ,  1980)
*  Limits f ixe d  by the Economic Development
Council (COE)
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country grew considerably from 1970 onwards, forcing 
Brazil to spend large amounts of foreign currency and 
increase its Balance of Payments difficulties. In 1971 
ouid 1972 the total amount spent on imported computer 
equipment corresponded to 13.6 amd 23.3% of the Balance 
of Trade Deficits for those years respectively.
In April 1972, in view of the rising imports 
of computers amd related equipment, national policies 
amd am increasing concern with the strategic amd 
economic importance of computer technology for the 
country's development process, the Brazilian Government 
created the Commission for Co-ordination of Electronic 
Data Processing Activities, (CAPRE) subordinated to the 
Ministry of Plamning. CAPRE's main objectives were to 
develop am account of the country's resources in 
computer technology, to design measures in order to 
maximize the installed computer capacity, to advise the 
Government on imports of computer equipment for the 
public sector, amd to propose measures for the 
financing of computer equipment. Initially, CAPRE 
formulated a resolution requiring that Government 
Organisations obtained prior approval for the 
acquisition of computers amd equipment valued at more 
tham US$ 225,000. Every request for new computer 
equipment had to be screened by CAPRE, according to the 
suitability of the equipment for the proposed
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application, the technical and managerial level of the 
human resources available, the services provided by the 
supplier, and the terms of the contract between the 
user and the supplier.
In subsequent years, in order to deal with 
the rising balance of trade deficits, and the massive 
foreign debt, and in an attempt to optimize the 
existing installed capacity, the Brazilian Government 
designed further import restrictions for the computer 
sector. CAPRE, the National Foreign Trade Council 
(CONCEX), The Central Bank of Brazil, The Economic 
Development Council (CDE) and the National Institute of 
Industrial Property (INPI) established a network of 
policies amd regulatory mechanisms of a relatively 
complex nature. In December 1975, the National Foreign 
Trade Council resolution No. 104 established that all 
imports of computer systems, parts, components amd 
related equipment, were subject to CAPRE'S prior 
approval. In 1975, the Central Bamk of Brazil 
resolutions 331 amd 335 imposed a compulsory deposit of 
100% of the FOB value of imports.
The normative act No. 15 from the National 
Institute of Industrial Property consolidated in 1975, 
the legislation on technology tramsfer transactions amd 
redefined the Government's policy for the transfer of 
industrial technologies. As from 1977, the Economic
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Development Council fixed limits on the value of 
computer amd related equipment imports (Resolutions CDE 
06/77 amd 01/78). In general, these measures, 
established a virtual bam on imports of computer
equipment, parts amd components.
In February 1977, Resolution 05/77 from the 
Economic Development Council established the basic 
criteria for approving the concession of fiscal 
incentives for manufacturers of data processing
equipment. (Brazil, Economic Development Council, 
1977). These were: the index of nationalization of
products amd components; export potential; technology 
tramsfer potential; market competitiveness, amd the 
existence of national capital in the recipient
enterprise.
In April 1977, the Industrial Development 
Council, which orients the Government's industrial 
strategy, emphasized the need for protecting some 
sectors of the economy for indigenous manufacturers. 
As a result of these guidelines, CAPRE adopted a 
national policy of reserving the minicomputer segment 
of the market for domestic manufacturers.
In June 1977, CAPRE decided to invite three 
more companies to manufacture minicomputers in Brazil. 
Resolution CAPRE 01/77 asked companies worldwide to 
submit plams to manufacture minicomputers in Brazil.
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The criteria for selection were based on the Economic 
Development Council's rules for granting fiscal 
incentives. In December 1977, CAPRE selected three 
local firms, out of sixteen competitors to participate 
in the minicomputer segment of the market. The firms 
selected envisaged the acquisition of technology from 
Nixdorf (Labo); Logabax (SID) amd Fujitsu (Edisa). In 
1978, SISCO, a compamy formed by the largest 
engineering firm in Brazil was given permission to 
penetrate the market, producing a minicomputer with 
total compatibility with Data General's Nova 3 model.
6. THE CREATION OF COBRA
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6. THE CREATION OF COBRA
6.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter aims to describe the development 
of events in Brazil, between 1965 and 1974, leading to 
the creation of Computadores Brasileiros SA., (COBRA) 
the pilot compamy designed by the State in am effort to 
transfer computer manufacturing technology to Brazil.
We will attempt to take a chronological 
approach during the discussion.
6.2 THE NAVY'S PLANS
In 1965 the Brazilian Navy was developing am 
extensive prograunme of modernization amd expansion of 
its fleet. This prograunme included the acquisition of 
modern weapons, vessels, submarine equipment, frigates 
amd measures to promote the incipient electronics 
industry. According to Uchoa, (1979) their objectives 
envisaged:
a) An intensive support for the national 
industry through the development of 
prototypes of military electronic equipment.
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b) The development of national digital 
technology so as to guarantee the maintenance 
and future development of their equipment and 
systems.
c) The acquisition of frigates and military 
equipment such as computer- based Action 
Information Systems, weapon controls, etc.
d) The promotion of research and development 
activities in the Navy.
In general, the projects were aimed at 
promoting the manufacture of prototype equipment for 
ships for future production by the Brazilian industry 
so as to reduce the country's dependence on foreign 
naval equipment. Initially they would concentrate 
their efforts on small electronic projects and then 
proceed to the development of more complex activities. 
During the execution of these projects they would 
develop a teaun of high level personnel capable of 
receiving and absorbing the most recent technologies in 
electronics and in naval fields. Presumably, this 
would help them to create a structure in terms of 
research amd development capable of fulfilling their 
military ends, and at the saune time providing 
assistance for the expansion of the national
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electronics and associated industries.
Despite the Navy's limited experience in the 
field of digital electronics it was thought, at that
time, that it would be viable to absorb computer
hardware technology by assembling the electronic 
computers to be installed in the frigates and
submarines. The technical amd industrial knowledge
gained from assembling military computers amd systems 
would provide the Brazilian Navy, private enterprises 
amd research institutions with technological capability 
for the development of a prototype of am indigenous 
civil computer with modified characteristics. In 
co-operation with civiliam industry amd universities 
the Navy would tramsfer to private enterprise the 
prototype amd all technical information that would 
become available. This would encourage the
estaJslishment of am indigenous computer industry in the 
country.
Basically, these assumptions constituted the 
starting point of a succession of events amd policies, 
in am attempt to acquire computer technology amd 
develop am indigenous computer manufacturing 
capability.
6.3 THE SUPPLIER'S INVOLVEMENT IN BRAZIL
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According to a Ferranti manager, they first 
became involved in Brazil in 1967, when a group of 
Ferranti employees joined a Royal Naval delegation to 
Brazil in order to make a presentation of naval defence
equipment for the Brazilian Navy. At that time the
Brazilian Navy was considering the acquisition of 
frigates as part of the modernization and expansion of 
its fleet. In an attempt to open up a potentially 
large market for military and civil equipment, their 
initial contacts in Rio de Janeiro concentrated on 
rousing the Brazilian Navy's interest in the
possibility of fitting computer-based Action 
Information and Fire Control Systems in the frigates.
The Brazilian Navy wamted the frigates to be 
designed to meet their own requirements and
specifications. They were also planning to develop 
research and development capability in shipbuilding, 
aimed at promoting the manufacture of prototype 
equipment for ships for subsequent construction by
Brazilian industry.
Ferrauiti had considerable experience with 
overseas Navies as weapon systems engineers auid 
consultants for major British shipbuilders. Their 
reputation and technical excellence as manufacturers of 
defence equipment seemed to be well established world 
wide. (Management Today, 1980). They had operated in
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the military and civilian computer markets since 1948 
and had become a major supplier of naval technology to 
the U.K. Government. One of their major contributions 
to the U.K. naval defence technology was the 
application of digital computer technology to tactical 
data handling and weapon control on board of modern 
warships (Ferranti, 1979).
In the early sixties Ferranti was in the 
forefront of naval defence technology in Europe. 
Combining the expertise of its computer and electronics 
divisions, they introduced the F1600 series of military 
computers with a wide range of options and peripheral 
units. This serie was designed to control guns, 
torpedoes, missiles and a variety of anti-submarine 
weapons. Perhaps, one exaunple of Ferranti's technical 
expertise in naval defence technology in the sixties 
was the Royal Navy's dependence on Ferranti hardware 
and software technologies for weapon systems. A 
Ferranti report suggests that:
"With the introduction of the F1600 series of 
computers there was a fundamental chauige in 
the procedure for programming Royal Naval 
Systems because from this point onwards, the 
complete prograimming of Naval Systems was 
undertaken by Ferranti" (Ferranti, 1979).
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Between 1967 and 1969, in the process of 
definition of the Navy's requirements for computer 
equipment and weapon control systems, Ferranti becaune 
aware of two major conditions for bidding, through a 
series of visits, discussions and documents. These 
conditions were:
a)The supplier of defence technology should 
co-operate with local industry to provide 
long term support in a way that would benefit 
Brazil from the Tramsfer of Technology.
b) The supplier should operate through a 
local firm in order to facilitate support and 
maintenance activities in Brazil.
According to a Ferranti executive they soon
recognized the need to operate through a local firm. 
This could provide the necessary support and 
maintenance activities and possibly establish a channel 
for handling future expansion of the civil side of the 
computer market. However, since they had no previous 
links in Brazil this meant finding a local partner 
already established in the business or in a related 
field.
In April 1970, following previous discussions 
with the Navy and prospective partners, Ferranti 
attempted an agreement with Microlab. This was a small
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privately owned electronics firm operating in Rio de 
Janeiro with considerable experience in physics and 
nuclear technology. Despite Microlab's lack of 
experience in computer technology, it was agreed that 
they would establish a joint ownership company to 
undertake contracts with the Brazilian Navy, and, 
gradually, tramsfer the required capabilities and 
elements of technical knowledge.
Since the Brazilian Navy was considering the 
acquisition of British frigates, in which Ferramti 
equipment would be incorporated, in the event of a 
successful bid, this local company would provide the 
following services.
a) Routine servicing and "on-call" 
maintenance and repair of Ferranti equipment.
b) Installation, setting-to-work, and 
preparation for acceptance trials of Ferramti 
equipment in such ships as are constructed or 
refitted in Brazil.
c) Preparation of technical documentation in 
Portuguese.
d) Training of Brazilian Navy personnel in 
the operation amd maintenance of the 
equipment.
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Despite extensive contacts amd tentative 
agreements with Microlab, the joint ownership compamy 
was not formed. As a Ferramti mamager put it, 
"Unhappily, Microlaib was tempted away from us by 
Litton, one of our competitors, for the navy's 
business". Litton amd Univac, two major mamufacturers 
of military equipment, were Ferranti's most agressive 
American competitors. Apparently, Litton was the most 
likely to be selected by the Navy since they had 
already established links with Microlads, in order to 
comply with the local involvement requirement.
In August, 1970, Ferramti approached another 
electronics firm, appointed by the Navy, Equipamentos 
Electronics a small Rio-based electronics firm which 
had some experience in communications amd engineering, 
but no knowledge of digital computer technology. 
Nevertheless, the Navy approved the contact with 
Equipamentos Eletronicos amd as a Ferramti mamager 
stated, they "moved more quickly into signing am 
exclusive agreement".
6.4 THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK
During 1968 amd 1969 the Ministry of the Navy 
was still considering the development of a civil 
computer prototype based on the experience acquired
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from their military projects. However, in order to 
develop this project they needed financial support from 
the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE).
The BNDE is an institution created by the 
Brazilian Government in the early 1950's to impel the 
country's economic development process, strengthen the 
national enterprise, minimize regional differences, 
further the export growth and to promote the 
technological development.
In 1964 the BNDE created the Fund for 
Scientific amd Technological Development (FUNTEC) for 
providing financial support for projects involving 
basic research, graduate training and the development 
of technology. According to Teixeira (1980), since the 
mid-sixties, the BNDE's FUNTEC has been playing a vital 
role in speeding up the technological development of 
the country, strengthening the national enterprise, amd 
up-grading humam resources.
Within this context, in 1968 BNDE realized 
the importance of computer technology as a strategic 
element for the country's development process. (BNDE, 
1973). Following contacts with the Ministry of the 
Navy, BNDE analyzed a feasibility study of a digital 
real time computer to be developed in co-operation with 
the Navy, private enterprise and two Universities. In 
general the BNDE concluded that, at that particular
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stage of development, it was important, to acquire 
computer technology for national security reasons auid 
for strengthening the technological structure of the 
country.
6.5 THE SUPPLIER OF FRIGATES
In September 1970 the Brazilian Navy selected 
the British Vosper Thornycroft MK.X frigate design for 
the expansion of its fleet. The Brazilian Ministry of 
the Navy signed a contract with Vosper in the 
approximate amount of one hundred million pounds for 
the construction of six frigates. (Moore, 1977) Four 
of these were to be built in the U.K. auid two in 
Brazil.
According to Ferranti executives, since they 
acted, on behalf of the shipbuilders as weapon systems 
engineers and consultants, the choice by the Brazilian 
Navy, of Vosper technology meant the installation of 
Ferranti computer-based weapon control systems and 
related equipment In addition, the decision in favour 
of Vosper Frigates seems to have enlarged Ferranti's 
future possibilities in the Brazilian computer market. 
At that time, the Navy was not only fully responsible 
for governmental policies concerning the trauisfer of 
computer technology, but also the driving force behind
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the whole idea.
From the Navy's point of view, the most 
important criterion considered in the process of 
selection of frigates was the supplier's willingness to 
release technology for the recipients. (BNDE, 1973). 
Considering the strategic importance of defence 
technology, (Sherman, 1981) there was a preoccupation 
with an effective transference of naval and computer 
technology for the Brazilian Navy. It was assumed that 
the construction of two frigates in Brazil would 
provide an opportunity to learn by doing. This is 
considered as one of the best forms for national skill 
formation. ( Balas ubr amauiyaui, 1973; United Nations,
1973).
Regarding the relatively high price of the 
frigates in the context of the Brazilian economic 
conjuncture of 1970, price does not seem to have been 
the major buying factor in the process of selection of 
a technology supplier As one article about the Navy's 
participation in the computer industry has suggested,
"In military projects prices are always 
subject to national security considerations. 
Sometimes this means the expenditure of large 
amounts of resources, but, at the same time, 
this allows us to be in the technological
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vanguard, and, in a second stage, benefits 
the industry of the country". (Jornal do
Brasil, 1973:1).
6.6 THE SPECIAL WORK GROUP
In February 1971, the Brazilian Government
created a Special Work Group for co-ordinating the 
design and development of a computer prototype for the 
Navy. (BNDE,1977)
In order to start its activities in March
1971, the Special Work Group signed contracts with the 
BNDE and the Ministry of Planning. The financial
resources were provided by the Fund for Scientific and 
Technological Development (FUNTEC 111) of the BNDE, amd 
the Ministry of Planning. Through these contracts,
approximately cr$ 10 million were allocated for The 
Special Work Group.
As a result of the Special Work Group's 
activities, Ferranti was requested to provide technical 
assistance and the preparation of an 'integrated plam' 
for the development of am indigenous manufacturing 
activity in Brazil. In May 1971, Ferranti and 
Equipamentos Eletronicos submitted a proposal to the 
Ministry of the Navy entitled "Integrated Plan for the 
Design of the National Computer auid for Local Support
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of Naval Digital Systems". This plan included a
proposal for the installation and maintenance of naval 
systems and a plam for the manufacture, under licence 
of the FM1500-B computer in Brazil.
However, according to a Ferranti manager,
the question of FM1600-B technology for civil 
applications promoted a split of opinion among the 
participants of the Special Work Group. In general, 
the 'Navy* group favoured, and the 'BNDE' group opposed 
it. The main argument was on the appropriateness of
the FM1600 technology for civil market applications.
Originally, the FM1600 technology was
developed for controlling guns, missiles,
anti-submarine weapons, etc. Their main applications 
were intended to be in Weapon Systems Automation (WSA) 
(Ferranti, 1979). The FM1600 computers were designed 
to meet military specifications in respect of ability 
to withstand shock, vibrations, changes in temperature, 
while not radiating information which might be picked 
up by the enemy, etc. Normally, the use of computers 
in organizations does not require these specifications. 
With the exception of process control installations, 
civilian applications usually do not require computer 
hardware to be used under severe conditions of climate 
and handling.
In March 1972, the Special Work Group
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selected Equipamentos Eletronicos as the domestic 
partner of the tripartite joint venture. Apparently, 
this firm was selected for the level of technical 
capability of its members and for having some 
experience in absorbing technology from a foreign 
manufacturer of teleprinting machines. Initially, it 
was also agreed that the Special Work Group and 
Equipamentos Eletronicos would together> select the 
technology-supplier for the joint-venture. A Ferranti 
manager explained: "This decision naturally favoured 
Ferranti because of the good relationship we had by 
then established with Equipamentos Eletronicos".
In July 1972, the Special Work Group 
determined their strategic guidelines. Two
simultaneous objectives would be pursued, in an attempt 
to establish a national computer manufacturing 
capability in the country. (BNDE, 1973). These were:
a) Project 1 would aim at the manufacture of 
cui indigenously designed minicomputer.
b) Project 2 would aim at the transfer of 
computer technology for the manufacture of a 
foreign minicomputer.
For project -1, resources would be allocated 
for the design, development and manufacture of a
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domestic minicomputer aimed at the national market. 
This becêune known as the 'Guaranis' project. The 
prototype would be designed and developed by the
Digital Systems Laboratory of the University of Sao 
Paulo. This University was involved in the design amd 
development of the first experimental Brazilian
computer known as "The Ugly Duckling". The Catholic 
University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC) was participating in 
the development of software for this project. The
prototype developed by these two universities would be 
manufactured by Equipamentos Eletronicos, the firm
through which Ferranti was providing local support, 
maintenance auid services for the Brazilian Navy.
For project 2, resources would be allocated 
for the transference of computer manufacturing 
technology to Brazil. According to the Basic Plan for 
Scientific and Technological Development, this would be 
achieved through the formation of a pilot compamy 
comprising the State, Equipamentos Eletronicos and a 
foreign firm supplying the required technological 
resources for the venture. (Brazil, Presidency of the 
Republic, 1973).
6.7 THE SELECTION OF THE TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER
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In view of the strategic importance of 
computers and their expected role in the national 
development process, in 1972 the Special Work Group 
requested computer manufacturers world wide to submit 
proposals for the establishment of a pilot compauiy in 
the computer industry. As they expected, manufacturers 
from Europe, North America and Japan presented their 
proposals, in an attempt to penetrate, under favourable 
conditions, the potentially large Brazilian computer
market.
THE FIRST SCREENING PROCESS
However, before reaching a decision, 
selecting a particular supplier of technology, members
of the Special Work Group visited computer
manufacturers in the U.K., France, Germauiy, Japan and 
the U.S.A. Their mission was not only to establish 
personal contacts with manufacturers but to discuss 
licensing terms cuid whether suppliers would be willing 
to participate in a joint venture designed for the 
enterprise. According to Uchoa (1979), the main
criteria applied by the Special Work Group in selecting 
the technology-supplier for the joint-venture were the 
following:
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a) The supplier of technology would not 
impose any export restrictions or territorial 
limitations of amy kind. (Since 1964 the 
Brazilian law prevented export restrictions 
to be included in licensing contracts).
b) The technology-supplying organization 
would agree to transmit the required elements 
of technical knowledge without restrictions, 
amd to provide information on technology 
improvements.
c) The supplier of technology would not 
prevent the recipient from acquiring 
technology from other sources.
d) There would be established a time limit 
within which the recipient would be allowed 
to sub-license technology to third parties.
According to a Ferrauiti executive, after 
these criteria were established.
"A long drawn out struggle developed with 
eight foreign companies trying to win the 
favour of the Special Work Group. Various 
ground rules for selection were laid down.
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changed and changed again. The Ferranti bid 
was strengthened by the introduction of a 
proposal to manufacture Argus 700 in Brazil. 
This gave Ferramti at once a technical edge 
over the others and got round the limitation 
of the restricted field of application of the 
FM1600 range".
At that time, the Argus 700 was Ferranti's 
latest computer design for civil applications. Argus 
700 was just coming into the British and European 
markets as a general-purpose, real-time minicomputer 
which could be utilized for business data processing, 
data communications, process control applications, 
freestanding computation in universities and research 
laboratories, etc. According to aui independent 
technical report on the Argus 700 series system,
"When Ferranti originally announced the Argus 
700 series in June 1973, the series was ahead 
of its minicomputer competitors in several 
respects. It was one of the first to offer 
high-level languages for real-time
progrsunming, and certainly the first to have 
an instruction set expressly designed for 
efficient compilation of high-level source 
languages". (Auerback, 1979).
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In the first screening process, the Special 
Work Group analyzed eight companies and came to the 
following conclusions:
a) AEG-TELEFUNKEN, PHILLIPS These companies 
were not interested in the general terms of 
technology trauisf er proposed for the venture.
b) HEWLLET-PACKARD was not willing to 
participate in a minority position.
c) DIGITAL EQUIPMENT did not agree to license 
technology without export restrictions.
d) VARIAN, ClI, FUJITSU, FERRANTI. These 
companies were still interested in terms of 
licensing auid form of participation.
THE SECOND SCREENING PROCESS
Since the special Work Group auid Equipamentos 
Eletronicos had to select only one supplier of
technology, they decided to adopt a second screening 
process, consisting of the following items:
a) The terms auid conditions under which 
technology would be transmitted.
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b) A technical comparative auialysis of the 
various products in terms of hardware and 
software.
c) The supplier's capability in terms of 
research, development auid innovations.
d) The supplier's position in terms of the 
scale of integration auid semiconductor 
technology utilized.
e) The supplier's rauige of peripherals, data 
entry, communication auid special equipment 
(Uchoa, 1979).
As a result of second screening process, auid 
additional contacts established with VARIAN, FERRANTI, 
FUJITSU and ClI, the Special Work Group narrowed the 
field to Ferrauiti auid Fujitsu.
Ferrauiti was proposing the Argus 700 series 
of computers, which could be used for both military auid 
civil applications. (Management Today, 1980) Fujitsu, 
one of the largest manufacturer of computers, 
components and telecommunications equipment in JAPAN, 
was proposing the PANAFACOM V-200 mini computer system. 
Fujitsu had been supplying computers to the Brazilian 
market since 1970 and was also co-operating with SPAIN 
in the development of a computer industry. Their
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product was specifically designed for commercial 
applications. (Fujitsu, 1978).
Equipamentos Eletronicos appointed Ferranti 
for the venture. However, the Special Work Group faced 
another split of opinions and interests. The Ministry 
of Planning and BNDE's representative selected 
Fujitsu's Panafacom V-200. The Navy's representative 
opted for the Argus - 700.
According to a Ferrauiti manager's view of the 
second screening process,
"They were not simply comparing the 
technologies of different contenders. They 
were comparing the whole package deal the 
different suppliers were offering".
"The Special Work Group looked for technical 
advice outside ... I think that the most 
influential people from a technical point of 
view were individuals from the Catholic 
University of Rio de Janeiro".
"But really, most of the arguments were 
political ..."
"Within the Special Work Group Mr. A wauited 
to go Fujitsu auid Mr. B wauited to go the 
Ferrauiti way, and the final decision was that
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they would go both ways".
In April 1973 the Ministry of Planning 
reached a compromise between the BNDE and Navy's 
interests. It established a Government holding compauiy 
with a military amd civil division to accommodate the 
divergent interests. The holding company, Brazilian 
Digital Electronics (EDB), was controlled by the BNDE 
(63%); CEF - a State Bamk (10%); SERPRO- The Federal 
Service for Data Processing (10%); TELEBRAS, the State 
Telecommunications enterprise (10%); auid others (7%). 
The EDB's initial capital was Cr $ 100 million. (BNDE, 
1973). Thus according to national policies, EDB would 
be the state partner in the tripartite joint-venture 
designed to trauisf er computer mauiuf actur ing technology 
to the country. (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 
1971, 1973). In aui attempt to trauisf er both civil auid 
military computer technology, EDB would establish two 
subsidiaries, as follows.
a) Compauiy A - This compauiy would be formed 
between EDB Equipamentos Eletronicos and 
Ferranti. It would be concerned primarily, 
but not exclusively, with the manufacture of 
military computers.
b) Compauiy B - This company would be formed
- 263 -
between EDB, Equipamentos Eletronicos and 
Fujitsu. It would be concerned with the 
manufacture of computers for civil 
applications. (BNDE, 1973).
In 1974, the Brazilian economy begaui to 
reflect some problems associated with the world 
petroleum crisis. Among other things, there was a 
sharp decline in the Gross Domestic Product and the 
real output growth rate of the industrial product, an 
unprecedented deficit in the balance of trade, a large 
deficit in the balauice of payments, and a return to the 
relatively high inflation rates of the previous decade. 
In view of Brazil's conjunctural economic problems and 
the strategic importance of company A in relation to 
current naval projects, aunong other things, the 
creation of this compauiy was given priority over
company B.
6.8 COMPÜTADORES E SISTEMAS BRASILEIROS (COBRA)
In May 1973, EDB signed aui agreement with
Equipamentos Eletronicos, Ferrauiti auid representatives 
of the Special Work Group envisaging the creation of 
compauiy A. This compauiy would be registered as a
limited liability partnership, with initial capital
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subscribed in equal parts by the three partners. Their 
objectives would be:
a) The provision of support to the Brazilian 
Navy, in terms of installation maintenance, 
repair and training.
b) The provision of support activities to the 
Brazilian Navy for equipment supplied by 
other manufacturers.
c) The development, manufacture, sale and 
support of digital systems for the Armed 
Forces of Brazil and for export.
d) The development, manufacture, sale and 
support, in Brazil and for export, of digital 
systems in non-military fields.
Following recommendations by the Special Work 
Group, on July 25, 1974, Computadores e Sistemas
Brasileiros Limitada (COBRA) was formed, as a limited 
liability company, between Eletronica Digital 
Brasileira (EDB), Equipamentos Eletronicos (EE) and 
Ferranti. According to Brazilian legislation, the 
limited liability company was characterized by the fact 
that the liability of the partners was limited to the 
aunount of subscribed capital. Thus if the partnership
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were to become insolvent the partners were not affected 
by the debts of the company, beyond the subscribed 
capital.
Cobra's initial capital was Cr$ 1.2 million, 
subscribed in equal parts by the State, Equipamentos 
Eletronicos and Ferranti. The control of COBRA would 
be exercised by a three man council representing each 
shareholder. Management would be exercised by three 
directors, nominated by the partners. The industrial 
director would be appointed by Ferranti, while the 
Financial aind Commercial directors would be nominated 
by EDB and the local partner, respectively.
According to National Development Plauis, 
Cobra was expected to play a pivotal role in the 
transference of computer manufacturing technology to 
the country. (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 
1971, 1974).
The following chapters are concerned with the 
process of transferring technological resources from 
the technology-supplying to the recipient organization. 
Chapter 7 presents the terms and conditions under which 
computer technology was transmitted to Cobra. Chapter 
8 discusses four hypotheses related to the supplier and 
recipient's perceptions of the transfer process.
7. THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS
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THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The major aim of this chapter is to analyze some 
aspects of the contractual arrangement between Cobra 
and Ferranti and the mechanisms utilized for the 
transference of technological resources. It includes an 
overview of the contractual agreement between the 
transferor and transferee, the forms of technology 
involved in the transaction, trademarks, information on 
technogical improvements, the training of human 
resources, the provision of technical assistance, the 
payment of royalties, and the settlement of disputes.
7.2 THE CONTRACTUAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
Within the framework of the Brazilian 
legislation and policies on technology transfer 
discussed in section 4.4, some aspects of the 
contractual agreement between the transferor cuid 
transferee will be exaunined. Appendix 1 presents the 
original technology transfer contract (1.1) between
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Cobra and Ferranti before the INPI's consolidated 
legislation auid aui amendment to the agreement, made 
after the specific legislation on technology trauisf er 
(1.2).
Following the formation of COBRA as a limited 
liability compauiy on July 18, 1974, aui Agreement of 
Technical Information, Assistance auid Training was made 
between COBRA auid Ferranti. This agreement was 
registered at the National Institute of Industrial 
Property on August 8, 1974, auid endorsed by the Central 
Bank of Brazil on the 19 August, 1974.
Later, in view of Cobra's new requirements 
regarding hardware and software modules, aui Agreement 
of Technical-Industrial Co-operation was appended to 
the initial contract on June 23, 1976. This amendment 
was made according to the INPI's consolidated 
regulatory fraunework.
7.2.1 THE TRANSFER AGREEMENT
The technological transactions involved a mix 
of patented auid unpatented technologies in the form of 
capital auid intermediary goods, humaui skills auid 
information. The agreement designed to trauisfer this 
mix of technologies, however, was denominated
- 268 -
'Agreement of Technical Information, Assistance auid 
Training'. Although the contract could have been 
denominated a licensing agreement it was not
characterized as such. A reasonable explanation for
this different denomination seems to be related with 
INPI's strict attitude in its approval of technology
transactions which involve additional burdens to the
balance of payments. (Wallender, 1979:190). One 
Ferrauiti manager who participated in the negotiation of 
the technology trauisfer contract with the INPI provided 
some comments on the difficulties associated with 
getting the INPI's approval of the contractual 
arrauigement between Ferrauiti auid Cobra:
"The problems we had to deal with INPI gave 
us a very good impression that technology was 
the last thing on earth they wauited".
"They were very bureaucratic auid appeared not 
to taüce auiy notice of everybody else in 
Brazil".
"Basic rule number one seemed to be no money 
should be paid for aui exchauige for know-how, 
auid there should not be auiy royalties ..."
"I think that a lot of malpractices which had 
been going on ... (evasion of currency
- 269 -
regulations, disguised payments for know-how 
and royalties, etc) ... made life very 
difficult not just for us but for all people 
who were trying to do genuine straight 
forward, sensible commercial deals".
"We started with our own idea of what a
licensing agreement should be in terms of
payments, royalties, etc, but we had to do a
compromise in the middle ... "
When the initial agreement was made in July, 
1974, the INPI had not defined any specific policy to 
determine how technology trauisfer agreements should be 
measured. As Figueredo (1972) suggested, there was not 
a coherent legal framework concerning technological 
transactions in general. What could be found was a
collection of laws auid regulations generated at 
different times by isolated institutions with different 
objectives in mind. In these circumstances, it seems 
that technological agreements were decided on a
case-by-case basis by the INPI. Perhaps, some of the 
problems associated with negotiating the contract under 
which various forms of technology would be transferred 
derived from the fact that there were no specific 
policies to orient the supplier auid recipient of 
technology, or to estimate the value of the
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technologies in relation to the current economic 
pr ior ities.
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7.2.2 FORMS OF TECHNOLOGY INVOLVED
The general aim of Agreement of Technical 
Information, Assistance and Training was "to acquire 
from Ferranti certain know-how and information" needed 
for the manufacture and sale of Argus-700 computers in 
Brazil. Specifically, this involved the acquisition of 
a mix of manufacturing, product and management 
technologies, in the following forms, as defined by the 
United Nations: (1972:5).
a) CAPITAL GOODS. These included peripherals 
not designed by Ferrauiti such as line 
printers, disk storage units, magnetic tape 
deck, plotters, paper tape punch, paper tape 
reader, teleprinters, etc. In the contract, 
special references to these peripheral 
equipment were made by clauses 2(iii) auid 
9(ii).
b) INTERMEDIARY GOODS. Refer to the hardware 
modules, equipment and components related to 
the manufacture of Argus-700 computers. They 
include various electronic auid
electro-mechauiical components such as central 
processor modules, monitor units, store
access units, general purpose logic elements.
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input/output units, printed circuit boards, 
registers, cooling fans, power supply units, 
etc. In the contract these hardware modules 
and other intermediary goods were designated 
as "The products". (Clause l(i).
c) HUMAN RESOURCES. These included training 
of engineering and managerial personnel at 
the supplier's premises in the United Kingdom 
(Clause 4) and the support of Ferranti's 
engineers of COBRA's plauit in Brazil. (Clause 
5). Details of training activities auid 
Ferranti's support in Brazil are provided in 
section 7.2.6
d) INFORMATION. This item caui be subdivided 
into two sub-items as follows:
SOFTWARE - Refer to the basic, auxiliary auid 
application software designed to control the 
internal operations of the computer and the 
execution of specific tasks. Basically they 
consist of sets of prograunmed instructions 
written in a computer "language" to control 
the execution of various tasks. In the 
contract, the basic software needed for the 
operating system was termed 'standard
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software package' (Clause 3(i)) while the 
auxiliary software such as the CORAL and 
FORTRAN compilers, and other application 
programs were referred to as 'Other Software 
Packages'. (Clause 3(ii)).
TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGES - These refer to the 
documentary information which describes how 
to assemble the modules, parts, components, 
materials auid the techniques used to carry 
out the production process. Among these 
packages there are specifications for 
materials, photographic processes, design 
standards, quality assurance testing, layout 
of production area, etc. The contract refers 
to these technical data packages as 
•Technical Information' (Clause l(ii)).
7.2.3 DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT
The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development sees the duration of contractual agreements 
involving trauisf er of technologies as aui important 
element in the contract between the transfering auid 
recipient enterprises. (United Nations, 1975, 1978) 
The basic argument is that the contract duration may 
tie the recipient to outdated technologies. Katz found
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that, in Argentina, 18 out of 60 contractual agreements 
researched specified periods between 7 auid 10 years, 
while some were for 50 years or more, (Katz, 1972). In 
an empirical research focussed on British industry 
Taylor and Silberston (1973) pointed out that in the 
electronics sector, where technology was chauiging 
rapidly, the five year period of duration for patent 
and know-how licensing agreements was being 
increasingly preferred by British companies. They also 
indicated that there was considerable variation in 
relation to the duration of the agreements, depending 
on the nature of the technology involved and the 
bargaining strengths of the parties.
Although the original contractual agreement 
between Ferranti and Cobra was signed before the INPI's 
normative act No. 15 regulating the subject, the term 
of the contract matched INPI's later requirements. In 
relation to the duration of the technology agreement, 
the initial contractual bound established between the 
partners was five years. The effective date of the 
agreement, however, was the date Cobra notified 
Ferranti that the necessary approvals of the Brazilian 
government authorities were obtained. (Clauses iv auid 
17).
The INPI approved the agreement on the 8th of 
August 1974 and the Central Bank of Brazil endorsed the
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contract on the 19th of the saune month.
The supply of "technical information"
relating to the hardware modules auid other products
(Integrated circuit boards, central processor circuits, 
power supplies, input/output devices, magnetic tape 
controllers, peripherals, etc) could be requested by 
Cobra within two years of the effective date of the 
contract. (Clause 2(ii) In respect to those 
peripherals, parts or components not designed by 
Ferranti, (The Calcomp plotter. Card Readers, Line 
Printers, Magnetic Tape Units, Disk Storage Units, etc) 
there was no obligation to supply any information 
related to these products, except the description of 
the functional requirements of the products amd the 
identification of the original manufacturers (Clause 
2(iii)).
As regards the aquisition of software
modules, (the set of prograuns such as the basic,
auxiliary and application software, compilers, etc) 
they could be requested by the recipient at auiy time 
within the duration of the agreement.
7.2.4 TRADE MARKS
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A trade mark is basically a distinctive mark 
connected with a product or process. When a licensor 
grants a trade mark to a licensee, as part of a 
technology transfer package, it is assumed that there 
are contractual arrangements assuring maintenance of 
the traditional standards associated with the product. 
As Behrmain (1976:55) put it, "no licensor is willing to 
see the quality of its trademarked products differ 
significantly in several markets around the world".
Under clause 16 of the agreement, the 
computers built by Cobra should carry the inscription 
"Manufactured under licence from Ferranti Ltd". This 
was considered normal under the 1974 legislation 
concerning license agreements. However, the new INPI's 
regulatory framework on contracts of technico- 
industrial co-operation prohibited the explicit use of 
trade marks connected with licensing agreements. 
(Provision 5.5.2a of the INPI normative act No. 15, 
appendix 2) Thus, if a licensee wants to incorporate a 
trade mark in the technology package, a separate 
agreement has to be registered at the INPI, according 
to the provisions established for this category. 
(Provision 1.1c).
7.2.5 INFORMATION ON TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS
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In the international literature on technology 
transfer, this concept is usually referred to as
"grant-back provision" (United Nations, 1978; 
Wallender, 1979; Pearlmutter, 1976; Behrman, 1976).
A United Nations study summarized the
situation regarding apparent limitations on the access 
to technology improvements by recipients in developing 
countries as follows:
"Technology suppliers also insist that 
recipients inform them of any improvements 
made in the technology without, however, any 
obligation to pass on to recipients
information about improvements which they may 
make themselves. Thus, the licensee is
deprived of access to the fruits of the
licensor's research amd development, to which 
he nonetheless contributes through royalty 
auid other payments, whereas the licensor cam 
take advantage of auiy development by the 
licensee without having made any financial
cntribution to it". (United Nations, 1975:
23) .
The saune study reported that the 
"non-reciprocity" practice was widespread in Argentina 
and the Philippines. Another study also published by
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the United Nations (1978) recognised the difficulties 
involved in defining what constitutes an improvement in 
technology and what could be termed new technology. 
Despite the considerable conceptual problems inherent 
to drawing a line between improvements vis-a-vis new 
technology, the study suggested that a practical 
definition of the required technology should be 
included in the contractual agreement and recipients 
should not accept any limitations regarding grant-back 
provisions.
The agreement for trauisfer of a computer 
manufacturing capability between Cobra and Ferranti 
stipulated a two-way exchange of technology during the 
period of the contract. Clause 13 states that each 
party "shall promptly after incorporating auiy 
improvements in products manufactured by it inform the 
other party of such improvement auid shall as soon as is 
reasonably practicable supply to such other party 
technical information relating to such improvement". 
However, it was also agreed that the receiving party 
would be responsible for using the information which 
could lead to technical improvements as well as for the 
quality and performance of the resulting products. 
(Clause 14).
Behrman sees a two-way exchange of 
technology as probably more valuable to the recipient
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than exclusive control over future technological 
developments. From the supplier's point of view he 
argues that "no licensor will readily give up the use 
of its technology if it considers the licensee to be in 
a position to make technological improvements that may 
preclude the licensor's ability to readily enter the 
world market. Therefore, grant-backs merely continue 
the ability of the licensory to stay in the gcune" 
(Behrman, 1976:53).
Depending of the objectives of the supplier 
and recipient, a two-way exchauige of technology seems 
to be, in principle, a reasonable mecuis of 
participating at each other's research and development 
efforts. For instance , recently, there have been some 
equipment developments in Brazil. Cobra produced a 
combination of hardware and software elements for a 
local organization of supermarkets, designed for use in 
stock control within the chain. This application 
required the use of a special peripheral terminal 
equipment which was designed specifically for the 
supermarket chain. Both the hardware auid software 
components of the application were designed , developed 
auid made entirely by Cobra. As the real time stock 
control system was operating in the supermarket chain, 
the British Airport Authority was considering 
installing in each airport some processing equipment
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with similar characteristics. The application basically 
involved providing a terminal for each of the different 
shops at the airports. This data processing equipment 
in the airports would offer the various shop 
concessionaries with facilities to do stock control, 
accounting, payroll, etc.
Ferranti immediately saw the similarity 
between the British Airport Authority's needs and the 
Brazilian supermarket chain application. Instead of 
developing completely new hardware and software to meet 
the needs of the airports, Ferranti was considering 
using Cobra's equipment in Englamd, with some minor 
modifications in the software to meet the requirements 
of its clients.
In the international literature on technology 
transfer this would be considered an example of the 
"reverse of technology transfer" (OECD, 1975). 
Perhaps, what is interesting to note is that this 
presumable flow of technology in the other direction 
implicitly seemed to carry with it some of the problems 
usually associated with the aquisition of technology by 
recipients from developing countries. For instance, 
one Ferranti manager stated:
"Those terminals might be ideally suited ..."
" ... and probably if they do the easiest way
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would be to buy some, rather than to get the 
design, because if we do that and start 
putting it into our manufacturing then we
would have the problems of understanding
their drawings, auid their ways of doing 
things, finding their special finite 
components that are not easily available over 
here or have to be identified to come from 
some other suppliers auid so on ...”
Some of Cobra's mauiagers auid techniciauis 
interviewed in Brazil also stressed the difficulties 
they had in understanding Ferranti's documentation auid 
technical information. One software engineer who 
participated in the early training programmes in
Englauid stated:
" I expected to f ind a very clear 
documentation of the software that I was 
going to use in Brazil. However, what I 
could find were mostly drafts of 
ducumentation ...
Suddenly I found myself in a situation that I 
had to understand the prograuns auid, at the 
saune time, develop a clearer documentation
- 282 -
Perhaps, from the Cobra-Ferranti experience 
discussed above, the following points appear to be
worth noting:
1. Considering the lack of definitions as to 
what constitutes am improvement in technology 
as opposed to a new technology, it seems that 
this could lead to considerable
misunderstandings if a dispute were to arise 
between the technology supplier auid 
recipient. This suggests the need for a 
mutually agreed definition of terms to be 
included in technology trauisfer contracts.
2. Another factor which could, perhaps, lead 
to misinterpretations is the the expression 
"as soon as is reasonably practicable" as a 
time factor in clause 13, establishing the 
terms under which technological developments 
would be exchanged between the parties. A 
less flexible time limit would possibly maJce 
this clause clearer.
3. Considering the dynamic nature of 
technological changes in the electronics
sector cuid particularly in the computer 
industry, (Taylor auid Silberston, 1973;
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Withington, 1975; Baranson, 1979; Brock, 
1975; Harman, 1971; EIÜ, 1979a) the inclusion 
of two-way exchange of technology clauses 
seems to be a reasonable proposition for both 
sides of the technology transaction. It may 
enable both the supplier and recipient to 
gain from external economies derived from 
each other's resources invested in research 
and development activities.
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7.2.5 TRAINING OF HUMAN RESOURCES
The notion of training as a mechanism for the 
transfer of technology appears to be well recognized in 
the literature. (UNCTAD, 1972; Doctors, 1971; Lynton, 
1969).
Training of technical, engineering and 
managerial personnel at the premises of the technology 
supplier in England seemed to be considered a crucial
element of the envisaged technology transfer process.
A Ferranti director was explicit in this point:
"We were well aware that transfer of
technology was not simply sending pieces of
paper together with the hardware. We could 
have sent drawings, service manuals and all 
that, but that isn't ... It is too complex a 
subject. We were aware that there had to be 
a lot of training..."
The Agreement of Technical Information, 
Assistance and Training (Appendix 1.1) established that 
fifty personnel of Cobra were to be trained at 
Ferranti's premises in England. (Clause 4). The length 
of the training courses were approximately four months 
for each individual, at times mutually agreed between 
the technology supplier and recipient. These training
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activities were to be conducted in the English 
language, within two years of the effective date of the 
contractual agreement. This period, however was 
extended to December 1976, according to clause 1.4 of 
the Agreement of Technical Industrial Co-operation 
(Appendix 1.2).
Although the contractual agreement did not 
detail the chronogram of the training activities or the 
categories of personnel needed to participate in such 
training, a tentative training scheme was designed by 
Ferranti. According to one Ferranti manager, this 
scheme involved training the following categories of 
Cobra's personnel:
1. Administration auid Plauining Mauiagers.
2. Sales auid Support Engineers.
3. Hardware auid Software Engineers.
3. Maintenance Engineers.
4. Production Engineers.
Figures 7.1 auid 7.2 show the chronogram of 
training activities planned for the various categories 
of personnel to be developed in Englauid. The training 
courses comprised a variety of subjects, some specially 
prepared for the recipient's personnel, auid others
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derived from stémdard courses prepared for the 
supplier's own requirements. Some training activities 
included not only lectures, but periods of supervised 
practical experience in the factory.
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Figure 7 . 1  Chrono gram of training activities - Part 1
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Figure 7.2 Chronogram of traini ng activities - Part 2
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7.2.7 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
Another aspect of the preparation of Cobra's 
humaui resources was the provision of technical 
assistance by Ferranti's engineers, at the recipient's 
premises in Brazil. The rationale for the support of 
the transferor in loco was emphasized by a Ferranti's 
manager :
"Once we got the contractual arrangement 
under which the information would be 
supplied, then it became possible to go ahead 
and actually do it ... (the transfer 
activities)
Actually, doing it involved a whole string of 
complications, which I think, that the key 
element was that in order to transfer complex 
information from one organization to another 
you have to have a group of people in the 
other organization who is atole to accept auid 
absorb that information ...
We believed that it would be necessary for a 
fairly large teaun of experts to go to Brazil, 
stay there alongside the Brazilians in 
building up the capability".
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The general idea, according to another 
Ferranti manager, was to provide Cobra with engineers 
and managers who had practical experience in getting 
things manufactured. They would be based at Cobra's 
premises in Rio, working closely together with the
Brazilians, for a few years. They would also help to
select capable, although relatively inexperienced,
personnel to become Cobra's managers of the various 
departments. These mauiagers would actually be in 
charge of the various departments, but at the beginning 
they would not be maücing auiy decisions. They would be 
working in conjunction with the English experts. Then, 
a gradual trauisf er would be possible, as they gained 
on-the-job experience. The notion of this on-the-job 
training as a learning mechanism (Arrow, 1962) auid as a 
technology trauisf er instrument (Behrmaui, 1976) has been 
recognized in the literature.
The importance of technical assistance as a 
face-to-face medium for transferring technologies auid 
the mobility of technical personnel are emphasized in 
the literature in a variety of ways. Utterback's 
(1975) suggested that face-to-face contacts auid 
discussion of alternatives between supplier auid 
recipient personnel were effective chauinels for 
transfering technology. Local support abroad was also 
considered an essential factor in the trauisfer process.
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Doctor's evaluation of the NASA technology trauisfer 
program stresses the value of the mobility of the 
technologist, continuing personal contacts between 
supplier auid recipient personnel as trauisfer 
mechauiisms. He also considered these mechanisms to be 
more effective thaui the traditional programs of 
transferring technical information. Goulet (1977) also 
emphasizes the importauice of personal interaction, 
daily contact, working closely together, getting to 
know each other auid developing trust auid confidence. 
Figure 7.3 presents the proposed chronogram of 
activities involved in the supply of technical 
assistance at Cobra's premises in Rio auid the following 
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7.2.8 RATES OF ROYALTY
The question of the rates of royalty involved 
in international license agreements for the transfer of 
technology seems to be much discussed in the literature 
on technology transfer. In a study of the ownership 
policies of multinational corporations in less 
industrialized countries Stopford and Wells (1972) 
suggested that in joint ventures profits may be
transferred to the parent companies disguised as 
royalty payments for technological agreements. Thus, 
host governments sometimes impose barriers to the 
transmittal of royalties, just as they do against
dividends. (Robins and Stobaugh, 1973).
Taylor auid Silberston (1973: 120-124)
suggested that although the factors affecting the 
determination of royalty rates of patent amd know-how 
license agreements are complex amd difficult to 
generalise, the following principles seemed to be
relevant:
1 - The volume of physical output. The
larger the volume of output the lower the 
rate of royalty to be applied, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, the rate of royalty tended to 
be inversely proportional to the level of
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output.
2 - The elasticity of demauid. In some 
markets where the elasticity of demand for 
the product is "exceptionally" low, as for 
components which may affect the safety of 
airplanes, the rate of royalty tended to be 
relatively higher.
3 - The amount of know-how supplied. The
greater the aunount of know-how involved, the
greater the level of royalty, ceteris 
paribus.
4 - The value of finished products. In some 
sectors where components amd other inputs are 
produced under license for the mamufacture of 
a finished product, royalty rates tended to 
be fixed in relation to the value of the 
finished product.
In a sample of 27 firms, they found that 14
respondents reported royalty rates between 2.5 amd 5 
percent. The sample meam was 4.2 per cent. In the
chemical amd electrical engineering sectors respondents 
were concentrated around 2.5 - 5 per cent while in the 
mechanical engineering sector the subjects were in the 
5 - 1 0  per cent ramge. The relative importance of
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know-how in the mechanical engineering sector amd the 
nature of the market (limited, specialist markets) were 
considered to be the probable determinants of the 
higher rates of royalty in this field.
The rates of royalty agreed between Ferramti 
amd Cobra were determined in accordance to clause 
9(vii) of the technology transfer contract (Appendix 
1.1). In the agreement, the rate of royalty is 
referred to as "Applicable percentage levy".
The contractual rate of royalty varied 
between 2 amd 5 per cent of the net selling price of 
any product or derivative, mamufactured, assembled or 
repaired by Cobra, amd was determined according to the 
following formula amd variables:
Rate of Royalty » 5 / ( l + ( 1 0 ( D / P  )))
Where:
P - Cobra's Total Annual Net Sales
D - Ferranti's Relative Participation 
in Cobra's Capital Structure
Figure 7.4 shows the relationship between the 
rates of royalty, annual sales amd Ferranti's various
Pe-^ceniaqe Level oF Royally Percentage oP Ownership
naKi'TiO'ii Level 5^
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levels of relative participation in the capital 
structure of Cobra. Table 7.1 contains the calculated 
rates of royalty associated with Ferranti's relative 
participation in Cobra in 1974, 1976, 1977, 1980, and 
the values of simulated sales derived to analyze the 
relationship between the variables. Figure 7.5 
illustrates the relationship between the levels of 
royalty, simulated sales, cuid the supplier's relative 
participation in the recipient's capital structure.
In 1974, when Ferrauiti owned 33.3 per cent of 
Cobra's capital structure, if sales had reached 100 
monetary units the calculated rate of royalty would 
have been 0.65 per cent. However, since this value was 
below the minimum applicable rate, 2 per cent would
prevail. In 1976, even considering that Ferranti's 
participation increased to 45.3 per cent, the 100 sales 
value would still have generated a royalty rate (0.49)
lower thcui the minimum required level. In 1977 the
same sales level would allow a royalty rate above the 
minimum standard, (2.63) since Ferranti's percentage of 
ownership of Cobra had decreased to 4.5 per cent that 
year. In 1980, considering a lower percentage of 
ownership, (3.0) the saune sales level would have
produced a higher royalty rate. (3.12).
An analysis of figure 7.4 and Table 7.1 
suggests the following points in relation to the
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relationship between royalty rates, annual sales auid 
the level of the technology supplier's participation in 
the recipient's ownership structure:
1. At any percentage level of ownership, the 
greater the amount of sales the greater the 
royalty rate. Thus, the rates of royalty 
varied directly proportional to the amount of 
sales.
2. The lower the level of percentage 
ownership the greater the rate of royalty, 
ceteris paribus. In other words, the 
percentage level of ownership varied 
inversely proportional to the estimated rates 
of royalty, if sales were kept constant.
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Table 7.1 Calculated Rates of Royalty for various










50 0.65 0.49 2.63 3.12
100 1.15 0.90 3.44 3.84
200 1.87 1.53 4.08 4.34
300 2.36 1.99 4.34 4.54
400 2.72 2.34 4.49 4.65
500 3.00 2.62 4.58 4.71
600 3.21 2.84 4.65 4.76
700 3.38 3.03 4.69 4.79
800 3.53 3.19 4.73 4.81
900 3.64 3.32 4.76 4.83
1000 3.75 3.44 4.78 4.85
R o y a I t y
S a l e s O w n e r  sh i p ( >. 'i Sa I es
Figure 7.5 Isometric Projection of the Relationship 
between levels of Royalty, Annual Sales, 
and the Technology Supplier's Relative 
Participation in the Recipient's 
Capital Structure.
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7.2.9 THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
According to clause 27 of the contractual 
agreement, any disputes arising between the technology 
supplier and recipient, which could not be settled 
amicably, should be submitted to arbitration by the 
International Chamber of Commerce based in Paris, 
France.
Although the inclusion or arbitration clauses 
in international contracts involving technology 
transactions may seem an effective provision in the 
event of misinterpretations of the terms and conditions 
of the agreements, there appear to be some positive and 
negative aspects to be considered by the supplier and 
recipient in respect to these clauses. The Hon. Mr. 
Justice Kerr provides an overview of the main 
advantages and disadvantages of solving international 
disputes by arbitration as opposed to the traditional 
method of litigation in courts of justice.
"It is probably no over-generalising to say 
that businessmen generally prefer arbitration 
to litigation whereas lawyers do not. The 
reasons are easy to see. Businessmen 
instinctively prefer arbitration because it 
is private and generally more informal
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because they believe it to be cheaper and 
quicker, and because it is, or at any rate 
appears, to be a friendlier means of 
resolving disputes thaui by litigation. In 
the course of negotiating a contract neither 
side will usually see anything in the least 
bit hostile in the incorporation of an 
arbitration clause. It is merely regarded as 
an acknowledgment of the fact that, while 
both sides hope that no disputes will arise, 
both are determined from the outset to ensure 
that their resolution by some external meauis 
should be as friendly as possible if this 
proves necessary. Even where the contract 
contains no provision for arbitration and 
where disputes have already arisen, 
businessmen will often still find themselves 
able to agree on arbitration as the most 
amicable way of resolving them.
Lawyers on the other hand, are often rightly 
sceptical about the apparent advantages of 
arbitration. They know that their clients 
will often be disillusioned in the event. 
Arbitral tribunals have to be paid, whereas 
court fees are often negligible" (Kerr, 1980: 
164).
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To illustrate the difficulties and resources 
involved in dealing with disputes derived from 
international contracts with arbitration provisions, 
Kerr mentioned the case between a German versus an 
English company. Their contract envisaged the design 
and construction of a large and complex machine plant 
in Germany. The German company appointed the English 
Queen's Counsel as their arbitrator, the English firm 
indicated the Canadian Queen's Counsel and the 
International Chamber of Commerce nominated the judge. 
The contractual forum was Zurich, the governing law of 
the agreement was English, a Danish Supreme Court judge 
was appointed as a neutral umpire, auid the first 
hearings were in Copenhagen. The technical
complexities were further complicated when auiother 
disagreement on the appointment of expert witnesses 
arose. A professor of law from Basle was substituted 
for the Danish judge, a Swedish technical expert was 
appointed but challenged by one party who finally took 
the case to the Swiss Federal Court. To summarise the 
difficulties involved in reaching a settlement in this 
case, after 15 years of dispute, "The arbitration is 
far from finished".
Considering the difficulties and the amount 
of resources involved in attempting to solve 
contractual disputes by arbitration, as observed in the
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above practically indefinite case, the need for 
preventative measures such as clearly defined terms and 
conditions of technological agreements seems to be an 
important matter for both the transferor auid recipient.
Although there are no ready-made formulas for 
assuring the clarity of the terms and conditions of the 
technology transfer agreements, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, (United Nations, 
1978) auid the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO, 1977) have published "guidelines" for the 
aguisition of technology by developing countries. 
Apparently, these guidelines are intended to serve as 
frameworks for licensing agreements and other 
technology transactions, pointing out to the supplier 
and the recipient how the text of the agreement may be 
drawn. Other initiatives in this area include the much 
discussed Group of 77*s proposal for aui International 
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology. (United 
Nations, 1979; UNCTAD, 1974, 1975; Holland 1976).
In this respect, both the Japanese and 
Brazilian UNCTAD proposals for an international code of 
conduct on technology transfer, recognized the need for 
arbitration provisions in international contracts 
involving technology transactions. (Rao et al., 1976). 
According to their proposals, the selection of am 
arbitration forum to solve disputes between the
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technology supplier auid recipient enterprises has two 
advantages: It may be am effective way of settling
technology transfer disputes amd at the saune time it 
may act as am agency for dissiminating information 
among Governments, national amd international
enterprises, facilitating the communication between 
them. However, what appears be more important tham
selecting am arbitration forum is attempting to reduce 
the chamces of being involved in disputes at all. 
Perhaps, one way to diminish the chamces of getting 
such disputes is to maüce sure that the terms amd
conditions of the transactions are clearly defined amd 
mutually agreed ah initio.
8. PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROCESS
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PERCEPTIONS OF THE TRANSFER PROCESS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The major aim of this chapter is to present 
the results obtained from testing the hypotheses 
formulated in section 3.3, and to discuss the findings 
related to these hypotheses. Four alternative 
hypotheses were developed to test whether there would 
be significant differences between the supplier and 
recipient's perceptions of individual (Hypothesis No. 
1), technological (Hypothesis No. 2), organizational 
(Hypothesis No. 3), and environmental (Hypothesis No. 
4) factors affecting the transfer process. Sections
8.2, 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5 will deal with hypotheses 1, 2,
3 and 4 respectively.
8.2 HYPOTHESIS NO. 1
Hypothesis No. 1 proposes that the supplier 
amd recipient will differ in their perceptions of 
individual factors affecting the transmission of 
technological resources at each stage of the tramsfer 
process. Restated in the usual notation, the
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hypothesis was:
HI: There are significant differences between 
the supplier and recipient's perceptions of 
individual factors affecting the transmission 
of technological resources at the initial, 
intermediary and current stages of the 
process.
In order to test this hypothesis, a series of 
T-tests were conducted to determine the existence of 
significant differences between the supplier (Group 1) 
and the recipient (Group 2) at each stage of the 
process. The hypothesis was tested by examining the
summary measures of individual factors created for each 
stage of the process. These summary measures consisted 
of the meam scores of individual's variables, namely, 
individual's education, training, and experience. The 
relevant statistics, the calculated "T-values" amd
2-tail probabilities for each stage of the process are 
provided in table 8.1.
An amalysis of the data in table 8.1
indicates that, using a 0.05 level of significance,
there was no evidence to reject HI for the initial 
(INDl) and intermediary (IND2) stages of the process. 
The saune table indicates that HI was strongly rejected 
for the current (IND3) stage of the process. Thus,
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hypothesis 1 was partially supported.
Considering each stage of the process 
separately, am examination of Table 8.1 shows that a 
significant difference was found for the initial, (t 
-6.13, d.f. » 22.17, p < 0.001) amd intermediary stage 
of the process. (t » -2.69, d.f. - 23.37, p < 0.05).
An amalysis of the data for the current stage shows 
that no significant difference was found. (t » 1.53,
d.f. - 22.15, p > 0.05).
Figure 8.1 presents the mean scores of the 
summary measures of individual factors, (General 
Individual Factors) as perceived by each group, at each 
stage of the transmission of resources. Figures 8.2,
8.3, amd 8.4 show separately, the meam scores of the 
individual variables which were utilized to derive the 
measure of general individual factors.
An examination of figure 8.1 reveals that the 
difference between the supplier amd recipient's 
perceptions of individual factors, as suggested by the 
magnitude of the meam scores, was relatively greater 
during the first two stages of the transference. The 
discrepancy between their perceptions was at a maximum 
at the first stage of the process. In this stage, the 
supplier apparently perceived the general individual 
factors as having a moderately negative effect on the 
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In the subsequent stages of the process, this 
difference was reduced and both parties perceived the 
general individual factors as producing a positive, 
facilitating effect in the transmission of 
technological resources.
Some comments provided by individual 
participants of the process helped to identify other 
factors associated with the transfer activities. For 
instance, two members of the supplying organization 
stated:
"... a lot of people with whom we were 
dealing, had problems admitting a need to 
learn ... Probably, the key to solve this 
problem was getting a group of good people 
from Rio over into our factory in Manchester 
cuid by the time a number of them had been 
there for three or four months things really 
begun to start working ..."
"I think that, by far the greatest success 
all the way through, was by the people who 
really got this close working together ... 
this meauis the people who caune over for quite 
extended periods of time auid got themselves 
immersed in what it is all about ... Some
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very strong friendships have been built up".
These comments seem to support the notion 
that individuals are the main agents in the transfer 
process. (Burns, 1969; Geschka, 1974; Little, 1965; 
Rubenstein, 1974; Hertz, 1980). In addition, close 
personal relationships and informal contacts between 
individuals from the supplying auid recipient 
organizations are considered as efficient mechauiisms 
for transferring elements of technical knowledge, 
technical secrets auid confidential information. 
(Allen, 1971; Allen auid Cooney, 1973; Allen, 1973; 
Rogers, 1962; Utterback, 1975; Bass, 1974). Hardy 
summarizes his view on the importance of the human 
actors in the tramsfer process as follows:
"Technology transfer is a special case of the 
human communication problem ... Its success 
depends entirely on individual humam beings, 
not on machines or organizations" (Hardy, 
1974:188-89).
Some engineers from the recipient 
organization provided the following comments:
"Initially there was some incredulity in 
relation to our capacity to absorb the 
technology ... Therefore, one of our first
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preoccupations was to demonstrate our 
previous level of technical knowledge ... 
Once this was achieved they begun to trust us 
and we started learning properly".
"The technology transfer activities helped us 
to identify some deficiencies in the 
curricula of the electronic engineering 
courses of our universities. For instance, 
we discovered that no recent graduate 
engineer knew how to test most of the digital 
hardware equipment".
"The language problems were much greater tham 
we anticipated ... One thing is to be aüile to 
read technical books in English ... amother 
thing is to participate in a training course 
in English".
The lamguage problem mentioned by the 
recipient seems to illustrate Hardy's (1974) view that 
this is sometimes the most important barrier between 
the supplier auid recipient. Besides the general 
semamtic problems derived from the different cultural 
backgrounds, some individuals from the recipient 
organization also reported initial difficulties in 
trying to understand the unique jargon, or the coding
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scheme (Katz and Kahn, 1966) of the members of the 
supplying organisation, particularly in the field of 
computer engineering.
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8.3 HYPOTHESIS NO. 2
Hypothesis No. 2 was formulated to determine 
whether there would be differences between the supplier 
amd recipient's perceptions of technological factors 
affecting the transfer process at each stage of the 
transmission of technology. Restated in the usual 
notation, the hypothesis was:
HI: There are significant differences between 
the supplier amd recipient's perceptions of 
technological factors affecting the
transmission of technological resources at 
the initial, intermediary amd current stages 
of the process.
This hypothesis was tested by analyzing the 
summary measures of technological factors, which 
consisted of the mean scores of two variables: The
first was product complexity, or how the groups 
perceived the level of complexity of the product 
affecting the tramsfer process. The second was process 
complexity, or the extent to which the process utilized 
to assemble computers was perceived as having a 
positive (facilitating), neutral or negative 
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Table 8.2 presents the results of the t-tests 
conducted on the data from the two groups to determine 
the existence of significant differences for the three 
stages of the process. Using a 0.05 level of
significance, am amalysis of table 8.2 indicates that 
there was no evidence to reject HI for the initial
(TECl) amd intermediary (TEC2) stages of the process. 
For the current stage (TEC3) HI was strongly rejected. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2 was partially rejected.
An examination of table 8.2 shows that
significant differences were found between the supplier 
amd recipient's perceptions of technological factors at 
the initial, (t - 2.04, d.f. - 36, p < 0.05) amd
intermediary stages of the process, (t - 2.71, d.f. - 
25.17, p < 0.05). No significant difference was found 
for the current stage of the process. (t - 1.57, d.f. 
" 21.80, p > 0.05) Figure 8.5 summarizes the supplier
and recipient's perceptions of technological factors at 
each stage of the tramsfer process. The variables 
which were combined to generate the summary measure of 
technological factors are shown separately in Figures 
8.6 amd 8.7.
An examination of figure 8.5 suggests that, 
in general, the recipient perceived technological 
factors as exerting a neutral, tending to negative, 
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the opposite. According to the saune figure, the 
discrepancy in their opinions was at a maximum in the 
second stage of the process. Although both the 
supplier and recipient perceived the complexity of the 
process (Figure 8.7) during the three stages as having 
a relatively neutral (tending to positive) effect on 
the process, the complexity of the product (Figure 8.6) 
was seen as exerting a slightly negative, impeding 
effect. Thus, these results appear to suggest that 
technology per se, (Baranson, 1966, 1969; Seurat, 1976, 
Hertz, 1980) was considered as a constraint in the 
transfer process, while the process used to make 
computers, from the separate hardware modules,
mechanical êuid electromechanical components was not
viewed as such. In fact, the actual process of 
assembling the various elements and modules that go
into a computer central processing unit does not appear 
to be complex, compared with the high technology 
involved in manufacturing the components themselves. 
Several modules involved in assembling computers are 
'plug in packages'. The recipient basically follows 
the specifications amd testing procedures provided by 
the technology-supplier, assembling the various printed 
circuit boards, cables, power unit, and other 
electromechanical, mechanical amd microelectronic parts 































Hypothesis No. 3 suggests that the supplier 
and recipient will differ in their perceptions of 
organizational factors affecting the transmission of 
technology at each stage of the transference. Restated 
for the purpose of this analysis, the hypothesis was:
HI: There are significant differences between 
the supplier and recipient's perceptions of 
organizational factors affecting the 
transmission of technological resources at 
the initial, intermediary and current stages 
of the process.
This hypothesis was tested by examining the 
summary measures of organizational factors, which
consisted of the meaui score of the following variables:
a) The degree of ownership by the
technology-supplier;
b) The availability of local inputs for
production;
c) The availability of management resources;
d) The availability of engineering and
technical resources;
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e) The availability of other human
resources.
Thus, the summary measure of organizational 
factors represents, basically, an index of the extent 
to which the respondents perceived these variables 
exerting a negative (impeding), neutral, or a positive 
(facilitating) effect on the transmission technological 
resources, at each stage of the process.
To determine the existence of significant 
differences between the groups, a series of t-tests 
were conducted on the data. The relevant statistics, 
"t"-values cuid 2-tail probabilities are provided in 
table 8.3.
An analysis of table 8.3 shows that, using a 
0.05 level of significance, the hypothesis was 
supported for the initial (ORGl) auid current (0RG3) 
stages of the process. HI was rejected for the 
intermediary (0RG2) stage of the transfer. Thus, in 
general, hypothesis No. 3 was partially supported.
An examination of table 8.3 indicates that 
significant differences were found between the supplier 
cuid recipient's perceptions of organizational factors 
at the initial, (t - -4.44, d.f. - 25.82, p < 0.001)
amd current (t - -2.42, d.f. - 33.33, p < 0.05) stages 
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found for the intermediary (t - -1.80, d.f. = 25.22, p 
> 0.05) stage of the process.
Figure 8.8 exhibits the supplier and 
recipient's summary measures of organizational factors 
for the three stages of the transfer process. From data 
presented in figure 8.8 it seems that, once again, the 
diffference between the perceptions of the groups was 
more accentuated, at the initial stage of the transfer. 
According to the recipient, general organizational 
factors seemed to exert a neutral to positive influence 
on the first stage. On the other hauid, the supplier 
perceived organizational factors as producing a neutral 
to negative effect on the same stage of the process. 
Regarding the subsequent stages of the process, their 
perceptions, as suggested by the mean scores, were 
relatively congruent, cUid both parties appeared to 
perceive that organisational factors had little effect.
MANAGEMENT RESOURCES
Considering the variables which might have 
influenced the process in isolation, reference to 
figure 8.9 reveals a relatively strong difference of 
perception as to the extent to which the availability 
of management resources in the recipient organization 
affected the transmission of resources. The supplier 
suggested that this variable acted as a constraint to
1974-1976 1977-1978 1979-1980
Figure 8.8 - General Organizational Factors
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the process, particularly in the first stage, while the 
recipient considered it not an impeding force, but as a 
neutral, practically positive factor during the three 
stages of the transfer. The supplier's view appears to 
support Wallender's (1979) contention that the lack of 
management resources is one of the major constraints to 
successful technology transfer activities in developing 
countries. This point seems to be well recognized in 
the literature. (Seurat, 1976; Myrdal, 1981, Cooper 
and Sercovitch 1971; Baranson, 1969).
ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES
As to the availability of engineering and 
technical resources, (Figure 8.10) the supplier 
considered it as a slight constraint at the first stage 
of the process. In the subsequent stages it was viewed 
as a neutral, tending to positive factor. In general, 
the recipient seemed to indicate that this variable 
exerted a moderately positive influence on the process.
OTHER HUMAN RESOURCES
In relation to the availability of other 
human resources (Figure 8.11), such as skilled and 
semi-skilled personnel, both the supplier amd recipient 
appear to suggest that in general, it was considered as 
a neutral variable. One interviewee, however.
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commented that,
"We found it difficult to recruit amd train 
the skilled laÜDOur that we needed... .
This is one thing that we were usually short 
of in Brazil. You have the university 
graduates amd manual laüsour, but it was the 
skilled laibour in between that it was always 
so difficult to get".
DEGREE OF OWNERSHIP BY SUPPLIER
As regards the perceptions of the extent to 
which the degree of ownership by the transferor acted 
as a positive, neutral or negative factor in the 
tramsmission of resources, reference to figure 8.12 
reveals some divergence between the supplier amd 
recipient's views in the first stage of the transfer. 
The former indicated that this factor exerted a neutral 
tending to positive, influenceon all stages of the 
process, while the latter emphasized its positive 
aspects in the first stage of the process.
The actual levels of supplier's participation 
in the capital structure of the recipient enterprize 
are illustrated in figure 8.14. Apparently, the 
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Figure 8.14 Supplier's participation in the Recipient's
Capital Structure.
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supplier's participation at the initial stage as a 
positive, facilitating factor in the tramsfer process. 
The literature suggests the existence of a trade-off 
between the extent of technology transferred and the 
degree of capital ownership by the supplier.
(Balasubramanyam, 1973, United Nations, 1975; Bredo 
1974; Vernon, 1972).
LOCAL INPUTS FOR PRODUCTION
Regarding the availability of local inputs 
for production, figure 8.13 suggests that both the 
supplier amd recipient perceived this variaüsle as a
disturbing, negative factor, in its first factor, in
the first stage of the transfer. In the subsequent
stages of the process the recipient considered it as a 
slightly negative factor while the recipient rated it 
as exerting a neutral, tending to negative, effect on 
the transmission of technology. In general, both 
parties seemed to recognize the problem of the lack of 
adequate sources of supplies and ancilliary services in 
the local environment. (Livingstone, 1975; Baranson 
1969). In addition, the recipient provided an 
illustration of production problems caused by the local 
supplier of printed circuit boards, i.e. sometimes, it 
took more thsui 120 days to deliver an order. The 
relatively small size of the industrial market for
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computer parts and components, and the level of 
technological development of local suppliers appear to 
be further constraints to the anticipated rates of
"Brazilianization" of the product. Some parts and
components needed for production, such as multi-layer 
circuit boards, and other electro-electronic and 
electro-mechanic components are simply unavailable in
the local environment. Apparently, this forces the
recipient, among other things to be dependent on 
foreign sources of supply amd face legislative, 
financial and administrative difficulties associated 
with obtaining foreign exchange, import licenses, etc.
Thus, there appears to be a vicious circle 
associated with the lack of local supplies, materials 
amd services. Assuming that the industrial market for 
computer parts amd components in Brazil is not large 
enough to allow economies of scale, a priori, local 
firms may not be encouraged to acquire new technologies 
amd capabilities required for producing some parts amd 
components locally. And, if they do not acquire these 
technologies amd capabilities, the market is likely to 
remain dependent upon foreign sources, etc. Perhaps, 
one possible way out of the "vicious circle" is some 
form of co-operation between foreign amd local 
enterprises, following the IBM exaunple. Since 1972, 
the Brazilian subsidiary of International Business
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Machines is producing a variety of computer equipment 
amd peripherals in its Sumare plant in Sao Paulo.
Instead of importing a number of computer parts amd 
components IBM/BRAZIL opted for what Livingstone 
(1975:125) calls a "very positive attitude of
encouraging amd ... giving advice to local suppliers" 
Within two years of a supplier development programme, 
with the participation of its French subsidiary, IBM 
transmitted to a Brazilian supplier the technological 
resources amd elements of knowledge needed to produce 
integrated circuit boards. A similar arrangement was 
made for producing capacitors, transformers, caüsles,
conductive paint for computer fraunes, etc. As a result 
of this supplier development prograurane, IBM/Brazil
presently acquires locally a variety of computer parts 
amd components which otherwise would have been 
imported.
OTHER FACTORS
Other organizational problems associated with 
the tramsfer process were revealed through the open 
discussions with the executives, engineers amd mamagers 
directly involved in the transmission of technological 
resources. For instance, some executives suggested 
that part of the initial difficulties were due to the 
fact that they were not transferring technology to am
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existing organization but to something which was being 
structured as they were attempting to transmit the 
elements of technology. One of the executives stated:
"At the same time we were trying to transfer 
the technology, they were trying to recruit 
the people to make use of it ..."
Thus, as the technology was being 
transmitted, individuals were being recruited into 
Cobra and not into very clear locations within Cobra, 
because it did not have an organizational structure, 
initially. In terms of Wallender's (1979) hypothesized 
stages of user firm development for receipt of 
technology presented in table 2.1, chapter 2, the 
presence of a basic organizational structure in the 
recipient organization is a pre-requisite for the 
acquisition of technological resources. Therefore, the 
lack of an organizational structure may be viewed as a 
critical problem at the initial stage of the process. 
According to Wallender's view, since the eight stages 
of user firm development are cumulative, many 
technology transfer projects, such as the organization 
of Americam States (OAS) Pilot Project amd the United 
States National Technical Information System are 
mismatched to the needs of the user because they failed 
to identify the relative level of development of the
- 336 -
recipient organization amd started to tramsmit 
technology directed at higher levels. In general, the 
literature seems to recognize that the lack of an 
adequate organizational structure in the recipient firm 
may produce negative, inhibiting effects on the 
transmission of technological resources on an 
enterprize-to-enterprize basis. (Wallender, 1979; 
Seurat, 1976; Rogers, 1972; Weil, 1980).
The literature on international technology 
tramsfer suggests that organizations which have some 
experience in acquisition of technology are more likely 
to benefit more quickly from other technology tramsfer 
programs. (Bass, 1974; Teece, 1976; Wallender, 1979; 
Stewart, 1977). However, some comments provided by one 
mamager from the technology-supplying organization 
appear to suggest that past experience in technological 
transactions is am important variable in the transfer 
process for both the technology-receiving amd supplying 
organizations. This mamager explained that, although 
the compamy had sold technologically sophisticated 
products to mamy other nations,
"...selling abroad is different from 
transferring technology..."
"Yes, it is true to say that we were learning 
as well as the Brazilians".
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Apparently, the Braziliar experience in 
international technology tramsfer produced, for the 
supplier, what Thomas (1977) calls a learning 
opportunity. The saune mamager noted that they were 
about to do another licensing agreement for the 
manufacture of computers with a foreign nation, amd 
that the Brazilian technology tramsfer experience was 
being helpful in the negotiations . He observed that,
"In talking with the ... we have been maücing 
a great thing of the experience we have had 
in Brazil. If we do a deal with ... the 
situation is very similar. We know where to 
start and a lot of things to avoid".
Another problem associated with the 
technology transfer activities from one organization to 
amother was the question of conflicting roles of some 
individual participants in the process. One manager 
from the supplying organization explained:
"Although I becaune a COBRA employee, they 
thought that my sole purpose was to look 
after Ferranti's interests ... amd I could 
not persuade several of these people that I 
was a Cobra mam. Okay, Ferranti's interests 
had to be looked after, but as part of what
- 338 -
was happening, not as my main function. 
Several of them never really believed that I 
was a Cobra mam, they simply regarded me as a 
Ferramti mam, looking after Ferranti's
interest. This was amother problem."
This seems to be am example of what Kahn et 
al (1964:19) call a role conflict in organizational 
settings, which arises from the "simultaneous 
occurrence of two (or more) sets of pressures such that 
compliance with one would maüce more difficult 
compliance with the other".
In terms of PearImut1er's (1969) typology of 
conflict handling situations, this mamager was 
presumaüDly attempting to taJce a geocentric or balanced 
attitude towards the local amd home office's interests. 
However, considering this role conflict in a broader 
perspective, it appears to be a manifestation of a 
wider problem, naunely, the latent conflict of interests 
(Fayerweather, 1969; Quinn, 1969; Gabriel, 1972; Hardy, 
1974; Hertz, 1980) between the objectives of the 
technology-supplying amd recipient organizations.
- 339 -
8.5 HYPOTHESIS NO. 4
Hypothesis No. 4 proposes that individuals 
from the technology-supplying and receiving 
organizations will differ in their perceptions of 
environmental factors affecting the transfer of 
technology at each stage of the process. Stated in a 
testaüDle form the hypothesis was:
HI: There are significant differences between 
the supplier amd recipient's perceptions of 
environmental factors affecting the 
transmission of technological resources at 
the initial, intermediary amd current stages 
of the process.
For testing hypothesis No. 4, the summary 
measures of environmental factors for each group were 
utilized. These consisted of the meam score of fifteen 
variables, representing am index of the extent to which 
individuals perceived the set of macro-environmental 
variables exerting a negative, neutral or positive 
influence on the process of transmitting technology 
from one organization to amother. The summary measures 
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o) The technological infrastructure.
In order to test this hypothesis, a series of 
t-tests were performed on the data for each stage of 
the process, to determine whether there would be 
significant differences between the technology- 
supplying and recipient groups. Table 8.4 presents the
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results of the t-test amalysis for the three stages of 
the process, the relevant statistics, the 2-tail 
probabilities.
An analysis of table 8.4 indicates that, at 
the 0.05 level of significance there was no evidence to 
reject the alternative hypothesis for the initial 
(ENVl) intermediary, (ENV2) and current (ENV3) stages 
of the tramsfer process. Thus, the hypothesis No. 4 
was supported. Significant differences were found 
between the supplier and recipient's perception of 
macro-environmental factors affecting the transmission 
of technological resources for the three stages of the 
process.
Figure 8.15 presents the supplier amd 
recipient's summary measures of general environmental 
factors for the three stages of the transference. An 
examination of figure 8.15 suggests that, in general, 
based on the meam scores, the supplier perceived 
macro-environmental factors exerting a neutral, tending 
to positive, influence on the transfer process. On the 
other hand, the recipient group indicated that the saune 
factors were perceived as having a neutral, tending to 
negative, effect on the transmission of resources. The 
differences between the meam scores were smaller in the 
first stage of the process amd slightly larger in the
974-197G 1977-1978 1979-1980
Figure 8.15 - General Environmental Factors
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subsequent stages. Considering the magnitude of the 
mean scores, the groups differed in their perceptions 
of general environmental factors in all stages of the 
transfer.
NATIONAL IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CLIMATE
Figure 8.16 presents the supplier and
recipient's perception of the extent to which the 
general collective ideoloçfy of the nation, or "the 
systematic body of economic political amd ethical 
doctrines" (Livingstone, 1975:192) affected the
tramsfer process. Reference to figure 8.16 suggests 
that, in the first two stages of the process, this
var iaüDle was not perceived by the supplying amd
recipient groups as a major constraint to the tramsfer 
activities. In the third stage of the process, 
however, the differences between the supplier amd 
recipient views were slightly more accentuated. The 
supplier rated this variaü^le as exerting a moderately 
positive effect, while the recipient viewed it as a 
neutral, tending to negative factor.
Regarding the general attitude towards 
foreiners (Figure 8.17), the transferor amd transferee 
seemed to indicate that this variable exerted a 
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of the process. In the subsequent stages, both parties 
appeared to suggest that the general attitude towards 
foreiners had little effect.
Figure 8.18 presents the perceptions of the 
supplier and recipient concerning the political 
climate. In general, the supplier seemed to perceive 
that political factors produced a relatively neutral, 
tending to positive effect. The recipient appeared to 
suggest that political factors exerted a moderate, 
positive influence on the process.
The Brazilian political regime has been 
relatively stable since 1967, as compared with other 
Latin Americam countries. As a Financial Times (1979) 
survey stated, "Brazil is emerging from 14 years of 
military rule, during which time the Brazilian economic 
miracle was performed. The economy reached growth 
rates of 10 percent per annum at the turn of the decade 
and this might have continued at this rate but for the 
1973 oil crisis. However, the cost of the miracle in 
social terms was high". Despite these relatively high 
economic growth rates, Brazil has been facing a series 
of socio-economic and political problems such as 
growing pressures for political liberalization, a 
highly concentrated income distribution, the rising 
costs of petroleum, deficits in the balamce of trade, 
etc. These problems usually generate tensions and
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pressures for chauige. In general terms, one of the 
first signs of chamge has been a trend towards 
promoting a gradual political liberalization of the 
country. (National Westminster Bank, 1979). In other 
words, as one veteran politician observed, "we are 
making the transition to a real democracy" (Financial 
Times, 1978). Since the third stage of the process 
(1979-1980) coincided, with the gradual liberalization 
of the regime, perhaps the consideration of this event 
will clarify the analysis of the factors which may have 
affected the transmission of technology, as perceived 
by the supplier and recipient.
EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The supplier and recipient's perceptions of 
the extent to which the formal and informal educational 
infrastructure affected the transfer process are 
presented in figures 8.19 amd 8.20, respectively. Both 
the supplier amd recipient seemed to suggest that, in 
general, the network of schools, amd universities 
provided a positive effect on the transference of 
technological resources. Regarding the network of 
training establishments providing informal education, 
in the initial stage of the tramsfer process, it was 
viewed as a neutral, tending to negative factor, by 
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stages of the transfer, this variable was seen as 
exerting a slightly more positive influence in the 
process.
THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT
Figure 8.21 shows the supplier auid 
recipient's perceptions of the extent to which the 
market environment acted as a positive, neutral or 
negative factor in the transfer process. An
examination of the mean scores suggests some contrast 
in perceptions of the market environment in the three 
stages of the transference. Although both parties
seemed to perceive this variable exerting a positive, 
inducing effect on the transfer of technological 
resources, the magnitude of the meaui scores indicate 
that the recipient perceived the influence of the 
market environment as considerably more positive than 
the supplier.
According to Strasser (1974) the possibility 
of transferring technology successfully depends on the 
approach utilized. He distinguishes between the
"market pull" versus the "technology push" approach. 
The market pull approach represents basically a
marketing approach. Technology is introduced as a 
response to a market demand and in an attempt to meet 
the needs of the customer. In contrast, the technology
— 350 —
push approach advocates the transmission of technology 
independently of the needs of the user. Strasser 
suggests that the market pull approach tends to be more 
successful than the other, despite being more 
difficult and the time consuming, since it requires an 
understanding of the market signals aind an assessment 
of the users' needs.
Considering the relatively high growth rates 
of the Brazilian computer market, particularly the 
minicomputer segment, as discussed in chapter 5, the 
market environment appeared to have produced a "market 
pull" effect on the transfer process. According to 
Wallender (1979) organizations which acquire technology 
to take advantage of market opportunities usually have 
greater chamces of success in technology transfer 
activities than those which respond to other problems. 
In general, the literature seems to support the notion 
that the size of the market is a key variable in the 
process of transferring industrial technology for the 
establishment of production facilities. (Vernon, 1966; 
Baranson, 1966; Stobaugh, 1969; Wells, 1972; 
Livingstone, 1975; Myrdal, 1981).
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The perceptions of the extent to which 
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transfer process are depicted in figure 8.22. An
examination of the supplier and recipient's mean scores 
suggest a divergence of perception regarding the 
influence of this variable in all three stages of the 
process. The supplier seemed to perceive the national 
regulatory framework on technology transfer 
transactions exerting a negative, hindering, effect on 
the transference of technology, particularly in the
initial stages of the process. The recipient however, 
appeared to indicate that the regulatory framework 
produced basically a neutral impact on the transmission 
of resources.
In 1974, when Cobra was established and the 
first contacts with the National Institute of
Industrial Property (INPI) were made, there was not an 
explicit national policy with regard to technology 
transfer transactions. (Figueredo, 1972) Thus, 
licensing agreements amd contracts involving 
proprietary rights and royalty payments were amalyzed 
on a case-by-case basis by both the Central Bauik of 
Brazil and the INPI. Presumably, this involved
considerable delays and margins for different 
interpretations of the web of laws, decrees auid 
administrative acts regulating the matter. The 
following comments may illustrate some difficulties 
perceived by the supplier in the initial stages of the
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transfer process.
"We had a whole batch of problems associated 
with getting agreement to the transfer of 
technology contract ... Initially INPI were 
providing problems. The question of whether 
we would be allowed to be paid amything at 
all for what we were providing ..."
"In fact, the whole thing very nearly failed 
to happen completely because of the 
difficulties that we had ... They were 
chauiging their minds about what they wanted 
to do".
"If the Navy had not been involved I don't 
think Cobra would have ever come into 
existence".
THE GENERAL ECONOMIC CONJUNCTURE
In general, it seems that the supplier and 
recipient perceived the overall state of the economy 
(Figure 8.26), the balamce of payments position (Figure 
8.27), and import regulations (Figure 8.24) as causing 
some difficulties to the technology trauisfer process. 
As to the influence of exchange control (Figure 8.23) 















Figure 8.25 - Royalty and ProFit Remission Regulations
974-1976 1977-1978 1979-1980
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8.25) in the supplier's view they appeared to have 
produced a neutral, tending to negative effect on the 
transfer process, while the recipient considered them 
as neutral, tending to positive, variables. These 
factors will be considered in the context of the 
changes in the Brazilian economy since 1974.
Since 1974, the Brazilian economy began to 
reflect some problems caused by the four-fold increase 
in international petroleum prices, at the end of 1973.
In 1974, the domestic production of crude oil covered
only 21.3 per cent of the consumption. Thus, as an 
oil-importing country Brazil suffered the impact of the 
sharp rise in world petroleum prices. Among other 
things, as a result of the increase in oil prices, the 
following changes have been observed in the economy.
a) In 1974, an unprecedented deficit in the 
balance of trade. (US$ 4.5 billion). The 
current account deficit more than tripled and 
Brazil's balance of payments registered an 
overall deficit of approximately 1 billion 
dollars. Between 1974 and 1980, the balance
of trade continued in deficit, except for a
small surplus registered in 1977. (Figure 
4.3)
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b) In 1974, a sharp decline in the Gross 
Domestic Product and the real output growth 
rate of the industrial product, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. The real output growth rates 
associated with commerce, transport and 
communications also fell considerably. 
(Figure 4.2)
c) A return to the relatively high inflation 
rates. The general price almost doubled, 
from 15.1% in 1973 to 28.7% in 1974. As 
shown in table 4.3 the pattern of decline in 
the inflation rates achieved between 1965 auid 
1973 was broken and between 1974 to 1980, the 
general price index rose considerably.
In am attempt to adjust the economy to the 
realities of the world oil crisis, suid to reduce the 
deficit of the deteriorated balance of trade, the 
Federal Government designed a series of monetary, 
fiscal and administrative corrective measures. Among 
these, the following import restrictions were enacted:
a) Higher import tariffs. Since 1974, an 
increase in import tariffs for 3,503 selected 
products, varying from 30 to 100 per cent of 
the FOB value. Most of the products affected
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were consumer goods. (Decree-Laws numbers 
1334, 1364, 1421, 1501, 1589 and 1685).
b) Compulsory deposit for imports. In 1975, 
through resolutions 331 and 354, the Central 
Bcuik of Brazil subjected the issue of import 
licenses to the deposit in cruzeiros, of the 
sum corresponding to 100% of the FOB value of 
the import. After 360 days, the compulsory 
deposit could be returned to the importer 
without interest or monetary correction. 
Excluded from this resolutions, among others, 
were goods imported through the Free Zone of 
Mcuiaus, crude petroleum and by-products, 
equipment for scientific and technological 
research, goods from the Latin Americaui Free 
Trade Association, parts and components for 
the manufacture of airplanes cuid some 
categories of capital goods.
c) Reduction in Governmental Imports. In
1974, through decree 74.908 the Government 
established a ban on direct imports of 
consumer goods by Governmental agencies. In
1975, through decrees 76.406 and 76.407 the 
Government delegated to the Economic 
Development Council (ODE) the establishment
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of limits for governmental imports. 
According to the Central Bank, Governmental 
imports represented s substantial amount of 
total imports. In 1977, for instance, 
approximately half of total Brazilian imports 
(US$ 12 billion) corresponded to Governmental 
purchases.
d) Other corrective measures. These were 
intended to reduce the general demand for 
imports in selected sectors of the economy, 
i.e., airplanes, computers and syderurgical, 
products. Regarding the computer sector, in 
1975, the National Council of Foreign Trade 
(CONCEX) determined, through resolution 104, 
that all import licenses for computer 
equipment, parts and components would be 
subject to CAPRE's prior approval. Later, 
through resolutions 06/77 amd 01/78 the 
Economic Development Council (CDE) fixed 
limits for the import of computer equipment, 
including parts and components for the 
manufacture of computers, for 1977 (US$ 100 
million) auid 1978 (US$ 130 million). In 1979 
and 1980 the limits were raised of US$ 150 
and 180 million, respectively.
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Besides these import restrictions, between 
1974 and 1980 the Government kept its exchange rate 
policy of depreciating the cruzeiro against the U.S. 
dollar. The crawling-peg depreciation is basically an 
instrument, adopted since 1968, for stimulating
imports. However, it serves a dual purpose of
stimulating exports and, at the same time, 
suppressing, to some extent, imports. Imports become 
increasingly expensive in terms of cruzeiros and, on 
the other hand, exporters are stimulated to engage in 
export activities.
Considering that the imports of hardware 
modules, parts and components for the manufacture of 
computers were directly affected by the import 
restrictions implemented by the Brazilian Government 
between 1974 and 1980, it seems that, in general, the 
corrective measures enacted by the Government limited 
to some extent, the flow of technological and monetary 
resources between the technology-supplying and
recipient organizations.
TECHNOLOGICAL, INDUSTRIAL AND PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Figures 8.28, 8.29 and 8.30 present the views 
of the supplier and the recipient on the extent to 
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infrastructure of Brazil affected the process of 
transmitting resources from the technology-supplying to 
the recipient organization.
Regarding the technological infrastructure or 
the support provided by the network of universities, 
governmental and private research establishments, the 
meam scores indicate a relatively strong difference of 
perception in the three stages of the transfer. In 
general, while the supplier rated this variaüsle as 
practically neutral, the recipient suggested that it 
was hindering the process. The influence of the 
technological infrastructure of the recipient country 
on the transfer process seems to be recognized in the 
literature. (Baranson, 1969; Spencer, 1970; Streeten 
1972; Galbraith, 1973; Leontif, 1977; Goulet, 1977; 
Sobeslavsky amd Beazley, 1980).
As to the industrial infrastructure of the 
country, both the supplier amd recipient seemed to 
indicate that it hindered the process in the three 
stages of the transference. Thus, their perceptions 
seem to support the notion that the lack of an adequate 
industrial infrastructure is, sometimes, a constraint 
to the technology transfer process. (Baranson, 1966; 
1969; 1978; Schweitzer, 1974; Halty-Carrere, 1974;
Berhrmam amd Wallender, 1976; Well, 1980; Myrdal, 
1981) .
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As regards the physical infrastructure of the 
country, an examination of the meam scores in figure 
8.30 suggests that, in general, both parties considered 
this a favourable variable in the process. In the 
literature, the recipient country's physical 
infrastructure has been identified as a fundamental 
variable in the transfer process. (Baranson, 1966; 
1969; Spencer amd Woroniack, 1967; Stobaugh, 1969; 





The major purpose of this chapter is to draw 
the conclusions from the study (Section 9.2), present 
the limitations of the research (Section 9.3), discuss 
some implications of the study for managers and policy 
makers (Section 9.4), and suggest some areas for 
further research (Section 9.5).
9.2 MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
9.2.1 GENERAL
1. In the last decade, considerable attention 
has been dedicated to the study of technology transfer. 
In spite of the recent proliferation of studies 
focussed on the question of transferring technology 
internationally, most of the literature seems to be 
concerned with issues such as the suitability of the 
technology in relation to the needs of the recipient 
countries, the effective utilization of the technology, 
the impact of the . technology, policies for the 
transference of technology, practices of multinational 
corporations, the price of technology, etc. In general.
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there have been relatively fewer studies aimed at 
broader theoretical analysis of the technology transfer 
phenomenon.
2. Another characteristic of the literature 
on the international transference of technology is the 
general lack of agreement concerning the concepts of 
technology and technology transfer.
There appears to be considerable difference 
of opinion on what technology is. Each definition of 
the subject seems to reflect a different perception of 
the matter using a terminology associated with a 
particular field of activity or academic discipline.
The etymology of the word technology 
suggested that the term derived from the Greek concept 
of 'art* and the Latin notion of 'Techna'.
The concept of technology as a special 
category of resource seems to have been referred to by 
the classical economists in a variety of ways. In the 
eighteenth century, Adam Smith seemed to have a 
relatively clear understanding of the strategic and 
economic importance of what today would be called 
international technology transfer. He emphasized the 
"communication of knowledge", and the "useful arts" by 
the immigrants, giving the colonies of Europe a chance 
to accelerate their relative stage of development. In
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the nineteenth century, David Ricardo seemed to refer 
to technology, as a source of comparative advantage for 
the nations which possessed the superior knowledge, 
skills and machinery. Alfred Marshall also recognized 
the influence of technology, or knowledge, as the vital 
input of production.
At present, the term technology covers a wide 
spectrum of connotations. In a narrow sense, the 
concept of technology can be viewed in terms of its
physical embodiments such as capital and Intermediary 
goods, artifacts, hardware, etc. In a more general
sense it can be viewed as information, computer 
programs, formulae, specifications, etc. In a broader 
sense, technology can be viewed as skills, knowledge, 
knowhow and abilities of humaui resources. The broadest
views of all conceptualize technology as public
knowledge, the nation's common fund of knowledge, and 
as basic education, combined with eui attitude which 
favours chcuige. In general, there is no conceptual 
agreement on the meaning of technology. However, the 
concept of technology seems to be increasingly 
associated with the idea of knowledge. In arriving at 
this conclusion we find that, the notion of knowledge, 
often included implicitly or explicitly in definitions 
of technology, seems to be a common element between old 
and new concepts of the matter.
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Many different meanings and interpretations 
were found to be associated with the expression 
technology transfer. In general, there is no agreement 
of the meaning of technology transfer because there is 
no consensus about the meaning of technology.
3. If the concept of technology cam be
equated to forms of knowledge, then, the study of
technology transfer seems to be concerned with the 
process by which individuals acquire knowledge. In
this sense, the study of technology transfer appears to 
be intimately linked with theories of knowledge. Thus, 
in order to be able to fully appreciate the process of 
transferring technology between individuals,
organizations or nations, we need to develop a better 
understanding of the process of knowing.
4. Perhaps, the most important contribution 
of this study is to provide a conceptual model for 
explaining the process of transferring technological 
resources, internationally, on an
enterprise-to-enterprise basis.
The literature concerned with the theoretical 
aspects of the transfer process is rather restricted. 
There is very little known about what factors affect 
the process of transferring technology from one
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enterprise to another. Although there are some sparse 
contributions towards an understanding of the transfer 
process, no theoretical framework satisfactorily 
embraced the multiplicity of concepts, actors amd 
variables involved in the transference of technological 
resources.
This study developed a comprehensive analysis 
of the technology tramsfer phenomenon. The 
multiplicity of actors amd variables which may affect 
the transfer process were identified amd integrated 
into a conceptual model. The technology transfer 
transaction was conceptualized as am exchange of 
interests between two parties. By exchange we meam a 
mutually advantageous transaction between the 
technology-supplying and recipient enterprises. The 
major actors of the process were identified as the 
individuals, organizations and environments of the 
technology-supplying and receiving countries. The 
interfaces of these actors, conceptualized as 
subsystems of the total tramsfer system, amd their 
hierarchical relationships, are presented in figure 
2.4, page 99. A description of the elements of the 
model and am outline of the logical relationships among 
the variables involved in the transfer process is 
provided in section 2.6 and presented schematically in 
figure 2.5, page 102.
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According to the logic of the model, the flow 
of resources between the technology-supplying and 
recipient organizations is a function of the following 
independent variables:
a) The contractual variables, establishing 
the terms and conditions under which the 
technological resources cam be transferred.
b) The individual variables, related to the 
characteristics and behaviour of the 
individuals from the technology-supplying and 
the recipient organizations.
c) The organizational variables, related to 
the characteristics amd behaviour of the 
technology-supplying amd recipient
organizations.
d) The environmental variables, related to 
the economic, legal, political, cultural, 
educational amd market environment of the 
transferring amd receiving countries.
e) The technological variables, related to 
the nature and characteristics of the 
technologies* involved.
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f) The transmiseion-mechanisms variables, 
related to mechanisms and procedures whereby 
the technological resources are transmitted.
g) The time variable involved in the 
transmission of resources between the 
transferor and transferee.
In general, we have identified the major 
concepts, actors and variables involved in the transfer 
process and outlined their relationships. Considering 
the rather embryonic state of knowledge concerning the 
factors and conditions affecting the transference of 
technological resources, we feel that the model being 
proposed here will be helpful to future efforts aimed 
at explaining, controling or predicting the transfer 
process.
As a result of the present study, it may be 
concluded that the process of transferring 
technological resources internationally is a dynamic, 
multi- dimentional phenomenon, involving a variety of 
mutually interacting variables. The network of 
interrelationships between contractual, individual, 
organizational, environmental, technological,
transmiseion-mechanisms cuid time-related variables can 
be quite complex. This suggests clearly that a number 
of disciplines are relevant to understanding the
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transfer process, amd that the complete picture can 
only be assessed through a multi-disciplinary approach.
- 371 -
9.2.2 COBRA-FERRANTI
1. The creation of Cobra, in 1974 was the 
result of military interests, combined with a period of 
unprecedented growth of the Brazilian economy, 
government import-substitution policies, and a 
relatively strong "market pull" effect. Between 1968 
amd 1973 the Brazilian economy experienced what is 
often referred to as am "economic miracle". In this 
period, the average annual real growth rate of the 
Gross Domestic Product exceeded ten per cent. In the 
year prior to the creation of Cobra, the economy 
registered the best results in Brazil's history, with a 
surplus in the balance of trade, relatively low rates 
of inflation, amd am amnual growth of the real GDP of 
14 per cent. Throughout this period, the Brazilian 
Government promoted industrialization via
import-substitution policies, which in the early 
seventies emphasized imports of capital goods, 
intermediary inputs and the transference of advanced 
technologies for key sectors of the economy. Since the 
mid-fifties, the Brazilian Navy was planning the 
expansion and modernization of its fleet, which 
involved, among other things, the acquisition of 
frigates equipped with computer-based weapon control 
systems. In order to reduce the country's dependence
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on foreign naval equipment and computer systems, for 
national security and economic reasons, the Brazilian 
Navy promoted the transference of naval defence 
technology to Brazil. These events, coupled with the 
simultaneous expansion of the installed computer base, 
rising demand for computers in many sectors and the 
extraordinary growth prospects of the minicomputer 
segment of the market, appear to have led the Brazilian 
Government to create Cobra.
2. The creation of Cobra, however, coincided 
with a slowdown of economic activity in Brazil. In 
1974, the Brazilian economy began to reflect the 
problems associated with the world petroleum crisis, 
late in 1973. As a non-oil developing country importing 
approximately 80 per cent of its petroleum consumption, 
Brazil suffered, in subsequent years, the impact of the 
increases in world oil prices. Among other things, it 
was observed that there were relatively lower growth 
rates of the GDP, rising inflation rates, unprecedented 
deficits in the balamce of trade, auid a sharp rise in 
the foreign debt. In an attempt to control these 
problems, the government designed a series of monetary, 
fiscal and administrative corrective measures which 
included higher import tariffs, a compulsory deposit 
for imports, a reduction in Government imports, and
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selective import restrictions which affected imports of 
computer equipment. In general, the corrective
measures implemented by the Brazilian Government in
response to the economic problems associated with the 
petroleum crisis, and the regulatory framework on
technology transfer, seem to have limited, to some 
extent, the initial flow of technological and monetary 
resources between Cobra and Ferranti.
3. Regarding differences between the supplier 
cuid recipient's perceptions of factors affecting the 
transfer process, the overall results of the four 
hypotheses tested seem to indicate that, in general, 
although some differences of perception were found, 
these tended to be more accentuated in the first two 
stages of the process, particularly in the first. The 
hypotheses related with differences between the 
supplier and recipient perceptions of individual, 
technological and organizational factors affecting the 
transfer process were partially supported. Significant 
differences, however, were found between the supplier 
and recipient perceptions of environmental factors 
affecting the three stages of the transfer process. In 
very general terms, the findings seem to suggest that 
in the last stage of the process, the differences of 
perception tended to be relatively smaller. In other
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words, although there are some differences of 
perception, their views regarding the factors affecting 
the transfer process appeared to be more nearly 
congruent than in the previous stages.
4- Individuals played a pivotal role in the 
transfer process. In very general terms, close 
personal relationships seemed to be more important than 
contractual agreements. The development of close 
personal relationships between individuals from the 
technology-supplying and recipient organizations seems 
to have been an important informal mechanism for the 
transmission of critical elements of technical 
knowledge. This finding lends support to the notion 
that individuals are the main agents in the transfer 
process. In spite of the initial language problems, the 
personal contacts, friendships and informal 
interactions among individuals from the two 
organizations appear to have exerted a critical role in 
the transfer process, perhaps compensating for their 
organizations' relative lack of experience in 
technology transfer transactions.
5. Since the technology-supplying and 
recipient organizations had no past experience in 
matters of technology transfer, the initial process of
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transferring technological resources represented, for 
both organizations a learning opportunity. Following 
the first stage of the transfer process, the Brazilian 
Government formulated am industrial policy which 
envisaged, among other things, the acquisition of other 
technologies to the indigenous minicomputer segment of 
the market. The supplier of technology suggested that, 
the Brazilian experience in international technology 
transfer was being helpful in negotiating another 
licensing agreement for the manufacture of computers in 
a foreign nation. Thus, it appears that the 
Cobra-Ferranti experience in technology tramsfer 
produced, for both parties aui organizational learning 
opportunity.
6. In a broad sense, what Cobra acquired from 
Ferranti was not simply "technology", elements of 
technical knowledge or the capacity to produce 
computers. In very general terms, besides
technological resources, what was being transacted was 
a set of actual or perceived benefits in the form of 
the supplier's reputation and technical expertise in 
computers, naval defence technology, electronics, and 
microelectronics. In addition, other apparent benefits 
were the assurance of dependable supply, prospects of 
continuing liaison in technical matters, technical
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assistance, special credit terms, etc. From the point 
of view of the supplier, the transaction probably meant 
prospects of penetrating a potentially large market, 
increased sales of hardware modules, electronic 
components and related equipment, the provision of 
technical assistance on a long-term basis, financial 
participation in Cobra, continued provision of services 
for the Brazilian Navy, etc. Thus, in this broad 
sense, the technology transfer transaction represented 
a mutually advantageous exchange of economic and 




In general, in the social sciences the 
results of any study are dependent upon those variables 
which the researcher chooses to include in the study. 
Since the researcher is often confronted with complex, 
multi-disciplinary problems involving a large number of 
variables, that it is not practical to include, the 
selection of the major variables seems to be an
important part of the investigation. Based on the
review of the literature, aui attempt was made to select 
the most relevant factors presumed to affect the 
transfer process. However, in reducing reality to more 
môuiageable proportions the researcher may exclude some 
important variables.
Only in the recent past have systematic
attempts been made to understand the actual process of 
transferring technology internationally. In am attempt 
to gain some insights into this relatively unformulated 
area of knowledge, among the methods of investigation 
this research employed a longitudinal analysis of an 
indepth case study. The quality of the results of case 
analysis depend, among other things, upon the 
combination of research methodologies adopted. By 
examining the Cobra-Ferranti experience over aui
- 378 -
extended period of time, by using our conceptual model, 
by utilizing the tramsfer process as the unit of 
investigation, by analyzing the matter from the 
supplier amd recipient's amgles, by comparing their 
perceptions with known facts, amd by gathering both 
qualitative and quantitative information, we believe 




The major implications which can be drawn 
from this study have particular relevance to managers 
and policy makers concerned with matters related to the 
international transference of technological resources. 
Three main implications, regarding the individual, 
organizational amd environmental factors in the 
transfer process, are summarized as follows:
a) Technology tramsfer is the result of a 
dynamic, complex process, in which 
individuals are the main agents. The 
interactions of individuals from the 
technology-supplying amd recipient
organizations play a key role in determining 
to some extent, the success of the tramsfer 
activities. In this respect, although there 
seems to be no magic formula for ensuring the 
development of satisfactory personal 
relationships, both the supplier amd 
recipient cam make am effort to create an 
environment conducive to personal contacts 
and informal relationships between
individuals.involved in the transference of 
technological resources.
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b) Another important aspect of the technology 
tramsfer transaction between enterprises 
which have different corporate interests and 
objectives is the contractual agreement. It 
should state clearly what is being exchanged, 
according to mutually agreed definition of
terms, chronogram of activities, amd 
resources involved. For instance, in order 
to avoid future misinterpretations of the 
contractual agreement, in setting time 
limits, expressions "as soon as is reasonably 
practicable" should be avoided. It seems 
that the inclusion of such flexible time
limits could lead to considerable
misunderstandings if a dispute were to arise. 
In general terms, a clear amd precise
contractual agreement appears to be a 
necessary condition for satisfactory
long-term relationships between the supplier 
and recipient.
c) The establishment of satisfactory 
individual amd contractual relationships are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
the transference of industrial technologies 
on a commercial basis. The process of
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transferring technological resources
internationally, is limited by the 
interaction between the supplier auid 
recipient's national environments.
Ultimately, the flow of technological 
resources between two nations is dependent 
upon national policies and upon the 
regulatory framework concerning the release 
cUid acquisition of technologies. Thus, it 
seems important that both the supplying amd 
recipient States should aim to establish, amd 
periodically revise, explicit national 
policies relating to matters of technology 
transfer, in accordance with national 
temporary amd also permanent objectives. In 
general, if these policies are made explicit, 
both the technology-supplying amd recipient 
organizations cam orient their technological 
transactions according to national interests, 
amd current economic priorities.
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9.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As am exploratory study of a broad amd 
complex subject this investigation encountered some 
areas with vague concepts, inadequate information amd 
insufficient knowledge, which represent possibilities 
for future research. These are proposed in terms of 
the following questions:
What other variables exist which affect the 
process of transferring technological 
resources from one organization to amother?
What is the relative importance of each 
varial)le in the tramsfer process?
Is it possible to measure the total effect of 
the transference?
What is the impact of individual, 
organizational amd environmental
characteristics upon the tramsfer process?
Cam the impact of the transference on the 
economies of the supplying and recipient 
countries be evaluated?
This set of questions constitutes only a 
brief outline of the topics which cam be explored in
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this largely underdeveloped area of research. 
Considering that this research was limited to the 
positive aspects of the transfer process, a valuable 
area of future research would be to include the 
normative aspects of the matter.
APPENDICES
- 384 - 
APPENDIX NO. 1 
THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTRACT
1.1 AGREEMENT OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION, 
ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING
THIS AGREEMENT, is made the 18th day of July 
1974, BETWEEN:
I - FERRANTI LIMITED a British Company having its 
registered office at Ho11 inwood, Lancashire, England,
duly represented by one of its directors, Mr. A,
British citizen, married, director, resident and
domicilied in City X, British Passport no. (n)
thereinafter referred to as "Ferranti" on the one
part, cUid
II - COBRA - COMPUTADORES K SISTEMAS BRAS ILEIROS
LTD (For which application has been made for 
registration), a Brazilian Compsuiy having its 
registered office at Rua Frei Fabia - no 215 - 4o.
cuidar - parte - Engenho Novo - Rio de Janeiro - Brazil, 
duly represented by its directors, Mr. C amd Mr. D, 
both Brazilians, married, engineers, residents and
domicilied in City Y, (hereinafter referred to as 
"COBRA") on the other part.
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W H E R E A S  Ferranti is one of the partners of
Cobra, and
W H E R E A S  Cobra pursuant to its Articles of 
Association wishes to acquire from Ferranti certain
know-how and information relating to those products
designed by Ferranti and hereinafter defined, and to
use such know-how auid information in the manufacture 
amd sale of such products, amd
W H E R E A S  Ferramti is prepared to supply such 
know-how and information upon the terms and conditions 
hereinafter set forth.
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:
1. As used herein the following terms shall have the 
following meanings:
(i) "The Products" shall meam the ARGUS 700 modules 
designed by Ferramti amd listed in the "First Schedule" 
hereto.
(ii) "Technical Information" shall meam Know-how, 
manufacturing information, maintenance and repair 
information, test specifications, photographs, 
descriptions and other like information of a technical 
nature.
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(ilia) "Net Selling Price" shall meam the price at 
which a Product manufactured or assembled auid sold or 
repaired by Cobra, is invoiced by Cobra, less packing, 
transportation auid insurance charges when shown 
separately on such invoice, all taxes incurred, and 
less the cost to Cobra of auiy parts supplied to Cobra 
by Ferrauiti and incorporated in such Product.
(iiib) In auiy case where Cobra deals in a Product other 
than by sale the Net Selling Price shall meaui the price 
at which that Product would have been invoiced in aui 
arms-length transaction.
(iv) "Total Sales" shall meaui the sum of the Net 
Selling Prices of Products sold or otherwise dealt in 
during a stated period.
(v) "Effective Date" shall mean the date defined in 
Clause 17 hereof.
2. (i) Within 30 days after the date of the request by 
Cobra for the supply of Technical Information in 
respect of the ARGUS 700 T/E modules and the ARGUS 700 
S modules, which request shall be made within six 
months after the Effective Date hereof, Ferranti shall, 
to the extent it is free to do so, commence supplying 
such Technical Information and shall complete the 
supply thereof as soon as is reasonably practicable
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thereafter, and in any event within 180 days 
thereafter.
(ii) At any time within a period of two years after 
the Effective Date hereof Cobra may request the supply 
of technical Information in respect of amy other ARGUS 
module listed in the First Schedule hereto. Within 30 
days after the receipt of any such request Ferramti 
shall, to the extent it is free to do so, commence 
supplying the Technical Information in respect of the 
module notified in such request amd shall complete the 
supply thereof as soon as is reasonably practicable 
thereafter.
(iii) Ferramti shall not be required to supply amy 
Technical Information in respect of parts or components 
either (i) not designed by Ferranti, or (ii) not 
designed specifically for the Products. In respect of 
such parts or components, however, Ferramti shall 
provide the functional requirements and identify the 
source from which Ferramti obtains its supply of such 
parts or components.
(iv) The Technical Information supplied by Ferramti 
shall be all of that used by Ferranti in its 
manufacture of the relevant Products.
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3. (i) Prior to the completion of the supply of the 
Technical Information pursuant to Clause 2(i) hereof 
Ferranti shall supply to Cobra the Stauidard Software 
Packages listed in the Second Schedule hereto and 
thereafter shall promptly inform COBRA of any 
modifications incorporated by Ferranti in such standard 
Software Packages.
(ii) At ouiy time within a period of five years after 
the Effective Date hereof Cobra may request the supply 
of any other Software Package listed in the Second 
Schedule hereto. Within 30 days after the receipt of 
any such request Ferranti shall commence supplying the 
Software Package notified in such request and shall 
complete the supply thereof as soon as is reasonably 
practicable thereafter.
4. (i) To assist Cobra in the application of the 
Technical Information supplied pursuant to Clause 2(i) 
hereof Ferrauiti shall provide training for up to fifty 
(50) personnel of Cobra at the premises of Ferranti in 
England. The training will be approximately four 
months for each of Cobra's personnel and shall be at 
times agreed between Ferrauiti and Cobra but shall in 
any event be completed within a period of two years 
after the Effective Date hereof. The training courses 
will be given in the English language and Cobra's
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personnel must be able to fully comprehend English and 
should be suitable qualified for the type of training 
course attended.
(ii) If Cobra requires training in England of amy of 
its personnel in excess of the fifty (50) personnel
referred to in sub-clause 4(i) amd during the period of
two years after the Effective Date hereof it shall so
notify Ferramti amd Ferramti shall provide training for
such excess personnel.
5. (i) To further assist Cobra in the application of 
the Technical Information supplied pursuant to Clause 
2(i) hereof Ferranti shall, at the request of Cobra amd 
at times to be agreed between Ferramti amd Cobra, maüce 
available to Cobra at the premises of Cobra or 
elsewhere in Brazil suitably qualified Ferramti 
engineers.
(ii) If within sixty days after Ferramti has 
supplied amy engineer it is shown that that engineer is 
not suitably qualified Cobra may require Ferramti to 
supply a replacement engineer at no additional charge 
to Cobra.
6. If Cobra requires amy additional assistance from 
Ferramti in carrying out amy project involving the 
application of the Technical Information supplied
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pursuant to Clause 2 hereof it shall so notify 
Ferranti. Ferranti shall inform Cobra of its charges 
for supplying such additional assistance amd if Cobra 
accepts such charges Ferranti shall supply such 
additional assistance.
7. (i) Employees aind/or Representatives of one of the 
parties hereto visiting the premises of the other party 
hereto shall be subject to all applicable rules amd 
regulations of such other party in force at the 
premises being visited.
(ii) Each of the parties hereto shall be responsible 
for all travel, accommodation amd subsistence expenses 
of its own personnel.
8. (i) Ferramti hereby authorizes Cobra to use the 
Technical Information supplied pursuant to Clause 2 
hereof in the manufacture in Brazil of Products amd in 
the sale, repair or maintenance thereof.
(ii) Ferramti hereby authorizes Cobra to copy and 
modify or otherwise vary the Software Packages supplied 
pursuamt to Clause 3 hereof and to sell copies of such 
Software Packages, whether modified or otherwise varied 
or not, provided that amy such sale is made in 
connection with a Product manufactured, sale or 
otherwise marketed by Cobra.
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9. In consideration of the foregoing Cobra shall made 
the following payments to Ferranti:
(i) in respect of the supply of Technical 
Information relating to the ARGUS 700 T/E modules auid 
the ARGUS 700 S modules pursuant to Clause 2(i) hereof 
the sum of sixty five thousand pounds Sterling ( 
65,000) which sum shall be paid as follows:
(a) 13,000 Pounds Sterling at the time of
requesting the supply of such Technical 
Information;
(b) 19,500 Pounds Sterling upon the 
completion of the supply of such Technical 
Information;
(c) 16,250 Pounds Sterling within one year
after the completion of the supply of such 
Technical Information auid;
(d) 16,250 Pounds Sterling within two years
after the completion of the supply of such 
Technical Information.
(ii) in respect of the supply of Technical 
Information relating to any other ARGUS module listed 
in the First Schedule hereto pursuant to Clause 2(ii) 
hereof a sum in pounds Sterling equal to the list price 
of that module current at the time the request for the
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supply of that Technical Information is made (which 
sum, in the case of modules marked with an asterisk in 
the First Schedule hereto shall be reduced by a sum 
equal to the price of the bought-out equipments
included by Ferranti in such modules) which sum shall 
be paid as follows:
(a) 50% at the time of making such request; 
amd
(b) 50% upon the completion of the supply of 
such Technical Information
(iii) In respect of the supply of amy other
Software Package listed in the Second Schedule hereto 
pursuant to Clause 3(11) hereof a sum in pounds 
Sterling equal to seven (7) times the list price of 
that Software Package current at the time the request 
for the supply of that Software Package is made which
sum shall be paid upon the completion of the supply of
that Software Package PROVIDED THAT if prior to making 
the request for the supply of that Software Package 
pursuant to Clause 3(ii) hereof Cobra shall have 
purchased that Software Package one or more times from 
Ferranti without the right of reproduction, the number 
seven (7) referred to above shall be reduced by the 
number of times that Cobra has so purchased that 
Software Package.
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(iv) In respect of the training to be supplied by- 
Ferranti pursuant to Clause 4(i) hereof the sum of one 
hundred and two thousand five hundred pounds Sterling (
102.500) which sum shall be paid in fourteen (14) equal 
and successive monthly instalments, the first of such 
instalments to be paid 30 days after the date of 
request for the supply of Technical Information 
pursuant to Clause 2(i) hereof.
(v) In respect of any training of additional 
personnel of Cobra pursuant to Clause 4(ii) hereof the 
sum of six thousand five hundred pounds Sterling ($
6.500) per mam-year or proportionally for any part of a 
mam-year which sum shall be paid upon the presentation 
of the Ferramti invoice therefor, upon the completion 
of the Training.
(vi) In respect of the supply of Ferramti engineers 
in Brazil pursuant to Clause 5 hereof the sum of thirty 
thousand pounds Sterling ( 30,000) per mam-year 
proportionately for amy part of a mam-year during the 
first year after the Effective Date of this Agreement, 
which sum shall be paid upon the presentation of the 
Ferranti invoice therefor. This rate will be subject 
to review by Ferranti after the first year after the 
Effective Date of this Agreement.
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(vii) In respect of each Product or any derivative 
thereof manufactured or assembled and sold by Cobra or 
repaired by Cobra amd for which orders are accepted by 
Cobra prior to the expiry of a period of five (5) years 
after the acceptance by the customer of Cobra for the 
first ARGUS 700 system manufactured amd sold by Cobra a 
levy at a maximum rate of five per cent (5%) of the Not 
Selling Price of that Product. Such maximum levy rate 
shall be decreased to a minimum rate of two per cent 
(2%) in accordance with the following formula;
Applicable percentage levy rate for any particular year 
ending on the last day of March
Levy rate = 5 / ( 1 +  (10 ( D / P ) ) )
where P * Total Sales during that particular 
year in respect of which levies are being 
paid, and
D « Ferranti's share of the net distributed 
results of Cobra and/ or a proportion of the 
net distributed results equal to Ferranti's 
relative participation in Cobra's net worth 
not credited to any of Cobra's quota holders 
but put into reserve with the consent of 
Ferranti, for that particular year in respect
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of which levies are being paid. The word
"distributed" means payments in cash or in 
additional quotas auid/or shares.
10. Cobra shall keep true and particular accounts of
all sums to be paid to Ferranti pursuant to Clause 9
(vii) hereof and shall within 30 days after the last
days of March and September in each year during which
such sums are due to be paid to Ferranti, send to
Ferramti a statement showing the sums due in respect of 
Products delivered by Cobra during the preceding six 
months and shall at the same time pay to Ferranti the 
sums shown therein to be due PROVIDED THAT in respect 
of the September payment made in each year the levy
rate calculated in accordance with the formula in
Clause 9(vii) for the preceding year shall be used and 
that rate shall be corrected in the next following 
March, any variation in the corrected September payment 
being added to or subtracted from the next following 
March payment.
11. Cobra shall permit any representative, duly 
authorised by Ferranti and at the expense of. Ferranti, 
to inspect and take copies of amd extracts from the 
relevant accounts kept in accordance with Clause 10 
hereof and will produce to such representative any 
receipts or vouchers relating to such accounts.
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12. All sums to be paid by Cobra to Ferranti hereunder 
shall be paid in pounds Sterling to Ferrauiti at its 
registered office in accordance with all rules and 
regulations set forth by the proper Brazilian 
Government Authorities and after the submission of aui 
invoice by Ferranti for the appropriate payment.
13. During the term of this Agreement each party 
hereto shall promptly after incorporating any 
improvement in Products manufactured by it inform the
other party of such improvement auid shall as soon as is
reasonably practicable supply to such other party
Technical Information relating to such improvement. 
The party receiving such Technical Information shall at 
all times have the right to incorporate such 
improvement in products manufactured by it auid to sell 
such improved Products.
14. The sole liability of either party hereto with 
respect to the Technical Information supplied by it to 
the other party hereto shall be to furnish such
Technical Information in accordance with the provisions 
of this Agreement. The party supplying such Technical 
Information shall have no responsibility for the 
ability of the receiving party to make use of such 
Technical Information, the quality and performance of 
Products produced by the receiving party or any claim
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by third parties arising from the use of such Technical 
Information by the receiving party.
15. Each of the parties hereto shall for a period of
ten years after the effective Date hereof treat as 
confidential all information received from the other 
party hereto except to the extent that such information 
was in the possession of the receiving party prior to
the date of its receipt from the other party or to the
extent that such information is or becomes published or 
otherwise available to the public, provided however 
that the receiving party may disclose such information 
to the extent necessary in making offers of sales, 
sales and otherwise marketing Products.
16. Cobra shall mark Products manufactured by it under 
this Agreement "Manuf actur ed under licence from 
Ferrauiti Ltd." Cobra shall not without the prior 
written consent of Ferranti make any other use of the 
naune Ferranti or any trade mark owned by Ferranti and 
upon termination of this Agreement for suiy reason, any 
use for which consent has been given shall forthwith 
cease.
17. This Agreement shall not become effective until 
all necessary approvals of the Brazilian Government
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Authorities have been obtained. The Effective Date of 
this Agreement shall be the date on which Cobra 
notifies Ferrauiti of the receipt of all such approvals 
PROVIDED THAT if Ferranti has not received notification 
of the receipt of all such approvals within six months 
after the date of this Agreement, this Agreement shall, 
unless otherwise agreed between the parties hereto, be 
deemed never to have been entered into.
18. Subject to the provisions of Clauses 19 and 21 
hereof this Agreement shall be irrevocable for a period 
from the Effective Date hereof until the completion of 
the payment of levies pursuant to Clause 9(vii) hereof.
19. Either party shall be entitled forthwith to 
terminate this Agreement by giving notice in writing to 
the other party if at any time the other party:
(i) defaults in the performance of any of the 
provisions of this Agreement and fails to remedy such 
default within 90 days after receipt of notice in 
writing from the other party giving details of such 
default or
(ii) becomes insolvent or makes any assignment for the 
benefit of creditors or is adjudged bankrupt or has a 
Receiver or Trustee appointed for the whole or cuiy part 
of its assets.
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20. Upon amy termination of this Agreement by 
Ferranti pursuant to Clause 19 hereof Cobra shall maüce 
no further use of Technical Information supplied 
pursuant to Clause 2 hereof.
21. The provisions of Clauses 14 and 15 hereof shall 
survive any termination of this Agreement.
22. Termination of this Agreement pursuant to Clause 
19 hereof shall be without prejudice to auiy claims that 
may have accrued to either party at the time of such 
termination.
23. This Agreement may not be assigned or otherwise 
transferred by either party hereto without the prior 
written consent of the party hereto.
24. Any notices to be served pursuant to this 
Agreement shall be sent by Registered Post, by cable or 
by telex to the address of the appropriate party given 
at the head of this Agreement or such other address as 
may be notified by written notice during the term of 
this Agreement.
25. Failure by either party hereto at any time to 
enforce any of the provisions of this Agreement shall 
not be construed as a waiver by such party of any such 
provision nor in cuiy way affect the validity of this
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Agreement or any part thereof.
26. This Agreement has been prepared in English and
Portuguese texts. In any case of doubt the wording of
the English text shall prevail.
27. All disputes arising under this Agreement which 
cannot be settled by Agreement between the parties 
hereto shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with the rules of the International Chaunber of 
Commerce, Paris, France.
28. All taxes, duties or staunps or any payments which 
might be due to the Brazilian Government, whether 
Federal, State or Municipal, for the signing or
execution of this Agreement, or any payment resulting 
from these and/or in consequence upon these, excluding 
the withholding of the income tax on the payments to be 
made to Ferranti, which will be to the account of
Ferranti, will be under the exclusive responsibility of 
Cobra.
29. Likewise, all taxes, duties or stamps or auiy 
payments which might be due to the British Government 
for the signing or execution of this Agreement, or any 
other payment resulting from these and/or in 
consequence upon these shall be the exclusive 
responsibility of Ferranti.
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30. This agreement shall be binding upon the parties 
hereto, their successors auid/or inheritors.
31. This Agreement represents the total agreement 
between the Parties hereto. Any chamges or additions 
to this Agreement must be in writing amd signed by the 
authorized representatives of the parties hereto.
32. This Agreement and the operation thereof shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of Brazil.
33. The jurisdiction for the present Agreement is the 
one of the City of Rio de Jauieiro, Brazil.
Therefore in witness thereof, the parties sign the 
present Agreement in 7 (seven) copies of equal text amd 





AGREEMENT OF TECHNICAL-INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION
THIS AMENDMENT No.l is made the twenty third 
day of June 1976 BETWEEN FERRANTI LIMITED, having its 
registered office at Hollinwood, Lancashire, England 
(hereinafter referred to as "Ferranti") of the one part 
amd Cobra - Computadores e Sistemas Brasileiros S.A., 
having its registered office at Largo dos Leoes No. 15,
lo. e 2o. amdares, Rio de Jameiro, Brazil, (Hereinafter 
referred to a "Cobra") of the other part.
WHEREAS Ferramti amd Cobra are parties to am Agreement 
of Technical Information, Assistance amd Training, made 
the 18th day of July 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Assistance Agreement") registered at the Institute 
Nacional da Propriedade Industrial under No. 2584/74 on 
the 8th day of August 1974, amd registered at the Banco 
Central do Brasil under No. 382/523 on the 19th day of 
August 1974, amd
WHEREAS Cobra, founded on the saune day as the signature 
of the Assistance Agreement, is still in the phase of 
establishment amd definition of its market, amd
WHEREAS the current marketing plam of Cobra requires
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chamges in the types of modules in respect of which 
Ferramti is supplying information amd assistance to 
Cobra, which modules are listed in the First amd Second 
Schedules of the Assistance Agreement, amd
WHEREAS Ferramti is willing to chamge the types of 
modules upon the terms amd conditions hereinafter set 
forth, amd
WHEREAS Clause 31 of the Assistance Agreement provides 
that amy chamges or additions to the said Agreement 
must be in writing amd signed by the authorised 
representatives of the parties to that Agreement.
NOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED as follows:
1. The following amendments to the Assistance
Agreement are hereby effected:-
1.1 Delete the First amd Second Schedules amd 
substitute therefor the First amd Second Schedules
hereto.
1.2 In Clause 2 (i) lines 2 to 4, delete the words
"amd the ARGUS 700S modules, which request shall be
made within six months after the Effective Date 
hereof", and in lines* 6 amd 7 delete the words "amd in 
amy event within 180 days thereafter".
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1.3 In Clause 3 add a new sub clause (ill) reading as 
follows :
"(iii) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
clause 3 (ii) hereof, within fifteen (15)
days after the Effective Date of Amendment
No. 1 Ferranti shall commence supplying the 
other Software Package PMS (Process 
Mamagement System) listed in the Second 
Schedule hereto auid shall supply all
modifications auid additions made by Ferrauiti 
to that Software Package during the period of 
two years after the date of signature of 
Amendment No. 1."
1.4 In Clause 4 (i), lines 6 auid 7, delete the words
"within a period of two years after the Effective Date
hereof" auid substitute therefore the words "before the 
31st December 1976."
1.5 In Clause 9 (i), line 2 delete the words "auid the 
ARGUS 700S modules".
1.6 In Clause 9 (i) delete sub-paragraphs (b) (c) auid
(d) auid substitute therefor the following;-
"(b) 19,500 Pounds Sterling on or before 30th 
June 1976"
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"(c) 16,250 Pounds Sterling on or before 1st 
September 1975"
"(d) 16,250 Pounds Sterling on or before 1st
September 1977"
1.7 In Clause 9 add a new sub-clause (vii) 
reading as follows:
"(viii) Notwithstanding the
provisions of Clause 9 (iii) 
hereof, in respect of the supply of 
the other Software Package PMS 
(Process Management System) listed 
in the Second Schedule hereto Cobra 
shall pay to Ferranti the sum of 
one hundred thousand pounds 
sterling ( 100,000) which sum shall 
be paid in eight equal successive 
quarterly instalments, the first of 
such instalments to be paid within 
fifteen (15) days after the 
Effective Date of Amendment No. 1 "
2. Ferrauiti has completed the supply to Cobra of 
Technical Information in respect of the ARGUS 700T/E 
modules except in respect of those modules marked with 
a +. Ferrauiti shall complete the supply to Cobra of
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Technical Information in respect of those Argus 700T/E 
modules marked with a + within ninety (90) days after 
the Effective Date of this Amendment No.l.
3. If at amy time within a period of 24 months after 
the Effective Date of this Amendment No. 1 Cobra cam 
show to the reasonable satisfaction of Ferramti that 
Ferramti has omitted to supply amy of the Technical
Information in respect of the Argus 700T/E modules
which should have been supplied pursuant to the
Assistance Agreement or to this Amendment No.l, 
Ferramti shall promptly rectify such omission to the 
extent that it still has such information in its 
possession.
4. The Effective Date of this Amendment No. 1 shall be 
the date on which Cobra notifies Ferramti that this 
Amendment No. 1 has been registered by the Institute 
Nacional da Propriedade Industrial (INPI) amd by the 
Banco Central do Brasil.
5. This Amendment No. 1 amd its operation thereof 
shall be interpreted in accordance with the Laws of
Brazil.
6. The jurisdiction for the present Amendment No. 1 is 
the one of the city of Rio de Jameiro, Brazil.
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Therefore in witness thereof, the parties sign the 
present Amendment No. 1 in 8 (eight) copies, 4 (four) 
in Portuguese, 4 (four) in English, in the presence of 
the below mentioned witnesses.





LEGISLATION ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (INPI) 
Normative Act No. 15 
The President of the INPI, exercising his 
attributions and in view of the provisions of article 
2, sole paragraph, of Law No. 5.648 of December 11, 
1970, cuid of article 126 of Law No. 5772 of December 
21, 1971, and:
Whereas the main purpose of the INPI is to 
execute the norms governing industrial property, 
bearing in mind its social, economic, juridical amd 
technical function;
Whereas as part of this purpose it is also 
competent, by law, to adopt measures to regulate auid 
accelerate the transfer of technology, whether of 
foreign or domestic origin, while observing the 
priorities established in the national interest;
Whereas the directives established in the II 
PND - 2nd National Development Plan - are aimed, aunong 
other objectives, at enabling the production system to 
attain new levels, closely linked to the technological 
progress of the country:
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Whereas the parameters and criteria which, 
intended principally to control the contracting of the 
tramsfer of technology, will also act as guidelines to 
the contracting parties, so that they cam adapt the
terms amd conditions of the agreements to current legal
principles, amd also therefore to the Government's 
policy for the transfer of industrial technology amd to 
the economic-financial policy of the country, in whole 
or in part;
Whereas it is necessary to enable the INPI to 
observe the flux in the supply amd demamd of 
technology, resolves:
I - to establish basic principles amd to 
issue norms for the registration of agreements for the 
tramsfer of technology amd related agreements, in 
accordance with the Industrial Property Code (Law 
5.772/71).
1. - The registration of am agreement is the 
condition for:
a) legalizing the payments arising therefrom, 
whether within the country or abroad, in 
either case observing prevailing legal 
provisions amd restrictions;
b) allowing, when applicable, tax deductions, 
observing the norms established by specific 
legislation;
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c) giving evidence, when necessary, of the 
actual exploitation of the patent or the 
actual use of the trademark, in the country, 
observing the other conditions stipulated by 
the Industrial Property Code.
1.1 - Agreements for the tramsfer of 
technology amd related agreements are classified 
basically according to their objects, in five 
categories, for the purpose of registration:
a) licence agreements for the exploitation of 
a patent;
b) licence agreements for the use of a 
trademark;
c) agreements for the supply of industrial 
technology;
d) agreements for technical-industrial 
co-operation;
e) specialized technical services agreements.
1.1.1 - The provisions which apply to each 
object are quite distinct, and must correspond 
specifically to one single agreement in the appropriate 
category.
1.1.2 - In the case of an agreement as
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provided for in paragraph e), where the parties are 
resident or domicilied in the country, the agreement is 
only subject to registration by the INPI when the 
technical services are directly related to activities 
which are an integral part of the production system.
1.2 - If the licensor, supplier, co-operator 
or party rendering services controls or participates in 
the capital, whether directly or indirectly, the 
following situations will be taken into consideration, 




1.3 - The following are subject to 
registration:
a) agreements in which the parties are
resident or domicilied in Brazil;
b) agreements in which the licensor, supplier 
of technology or supplier of specialized
technical services is resident or domicilied 
abroad;
c) agreements in which the licensor, supplier 
of technology or supplier of specialized
technical services is resident or domicilied 
in the country.
1.3.1 - In the case of agreements provided
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for in paragraph c), registration of the agreement is 
not subject to the remaining provisions of this 
Normative Act.
5. - Principles and basic conditions of
agreement for technical-industrial co-operation.
5.1 - An agreement "for technical-industrial 
co-operation" is an agreement for the specific purpose 
of acquiring knowledge, know-how amd services required 
for the manufacture to order of industrial units amd 
sub-units, machines, equipment and corresponding 
components, amd other capital goods.
5.1.1 - The agreement must include 
principally:
a) the supply of all the technical data, 
drawings and engineering specifications for 
the "product" amd the materials used for its 
manufacture, as well as all the methodology 
of the technological development employed to 
obtain the saune (calculation notes, etc);
b) the supply of data amd information to 
up-date the product;
c) the rendering of technical assistance by 
technicians of the supplier amd the training 
of specialized technical personnel of the
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recipient compamy.
5.1.2 - If coming from abroad, the services 
to be produced must:
a) correspond to levels which cam not be 
attained or obtained in the country, which 
shall be verified by comparing it with 
actual, available national capacity to 
achieve the saune or with already existing 
alternative sources;
b) bring, within the short term, real 
advamtages for the development of the sector, 
in line with the objectives of national plams 
or policy for industrial technology amd 
development;
c) create quality conditions for the product 
resulting from its application, with the 
additional aim of exporting the saune;
d) allow the replacement of imports of the 
product amd of the components required for 
its manufacture.
5.2 - Remuneration: The value of the
remuneration must:
a) when directly linked to the actual 
manufacture of the product resulting from the 
application of the technology, be ascertained 
on a percentage basis or as a fixed amount
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per product unit, in either case being due on 
or in proportion to the net sales price, net 
sales receipt, or, when applicable, 
correlated with the profits earned by the 
product resulting from the application of the 
technology; (NOTE: For the purpose of
calculating the remuneration "net price" 
shall mean the value of the invoicing, based 
on the actual sales, less the taxes, charges, 
components amd raw materials imported either 
from the supplier of the technology or from 
amy other source directly or indirectly 
linked to the supplier, comissions, return 
credits, freight, insurance amd packaging 
expenses, as well as amy other deductions 
which may be agreed between the contracting 
parties;)
b) when a fixed price, on the basis of "cost 
plus fixed fee", exclude amy other forms of 
payment based on percentages of the receipt 
or production volume.
5.2.1 - When applicable, a fixed value may be 
established for the technical documentation initially 
supplied, which will represent am advance on the 
remuneration due, as established in paragraph a) of the 
preceding sub-item.
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5.2.2 - The estimate of the total value of 
the remuneration of the technicians of each contracting 
party, must be based on the following criteria:
a) the number of techniciams;
b) am individual daily rate, which must 
observe the criteria amd standards usually 
adopted, including in the country of origin, 
assessed on the basis of the specialization 
amd category of each technician amd the 
nature of the services;
c) am assessment of the period judged to be 
sufficient for the rendering of the technical 
assistance amd the carrying out of the 
personnel training prograunme. (NOTE: When 
the agreement also includes expenses 
connected with the maintenance of foreign 
technicians in the country (daily allowance, 
supplementary allowamce amd others), such 
expenses, which must be estimated on am 
individual basis, shall be paid in 
cruzeiros.)
5.3 - Form of Payment
5.3.1 - of paragraph a) of sub-item 5.2 - in 
accordance with the stipulated periods (quarterly, 
half-yearly or amy other), through duly authenticated 
statements issued by the recipient company, amd, when
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applicable, less the sum paid for the supply of the 
technical documentation.
5.3.2 - of paragraph b) of sub-item 5.2 
after the agreement comes into force, by means of a 
duly legalized invoice, specifying the services
produced and the respective sum.
5.3.3 - of sub-item 5.2.1 - after the
agreement comes into force, either in one lump sum or 
in instalments, by meauis of a duly legalized invoice 
issued by the supplier, evidencing the remittance of 
the technical documentation.
5.3.-4 - of sub-item 5.2.2 - at the same rate 
as the services are actually rendered by the
technicians, by means of an invoice issued by the
supplier, duly itemised and legalized.
5.4 - Term - The contractual bond, which is 
always of a temporary nature, must establish the term 
considered to be necessary to enable the recipient to 
reach the position of being able to master the
technology, by means of its actual absorption, its 
adequate use, amd the attainment of real results 
derived from its incorporation, observing a period of 5 
(five) years, from the actual start of production, 
which may be extended.
5.4.1 - In order to attain this objective.
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the recipient must present separate information on its 
technological capacity (technical-administrative
infrastructure), with an explicit time-scheme for the 
absorption of the technology and the carrying out of 
the prograunme for training its specialized technical 
personnel.
5.4.2 - To this saune end, and in the case of 
aui extension being permitted, the applicable criterion 
shall be that of remuneration decreasing over the 
period, so as to allow a greater participation by 
engineering produced in the country.
5.4.3 - In the case of the supply of services 
connected with product engineering to companies 
manufacturing capital goods amd corresponding 
components, amd so as to further the recipient's 
mastery of the technology to be transferred, the 
services must be rendered to such compamies, except if 
it is shown that such companies do not possess the 
required technical-administrative capacity, in which 
case the technology must be contracted by or through a 
national engineering amd/or consulting firm, having in 
mind the actual absorption of the technology.
5.4.4 - The INPI reserves the right, at amy 
time during the term of the agreement, to observe, 
either directly or through a duly competent authority 
or entity, the development of the time-scheme for the
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absorption of the technology amd the specialized
technical personnel training prograunme.
5.5 - Other Basic Conditions
5.5.1 - The agreement must:
a) explicitly define, amd give the extent or 
details of, the set of data amd technical 
information related to the technology and 
services to be transferred, as well as
specify precisely amd clearly the scope or 
field of activity, in the country amd aüaroad, 
of the technicians who will actually render 
the technical assistance amd carry out the 
prograunme for training specialized
technicians of the recipient, aimed at the 
subsequent absorption of the technology;
b) identify correctly amd fully the product 
or products, as well as the activity or 
industrial sector in which the technology 
shall be applied;
c) provide for the supply of supplementary 
data amd technical information, linked 
specifically to the technology transferred
and the services produced; (NOTE: If such
innovations are also the object of a patent
in Brazil, a specific "licence agreement" 
will also have to be drawn up in respect
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thereof, observing the conditions for 
agreements of this nature, except for the 
remuneration);
d) contain a clause to the effect that it is 
compulsory for the supplier, during the term 
of the agreement, to render technical 
assistance to the recipient, so as to ensure 
the best use of the transferred technology;
d) make suitable provision for the content of 
the technology to be transferred and the 
services to be produced, to be total, 
complete and adequate, so as to ensure the 
attainment of the established ends and the 
autonomy indispensable thereto;
f) include a guarantee to the effect that the 
supplier may not at any time claim any 
industrial property rights which may be 
connected with the contents of the technology 
transferred, except in respect of any details 
of the product or any future innovations 
linked to such product, provided that these 
are regularly protected in Brazil amd in the 
supplier's country of residence or domicile, 
amd that they are covered by licence 
agreements ;
g) determine which party is liable for the
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payment of income tax due in Brazil;
h) define and clarify any other 
responsibilities and obligations, whether of 
the supplier or the recipient of the 
technology auid the services.
5.5.2 - The agreement may not:
a) include either implicitly or explicitly, 
auiy reference to industrial property rights, 
such as "licence", "granting of licence or 
rights", "licensed product or process", 
"patented information", "industrial property 
rights protected against third parties", 
"manufactured under licence from", auid 
others, such as are usually adopted in a 
'license agreement';
(Note (1) Not withstauiding the provisions of 
paragraph a) aÜ30ve, the agreement may 
indicate the patent held by the supplier of 
the technology only in its country of 
origin; )
(2) If the product is completed by a 
component or contains some element which is 
the object of a patent regularly filed or 
granted in Brazil, a royalty -free licence 
agreement must be signed, in accordance with
- 421 -
the conditions for an agreement of this kind;
b) contain a clause to the effect that it is 
compulsory for the recipient to assign, free 
of charge, the innovations, improvements or 
developments obtained in the country with 
respect to the technology transferred and the 
services produced, which may be transmitted 
to the supplier under the same conditions as 
those applicable to the technology 
transferred auid the services produced;
c) provide for the performance of any other 
service or for amy other agreement or 
negotiation between the parties, which is 
unrelated to the object of the agreement;
d) contain any clause which, implicitly or 
explicitly, restricts auid/or prevents the 
supply of the technology and the services, or 
the activities of the recipient, which are 
referred to, directly or indirectly, by Law 
No. 5.772/71 (Industrial Property Code) amd 
Law No. 4.137/62 (Governs repression of abuse 
of Economic Power), principally that which:
i) regulates, determines, alters or limits 
the production, sale, price, publicity or 
divulgation, distribution, marketing or 
export, as well as the hiring of personnel
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cuid the reservation or distribution of 
markets or the exclusion of any market, 
except, in the last case, when permitted by 
industrial property legislation, when it can 
be proved to be required by specific 
legislation of the supplier's country, or 
when resulting from an international act or 
agreement to which Brazil is a party;
ii) stipulates as a condition or obligation 
the purchase of raw materials or components 
required for the manufacture of the product, 
or of machines auid equipment, from the
supplier of the technology and/or from amy 
other source it may determine, including
domestic sources;
iii) imposes the use of a foreign trademark 
or publicity slogam as a condition for the 
supply of the technology and the services;
iv) contains provision liable to limit, 
control, alter, interrupt or hinder the
research amd technological development policy 
and activities of the recipient of the 
technology and the services;
v) is designed to prevent the recipient from 
contesting, whether administratively or 
through judicial proceedings, the industrial
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property rights claimed or obtained in the 
country by the supplier of the technology;
vi) prohibits the free use of the technology 
and the services when a reasonable period has 
elapsed after each trauisfer of the latest
information;
vii) exempts the supplier from liability for 
cuiy faults or defects inherent in the 
technological content of the agreement, or in 
respect of any actions brought by third 
parties for the infringement of industrial
property rights.
II - Agreements in other categories, as well 
as other contractual conditions and terms not
specifically provided for or covered by this Normative 
Act, shall be submitted to the prior examination of the 
INPI, for the necessary guidance.
III - This Normative Act will come into force 
on the data of its publication.
September 11th, 1975 The president of INPI
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APPENDIX 3. THE INTERVIEW GUIDE
0  I G E N E R A L  I N F O R M A T I O N
G e n e r a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  on the c o m p a n y ,  its o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  h i s t o r y ,  
e x p e r i e n c e  in t e c h n o l o g i c a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s , e t c .
Major products and markets, market share for the main products, 
characteristics of the market, nature of competition,etc.
0 2 G E N E R A L  I N F O R M A T I O N
1
O w n e r s h i p  of t h e  c o m p a n y  a n d  m a j o r  c h a n g e s  in the c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e
T h e  e v o l u t i o n  of t h e  c o m p a n y ,  in terras of n u m b e r  of e m p l o y e e s ,  s a l e s ,  
f i n a n c i a l  i n d i c a t o r s ,  etc.
0 3 FACTORS AFFECTING THE TRANSFER PROCESS
P l e a s e  d e s c r i b e  the m a j o r  f a ct o r s  a f f e c t i n g  p o s i t i v e l y  i f a c i l i t a t i n g ,  
h e l p i n g  ) the t r a n s m i s s i o n  of t e c h n o l o g y ,  at the initial i _ 1-
i n t e r m e d i a r y  ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 #  ), and c u r r e n t  ( 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 # 0  ) s t a g e s  of tiie 
t r a n s f e r  p r o c e s s .
04 FACTORS AFFECTING THE TRANSFER PROCESS
P l e a s e  d e s c r i b e  t he m a j o r  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  n e g a t i v e l y  ( i n h i b i t i n g   ̂
i m p e d i n g  ) the t r a n s m i s s i o n  of t e c h n o l o g y ,  at. t:he initial ( 1 !'/'■
i n t e r m e d i a r y  ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 #  ), and c u r r e n t  ( 1 9 7 9 - 1 9 # 0  ) s t a g e s  of r he 
t r a n s f e r  p r o c e s s .
0 5 F A C T O R #  A F F E C T I N G  T H E  T R A N # P E R  I'ROC'C
I'leaoc indicate the e x t e n t  l,o v/hich the follow ng fan torn i-i: 
n e u t r a l  or n e g a t i v e  effect, on the p r o c e s s  of t r a n s f e r r i n g  'ect.: , , o:
the initial ( 1 9 7 ^ - 1 9 7 ^  ), i n t e r m e d i a r y  1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 #  ), and c u -v - - ■ T 
- 1 9 8 0  ) stages of the t r a n s f e r e n c e .  O O O O O O O O C ]
—  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  +
T h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d  of 
the i n d i v i d u a l s  a c q u i r i n g  the 
t e c h n o l o g y .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
The t r a i n i n g  l e v e l s  of the 
i n d i v i d u a l s  in c o m p u t e r  
t e c h n o l o g y .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e  
in i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  of 
t h e  r e c i p i e n t s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9
T he t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o m p l e x i t y  
of t he p r o d u c t  a n d  its 
c o m p o n e n t s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o m p l e x i t y  
of t h e  p r o c e s s e s  u s e d  to 
p r o d u c e  c o m p u t e r s .
□  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 6 FACTOR# AFFECTING THE TRAN#FER TOOCE’f
i'Loar.(.' i ndicate the e x t e n t  to which I,hr follow ng f nc torn nod i ooo i ve, 
neutral or n e go t  i ve el'fect on the p r o c e s s  of t ra ns f  e r r  i ng t e c h n o  I or;,y , at 
the initial ( 1974-197' ' ), i nt or m e d  i n ry ( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 #  ), and cu ru-r n  ' ' l^vn 
- 19#0 ) s t a g e s  of the t r a n s f e r e n c e . □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
—  1 2 3 4  5 6 7 0 9  +
T h e  d e g r e e  of o w n e r s h i p  b y 
t he t r a n s f e r o r  of the r e c i p i e n t ' s  
c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of m a n a g e m e n t  
r e s o u r c e s  in t he r e c i p i e n t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9
T h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of e n g i n e e r i n g  
a n d  t e c h n i c a l  r e s o u r c e s  in the 
r e c i p i e n t  o r g a n i z a t i o n .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9
T he a v a i l a b i l i t y  of o t h e r  h u m a n  
r e s o u r c e s  i n  t he r e c i p i e n t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of p a r t s , 
c o m p o n e n t s  a n d  o t h e r  m a t e r i a l  
r e s o u r c e s  f o r  p r o d u c t i o n .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 7 FACTOR# AFFECTING THE TRAN#FER mOCE#:
i lease I ndicate the oxt.ent; to wh , eh the; f'f)Mov; ne I'ac to"s na,i -, ; ns •. ve, 
neutral or n e go t  1 vo effect, on the pr'ocesr. of t ra ns f  err- in'' '.''chno 1 o* ;,v , at, 
the initial ( 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 #  ), i n t e r m e d i a r y   ̂ 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 #  ), and c u r r e n t  '
- 1 9 8 0  ) s t a g e s  of the t r a n s f e r e n c e .  □ □ □ □ □ C U C I I D D
—  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 9  +
T he g e n e r a l  c o l l e c t i v e  
i d e o l o g y  of the nation.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
The g e n e r a l  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d  
f o r e i g n e r s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ D D D D
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of s c h o o l s ,  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  , etc, p r o v i d i n g  
f o r m a l  e d u c a t i o n .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t r a i n i n g  
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  p r o v i d i n g  
s p e c i a l i z e d  c o u r s e s ,  etc.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The g e n e r a l  p o l i t i c a l  
c l i m a t e  i n  the r e c i p i e n t  
c o u n t r y .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
0 8 FACTOR.# AFFECTING THE TRANOFER mOCTC
1 Lease.' ndicat-e the extent to which the follow nr factor's liad a nos ' . ve, 
neu t ra I or- negative effect on the process of t r-ansferr Ing technology, at 
the initial ( 1974-197# ), intermediary  ̂ 1 977-197# ), and curron*. ' 1^70 
- 19#0 ) stages of the t r a n s f e r e n c e . N□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
—  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  +
T h e  s et of laws, r e g u l a t i o n s  
a nd a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l s  
on t e c h n o l o g i c a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
T h e  e x c h a n g e  c o n t r o l  
r e g u l a t i o n s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T h e  i m p o r t  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  t a r i f f s ,  
i m po r t  duties', etc.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T h e  l e g a l  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
c o n t r o l s  on r e m i t t a n c e  of 
p r o f i t s  a n d  r o y a l t i e s  abroad.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T he o v e r a l l  s t at e  of the 
e c o n o m y  as r e f l e c t e d  b y  
p r o d u c t i o n  l e ve l s ,  i n fl a t i o n,  etc
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
09 FACTOR# AFFECTING THE TRAN#PER MfOCE#:
iT oa s w  rulicaLo i.hc (jxt.ont, lo w h . c ! 'la; In I I aw nr I'ac Lnrn nan •> nor ' . ve, 
neiJi.ral or n cga t. i vc oi'i'ocl. on t;lie riroconr, of ' r a ns f  err-i ng fochrio I or;;/, at. 
the in tial ( 1 0 7 4 - 1 9 7 #  ) , ' n i.e rmed ' a ry 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 #  ) , and c w r-rcn ' '
- 19#0 ) s t a g e s  of t.he t r a n s f e r e n c e . □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
—  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  +
The g e n e r a l  s t a t e  of the b a l a n c e  
of p a ym e n t s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
The g e n e r a l  s t a t e  of the ma rk e t ,  
l e ve l  of d e m a n d ,  etc.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9
T h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of s u p p l i e r s  
an d  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s  p r o v i d i n g  
s u p p o r t  f o r  t he r e c i p i e n t .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s y s t e m s ,  en er g y ,  etc.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T he a v a i l a b i l i t y  of u n i v e r s i t i e s  
r e s e a r c h  I n st i t u t i o n s ,  etc, 
p r o v i d i n g  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  s u p p o r t  
for i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s .
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □  




This appendix intends to provide operational 
definitions of the variables gathered through personal 
interviews, and a description of the methods of 
measurement and scales employed. Most variables 
described here were measured in relation to three 
periods of time, or the initial (T1 : 1974 - 1976), 
intermediary (T2 : 1977 - 1978), and current (T3: 1979
- 1980) stages of the transfer process.
INFORMATION ON THE ORGANIZATION
These items were designed as a guide for 
collecting general information on the
technology-supplying auid recipient organizations. 
Among these items were information on the organization 
of the company, general history of the organization, 
experience in technological transactions, principal 
products and markets, approximate market share for the 
major products, general characteristics of the market, 
information on the ownership of the company and 
subsequent changes in the capital structure, general 
evolution of the company in terms of number of
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employees, assets, equity, sales, etc. (Questionnaire 
items 01 and 02).
FACTORS AFFECTING THE TRANSFER PROCESS
Seven questionnaire items were utilized for 
assessing the supplier and recipient's perceptions of 
factors influencing positively, neutrally or negatively 
the transference of technological resources. 
Questionnaire items 03 and 04 were designed to gather 
qualitative information, while questionnaire items from 
05 to 09 employed a nine-point semantic differential 
scale (Osgood et al., 1957) varying from negative to 
pos itive.
QUALITATIVE ITEMS. Subjects were asked to 
describe the major factors facilitating (Questionnaire 
item 03) and inhibiting (Questionnaire item 04) the 
trauisfer process, at the initial, intermediary auid 
current stages of transference.
QUANTITATIVE ITEMS. Subjects were asked to 
rate fifteen variables presumed to have a positive, 
neutral or positive influence in the trauisfer process, 
at each stage of the transference. (Questionnaire 
items 05, 06, 07, 08, and 09).
The individual, technological and
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organizational variables were derived from the general 
management literature, while those related to the 
macro-environment were selected from Farmer and 
Richman's (1966) comparative management matrix and 
adapted for the purposes of this research. The 
following variables were included:
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES (IND)
Individuals' Education. Refers to the 
educational background of the individuals acquiring the 
technology.
Individuals' training. Refers to the 
individuals' levels of training in computer technology, 
(computer science, computer engineering and/or computer 
usage technology).
Individuals' Experience. Refers to the 
professional experience in industrial activities of the 
recipients.
TECHNOLOGICAL VARIABLES (TEC)
Product Complexity. Refers to the level of 
technological complexity of the product and its 
components, i.e. hardware modules, printed circuit 
boards, etc.
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Process Complexity. Refers to the level of 
technological complexity of the process used to 
manufacture computers, i.e. assembling procedures, 
testing procedures, etc.
ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES (ORG)
Degree of Ownership. Refers to the degree of 
ownership by the transferor of the recipient's capital 
structure.
McUiagement Resources. Refers to the 
availability of management resources in the recipient 
organization.
Engineering cuid Technical Resources. Refers 
to the availability of engineering amd technical 
manpower in the recipient organization.
Other Humam Resources. Refers to the 
availability of skilled, semi-skilled amd other human 
resources in the recipient organization.
Local Inputs. Refers to the availability of 
parts, components amd other material resources needed 
for production, from local suppliers.
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MACRO-ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES (ENV)
National Ideology. Refers to the general 
collective ideology of the nation as exemplified by 
writing, speaking and other manifestations of a 
national point of view.
View Toward Foreigners. Refers to the general 
attitude towards foreigners as evidenced by overt 
behaviour.
The Formal Educational Infrastructure. Refers 
to the availability of schools, universities amd 
similar institutions providing formal education for the 
labour market.
The Informal Educational Infrastructure. 
Refers to the availability of training establishments 
providing specialized training courses, up-grading 
human resources, etc.
Political Climate. Refers to the general 
political climate in the recipient country.
Technology Transfer Regulations. Refer to 
the set of rules, laws, decrees and administrative 
controls on technology transfer transactions in 
general.
- 438 -
Exchange Control Regulations. Refer to the 
legal and administrative controls on the conversion of 
local currency to foreign currencies.
Import Regulations. Refer to the set of rules 
controlling imports including tariffs, quotas, import 
restrictions, etc.
Royalty and Profit Remission Regulations. 
Refer to the legal and administrative controls on
remittance of profits and royalties to foreign
countr ies.
Economic Conjuncture. Refers to the overall 
state of the economy as reflected by short-term
indicators such as industrial production levels,
inflation patterns, the financial and capital markets, 
etc.
General Balance of Payments Position. Refers 
to the general state of the Balance of Payments, 
surpluses or deficits in the balauice of trade, current 
and capital account, etc.
The Market Environment. Refers to the 
general state of the market, i.e. its characteristics, 
level of demand, etc.
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The Industrial Infrastructure. Refers to the 
availability of suppliers, companies within and outside 
the computer industry, providing support, service, 
external economies, etc.
Physical Infrastructure. Refers to the 
availability of power supplies, water, communication 
systems, transportation, etc.
Technological Infrastructure. Refers to the 
availability of universities, governmental amd private 
research institutions amd other organizations providing 
technological support for industrial enterprises.
SUMMARY MEASURES
In order to test the hypotheses, summary 
measures of individual, technological, organizational 
amd environmental factors were created for each stage 
of the process, for both the supplying amd recipient
groups. These summary measures consisted of the meam
scores of the variables comprising each factor. They 
represented am index of the extent to which, a
particular group perceived, at each stage of the 
process, the set of factors exerting a negative,
neutral or positive influence on the transfer process. 




XXX Refers to the individual (IND), 
technological (TEC), organizational (ORG) or 
environmental (ENV) factors.
N Refers to the Initial (1), intermediary 
(2) or current (3) stages of the transfer 
process.
Thus, '0RG2' refers to the summary measure of 
organizational factors at the intermediary 
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